Douglas Lahnborg is based in London and spends a proportion of his time in the Brussels office, which he founded.

Douglas represents clients before the European Commission and the Competition and Markets Authority in all areas of competition law. He has acted for clients in a broad range of industries, including technology, telecommunications, manufacturing, energy, healthcare, defence and mining.

Chambers UK recognises Douglas as a leading antitrust and competition practitioner. He is also ranked as a leading competition lawyer in Legal 500 UK and Legal Business.

Representative behavioural/contentious cases

  • Enron Coal Services in its private damages claim against English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd before the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. This is the first follow-on action to have reached trial in the UK
  • Sony Europe Limited in its damages action before the High Court against AU Optronics and other LCD manufacturers 
  • Asian technology group in its defence before the EU Commission in the DRAM cartel investigation
  • UK technology group in its defence in a Transatlantic cartel investigation involving the Office of Fair Trading and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice
  • Asian manufacturer in its defence in an animal feed cartel investigation
  • Car parts manufacturer in its defence in global cartel investigations
  • GlaxoSmithKline in the EU Commission’s abuse of dominance investigation into GSK’s enforcement of intellectual property rights relating to paroxetine
  • NVIDIA in the EU Commission’s abuse of dominance investigation into Rambus’ charging of royalty rates
  • Telenor in the EU Commission’s investigation into its long term pay-TV distribution agreements
  • TurboHercules in the EU Commission’s abuse of dominance investigation into IBM’s conduct in mainframe computing

Representative merger control cases

  • Telenor on the combination of its and TeliaSonera's Mobile Network Operators in Denmark, the first "four to three" mobile telephony transaction under Commissioner Vestager
  • Telenor on the creation of two online classified joint ventures in Asia and South America
  • Telenor on the sale of its mobile telecommunications assets in Russia and Ukraine to VimpelCom; its proposed merger with Telia; and on its acquisitions of various European mobile network operators, including Globul, the Bulgarian operator
  • Areva Transmission & Distribution in connection with its break-up acquisition by Schneider Electric and Alstom
  • VTech in the investigation into its completed acquisition of LeapFrog
  • Crane Co., a diversified manufacturer of highly engineered industrial products, in its acquisition of MEI Conlux Holdings, provider of unattended payment systems
  • U-Shin on its acquisition of Valeo’s Vehicle Access Mechanism Business
  • Exxaro Resources on the combination of its mineral sands business with Tronox
  • Venture Production on the hostile takeover bid launched by Centrica
  • Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (now Vale) on its public bid for Inco
  • Ericsson on its mobile handset joint venture with Sony
  • BAE Systems on the restructuring of Airbus; the creation of a rocket propellant joint venture; and its acquisition of United Defense
  • Aviva on its public bid for RAC
  • Temasek on its public bid for P&O Ports
  • Glaxo Wellcome on its merger with SmithKline Beecham 
  • H.J. Heinz on its completed acquisition of HP Foods 
  • Cable & Wireless on its acquisition of telecoms operator Energis

Posts by: Douglas Lahnborg

CMA Obtains Director Disqualification for Breach of Competition Law

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The Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) has today announced that it has secured the first disqualification of a director of a company which has infringed competition law. Under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002), the CMA can apply to the court for a disqualification order to be made against a director in cases where a company has breached competition law and the director’s conduct makes him or her “unfit to be concerned in the management of a company[1]. This is the first time that the CMA has utilised this power.

In this case, poster supplier Trod breached competition law by agreeing with a competitor that they would not undercut each other’s prices for posters and frames sold online, with the agreement between the competitors being implemented using automated re-pricing software. The company received a fine of £163,371 for this behaviour.

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English High Court Allows LCD Damages Action to Proceed

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On 29 July 2016, the High Court of England and Wales delivered its judgment dismissing the applications of two defendants to strike out a follow-on damages case in which the claimant, iiyama, asserts that it suffered losses as a result of the defendants’ alleged participation in the LCD cartel. Iiyama v Samsung [2016] EWHC 1980 (Ch).

The claim follows on from the European Commission’s decision of 8 December 2010, which found that six LCD panel producers had entered into a world-wide price fixing cartel and had implemented that cartel within the EU.  The Commission had been satisfied that the agreement related to direct and indirect sales of LCD panels to companies in the EU.  It also found that the participants in the cartel had sought to implement the cartel within the EU, even if price negotiations took place outside the EU.

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Price Signalling Can Put Companies in Hot Water in the EU

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The long list of practices violating EU competition law just got longer: in Container Shipping, the European Commission confirmed that the unilateral publishing of pricing information, in public media, can violate Article 101 TFEU.[1]

In this case, the Commission expressed concern that the practice of fourteen container liner shipping companies (“Carriers”) to publish intentions to increase prices may harm competition. The Carriers regularly announced intended increases of freight prices on their websites, via the press, or in other ways. The announcements were made several times a year and included the level of increase and the date of implementation. The Carriers were not bound by the announced increases and some of them postponed or modified the price increases after announcement.

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Observations on “Brexit” and the EU/UK Competition Law Regime

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Rightly considered to be a “once in a generation decision,” the UK electorate will on 23 June 2016 have a chance to vote on whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union (“EU”).

This upcoming referendum has resulted in emotional rhetoric and heated discussions in the media (and no doubt around dining tables throughout the UK and elsewhere) on which way to vote, and why. However, what is striking to us is the relative lack of focus on the legal implications of so-called “Brexit,” including on EU and UK competition law.

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Now in force: Major amendments to the antitrust damages regime in the UK

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The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“CRA”) comes into force today, 1 October 2015.1 It introduces major reforms to the antitrust damages actions regime in the UK.2 In particular, the CRA broadens the type of cases that can be heard by the UK’s specialist antitrust court, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the “CAT”), to include opt-out class actions, and makes other procedural amendments aimed at facilitating and streamlining private damages actions in the UK.

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EU’s Highest Court Confirms that Seeking an Injunction for SEPs May Constitute an Abuse of a Dominant Position

On July 16, 2015, the EU’s highest court, the Court of Justice, rendered its long-awaited ruling on whether seeking an injunction for a standard-essential patent (“SEP“) against an alleged patent infringer constitutes an abuse of a dominant position pursuant to Article 102 TFEU.  The judgment was in response to a request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Germany)[1] in the course of a dispute between Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd (“Huawei“) and ZTE Corp. together with its German subsidiary ZTE Deutschland GmbH (together, “ZTE“).

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A Comparison of 10 Key Issues in Civil Price-Fixing Cases Under the EU’s New Antitrust Damages Law and U.S. Antitrust Law

In April 2014, the European Parliament approved legislation governing antitrust damages actions brought in the national courts of European Union Member States. The Parliament’s approval followed several years of debate, and was the last significant hurdle for developing a private damages law for the EU. The Directive requires the approval of the European Council, which will be a formality, at which point it will be formally adopted. EU Member States then have two years to implement it into their national laws. The Directive aims to make it easier for companies and consumers to bring damages actions against companies involved in EU antitrust infringements. The text of the Directive is available here.

There has been a great deal of commentary concerning the extent to which EU private damages law will become like that of the United States—with all of its benefits for those harmed by anticompetitive conduct and all of its burdens for those accused of engaging in the conduct. Now that the Parliament has approved the Directive and the scope and contours of the forthcoming EU law have become clearer, this article compares some of the key features of the new law with U.S. law in price-fixing cases. For simplicity, the article focuses on U.S. federal law, with references to state law only where important. Our discussion of the new EU law similarly omits reference to national laws. Although brevity is the soul of wit, it also can be a source of potentially incomplete short-cuts that can lead to debatable, or even misleading, conclusions. Accordingly, while this article provides a general overview and comparison of some important issues under U.S. and EU law, it is not meant to substitute for independent legal research and analysis. READ MORE

UK Supreme Court Issues First Antitrust Ruling

In October 2012, the UK Supreme Court issued its first antitrust judgment, ruling that the UK statutory limitation period for bringing “follow-on” damages actions—i.e., claims based on antitrust infringement decisions—was sufficiently clear that, under the facts of the case, it did not deprive the claimants of effective redress. This ruling is significant as it is the first time the UK’s highest appeal court has examined antitrust damages claims and shows, alongside several high-profile UK Court of Appeal judgments handed down earlier this year, that the UK courts are gaining experience and confidence in dealing with complex antitrust matters. This increased competence will continue to benefit both claimants and defendants in the form of increased legal certainty in what remains a growing and developing area of EU and UK law.

BCL v. BASF centered on the compatibility of the UK limitation rules for follow-on damages actions with the European Union legal principles of effectiveness and legal certainty. The claimants, BCL Old Co. Limited and others (BCL), brought an action, in 2004, for damages against members of the vitamins cartel other than BASF, following a decision issued by the European Commission in November 2001. BCL did not sue BASF until more than six years after the decision, in March 2008, bringing its action in the UK specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). Pursuant to the CAT’s rules, a claimant wishing to bring such an action must do so within two years from the date on which the decision of the relevant competition authority becomes final, suspended by any appeal brought against the decision. BASF had appealed the Commission’s decision, but only on the level of the fine. BCL argued that it was not clear from the limitation rules that an appeal of the fine alone did not invoke the suspension of the limitation period and that, in any event, it had not been clear at the time the appeal was brought what BASF was appealing against.

In May 2009, the UK Court of Appeal found that BCL’s claim was time-barred and could proceed, if at all, only with an extension to the limitation period granted by the CAT itself. Later that year, the CAT assumed that it did have the power to extend but declined to do so. On appeal of this decision, the Court of Appeal, however, held that the CAT had no such power to extend the statutory deadline for bringing an action before the CAT and that European Union law did not require the CAT to hold such a power.

The UK Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the statutory limitation period and its application violated the claimant’s rights under European Union law principles by rendering it “excessively difficult” for BCL to bring a claim against BASF. The Supreme Court considered that the statutory language was “plain and ordinary” and the legal position was “clear.” It found that the risks to BCL of not bringing a claim against BASF in January 2004 were or should have been evident and the Supreme Court found no evidence that the reason BCL had not brought its claim earlier was actually due to any legal uncertainty. In any event, the Supreme Court held, even if the legal position had not been clear, the only remedy for BCL would have been to bring an action against the UK government. Any uncertainty would not have permitted an action for damages to be brought against BASF at this stage.

The ruling clarifies the CAT limitation period:  An appeal of a Commission decision limited to the level of fine does not suspend the two-year period. By contrast, an appeal on the substance of the infringement, by any addressee of the decision—even if not a defendant in the damages claim—does suspend the limitation period.

The UK Supreme Court and recent Court of Appeal judgments have a number of practical implications for both claimants and defendants in UK private damages actions. First, a claimant will need to review the details of all appeals of any relevant infringement decision to determine whether it is the infringement itself that is the subject of the appeal or merely the level of fine. An appeal of the level of fine will not suspend the CAT limitation period. For potential defendants who did not appeal the Commission’s decision, for example because they were one of the immunity or leniency applicants, this may mean a number of years of uncertainty where they have no influence over the outcome of any appeal. Conversely, a claimant will not be able to proceed with an action before the CAT until the outcome of any appeal brought on the substance of the infringement by one of the decision addressees, even if the claimant did not intend to sue that particular defendant. This may significantly delay any recovery by the claimant through an action brought before the CAT. Instead, a claimant may decide to bring a damages action before the UK High Court, which also has jurisdiction to hear follow-on damages actions, and where a claim is more likely to proceed pending appeals of the underlying infringement decision.

As outlined in previous editions of this Newsletter, the UK regime is currently undergoing significant reform with the planned merger of the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission due to take place as early as spring 2014. The procedure for bringing antitrust damages actions is also currently under review by the UK government with a proposal to expand the CAT’s jurisdiction to hear damages claims that do not arise from a decision by a competition authority (also known as “standalone” claims). The full text of the Supreme Court’s judgment is available here.