In August of 2016, we reported that the Ninth Circuit created a deeper circuit-split on whether class action waivers in arbitration agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) with its decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP.
As expected, the Supreme Court granted review today of three of the conflicting Court of Appeals decisions. It granted review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) position that class action waivers unlawfully interfere with employees’ NLRA rights to engage in concerted activity, agreeing with the Second and Eighth Circuits. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, adopted the NLRB’s position that class action waivers violate the NLRA.
The Supreme Court also granted review in Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). The Seventh Circuit held that an arbitration agreement precluding collective arbitration or collective action violates section 7 of the NLRA and is unenforceable under the FAA. The Ninth Circuit agreed and concluded that compulsory class action waivers violate sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA by limiting workers’ rights to act collectively, noting in footnote 4 that agreements containing an “opt-out” clause for pursuing class claims do not violate the NLRA.
All three cases have been consolidated and will be argued together.
In its first update in 14 years, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued new Enforcement Guidance on National Origin Discrimination (“Enforcement Guidance”) on November 21, 2016, replacing its 2002 Compliance Manual on National Origin Discrimination. With input from approximately 20 organizations and individuals, the Enforcement Guidance addresses important legal developments over the past 14 years on national origin issues ranging from employment decisions and workplace harassment to human trafficking. READ MORE
Can employers still require employees to sign arbitration agreements with class action waivers as a condition of employment? Last week, the Ninth Circuit became the second appellate court to adopt the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) position that class action waivers violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP.
The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) authorizes aggrieved employees to file lawsuits to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves, other employees and the state of California for Labor Code violations. In January, Governor Brown submitted a budget proposal that sought greater oversight of PAGA claims and amendments to the PAGA statute. On June 15, 2016, the California Legislature approved Governor Brown’s budget proposal which included significant amendments to PAGA (Labor Sections 2698-2699.5). SB 836 went into effect on June 27, 2016 and provides:
- The Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), the agency which coordinates workforce programs by overseeing seven major departments that serve California businesses and workers now has 60 days to review a notice under Labor Code § 2699.3(a). Prior to the amendments, the LWDA had 30 days to review. Additionally, the time for the LWDA to investigate a claim is extended to 180 days (it was 120 days);
- A Plaintiff cannot file a civil action until 65 days after sending notice to the LWDA (previously 33 days);
- The LWDA must be provided with a copy of any proposed settlement of a PAGA action at the time it is submitted to the court;
- A copy of the court’s judgment and any other order that awards or denies PAGA penalties must be provided to LWDA;
- All items that are required to be provided to the LWDA must be submitted online, including PAGA claim notices and employer cure notices or other responses;
- A $75 filing fee is required for a new PAGA claim notice and also for any initial employer response to a new PAGA claim notice. The filing fee may be waived if the party on whose behalf the notice or response is filed is entitled to in forma pauperis status; and
- When a plaintiff files a new PAGA lawsuit in court, a filed-stamped copy of the complaint must be provided to LWDA. This requirement only applies to cases in which the initial PAGA claim notice was filed on or after July 1, 2016.
Plaintiff Lynne Coates filed a class action lawsuit against Farmers on April 29, 2015 alleging gender discrimination claims under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, including violations of the federal and California equal pay acts and California’s Private Attorneys General Act. In this post on Orrick’s Equal Pay Pulse blog, Orrick attorneys Erin Connell, Allison Riechert Giese and Megan Lawson examine Coates v. Farmers and what it means for employers as well as future equal pay claims in California.
Earlier this month, the EEOC filed its first lawsuits against employers alleging sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, arguing that Title VII’s protections extend to sexual orientation as a form of gender bias. In the lawsuit against Scott Medical Health Center filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the EEOC alleges that a gay male employee was subjected to harassment, including anti-gay epithets, because of his sexual orientation. In the suit against Pallet Companies d/b/a/ IFCO Systems filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the EEOC alleges that a supervisor harassed a lesbian employee because of her sexual orientation, including making numerous comments about her sexual orientation and appearance. The EEOC alleges that the employers violated Title VII, which extends protection to workers who are discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. In both cases, the EEOC takes the position that sexual orientation discrimination necessarily entails treating employees less favorably because of their sex, thus triggering Title VII’s protections.
From coast to coast, as the calendar turned to 2016, a host of new employment laws became effective. States and local government are imposing broad obligations on employers well above what federal law requires. This patchwork of legal requirements will continue to bedevil employers. As you begin implementing your resolutions for 2016, here’s our take on the major changes that went into effect across the nation last week:
Emeryville will join San Francisco, Oakland and other cities across the nation that have enacted paid sick leave ordinances. On June 2, 2015, the city of Emeryville adopted its Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Leave Ordinance which goes into effect on July 1, 2015 (with enforcement starting July 2). Yes, you read that right: it goes into effect only a month after it was adopted! READ MORE
The new California paid sick leave law is now “in effect” (as we reported here and here) and you are ramping up your HR and payroll team to get ready for July 1 when employees can start accruing sick leave under the law. But now that you’re digging into the details, you’re realizing that this isn’t as easy as you thought. Don’t worry, you’re not alone. There are a few subtleties to the sick leave law that are catching more than a few employers off guard. But fear not, here are some tips to help you implement your sick leave plan:
Following up on our recent post regarding pregnancy discrimination developments, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued the Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues on July 14, 2014. This is the first comprehensive update of the EEOC’s guidance on discrimination against pregnant workers in thirty years, since its 1983 Compliance Manual chapter. One major development in the new Enforcement Guidance is that pregnancy discrimination claims are not limited to the current pregnancy under the PDA – they can be based on “past pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Thus, the EEOC will more likely find a causal connection between a past pregnancy and the challenged employment action if there is close timing between the two, however a longer time gap between the pregnancy and the challenged action will not foreclose a finding of pregnancy discrimination.