The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335, prohibits discrimination against members of the U.S. military and imposes various obligations on employers with respect to service members returning to their civilian workplace.
USERRA differs from other employment laws (e.g., Title VII, ADEA) in multiple respects. For example, USERRA has no statute of limitations of any kind for claims that accrued after October 10, 2008 (and claims that accrued after October 10, 2004 may be timely as well). See 38 U.S.C. § 4327(b); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.311. Also, USERRA applies to all public and private employers, irrespective of size. Therefore, “an employer with only one employee is covered….” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.34(a). READ MORE
The prognostication efforts are going into high gear as employers seek to forecast and prepare where the Department of Labor may land on its final overtime rules. As with all rules in the post-comment phase, government officials have not given any indication on when the final rules will be published (and become effective) or what they will contain. Our insight is the final rule will be published ahead of schedule before the July regulatory agenda date, perhaps as soon as later this month. The Congressional Review Act deadlines (described here) strongly indicate that the DOL will seek to avoid the prospect of any effective congressional action on the final rules. As to the final rule’s content, we believe that the Office of Management and Budget and DOL are taking into account the political winds and other considerations before making a final decision. Once published, however, the DOL can set the effective dates as early as 60 days which would give employers a very difficult compliance burden.
The EEOC seeks public comment on its new Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, which will supersede the agency’s last-issued guidance on the topic from 1998. The updated guidance addresses several significant rulings by the Supreme Court and lower courts from the past two decades. The guidance was also informed by public input on retaliation and best practices that the Commission gathered from its June 17, 2015 meeting on “Retaliation in the Workplace: Causes, Remedies, and Strategies for Prevention.” The 30-day input period on the guidance ends on February 24, 2016.
On May 4, 2015, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District, holding that unsuccessful FEHA plaintiffs should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s ordinary litigation costs unless, “plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit” (also called “the Christianburg standard”). (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 97, 99-100. Prior to Williams, the Christianburg standard applied when defendants sought attorneys’ fees after prevailing on the merits of a FEHA claim, but there was a split in authority regarding whether the higher threshold in Christianburg applied to awards of ordinary costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. Williams resolved the split and held that FEHA constitutes an exception to section 1032 and that defendants must meet the higher threshold in Christianburg before the court can exercise its discretion in awarding costs.
On Tuesday, August 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a directive to “clarify that existing agency guidance on discrimination on the basis of sex . . . includes discrimination on the bases of gender identity and transgender status.” This directive follows President Obama’s Executive Order 13672, issued on July 21, 2014, amending existing orders to specifically prohibit federal contractors from discriminating based on gender identity.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on March 3, 2014 in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Jesse Busk to resolve a federal circuit split on whether time employees spend in security screenings is compensable under the FLSA. The issue is whether security screenings are quintessential “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities that are non-compensable under the FLSA (as held by the Second and Eleventh Circuits) or whether time spent in security screenings is potentially compensable because it is “integral and indispensable” to an employee’s principal job duties (as held by the Ninth Circuit). READ MORE
Last week, the EEOC suffered another major loss when a New York district court found that the EEOC once again shirked its pre-litigation obligations under Title VII. READ MORE
Twice in one week, the California Court of Appeal sided with employees in two cases against grocery giant, Safeway Inc. READ MORE
A recent opinion by the Seventh Circuit holds that the standard for certifying a collective action under the FLSA is the same as the standard applied to a class action under Rule 23. In Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, No. 12-1943 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013), the court considered decertification by a Western District of Wisconsin District Court of more than 2,000 satellite technicians in an action alleging technicians did not receive overtime and were not compensated for certain hours. In analyzing the standard to apply in evaluating the decertification decision, the court contrasted the opt-in procedure of FLSA collective actions with the opt-out procedure of Rule 23 actions, as well as noted that the FLSA lacks “the kind of detailed procedural provisions found in Rule 23” that set forth the standard for certification. READ MORE
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on June 25, 2012 in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk to resolve a federal circuit split on whether an FLSA collective action is mooted when the lone plaintiff receives from defendants an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 that satisfies the plaintiff’s claims. Under Rule 68, a defendant may offer judgment against it on specified terms. If the offer is accepted, judgment is entered on the terms offered. If the offer is not accepted, plaintiff is liable for post-offer costs if the plaintiff fails to ultimately obtain a judgment more favorable than the offer. READ MORE