As employers welcome a new group of eager interns to their offices this summer, employers may be thinking about the recent wave of class action lawsuits alleging that unpaid internships violate minimum wage and overtime laws. Should these claims be litigated on a classwide basis? Read More
Earlier this month in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is permissible for defendants to “pick off” plaintiffs in FLSA collective actions. In jurisdictions that hold that an unaccepted offer of judgment fully satisfies and renders moot a plaintiff’s individual claim, a defendant can moot a collective action brought under the FLSA by simply tendering the named plaintiff a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment. Read More
The ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) expanded more than just employer liability for disability claims; it also broadened the scope of FMLA leave that employees may take to care for their adult children. On January 14, 2013, the Department of Labor clarified that the age of the onset of a disability is irrelevant to determining whether an individual is considered a “son or daughter” under the FMLA. See Dept. of Labor Wage and Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2013-1. Read More
The United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, Case No. 11-864 (March 27, 2013) reinforces class certification requirements as spelled out in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. However, the closely divided court (5-4) and a strong dissent underscore that the battle over class certification standards may be far from over. While Comcast involved antitrust claims, the Court’s decision has implications for all Rule 23 cases, including employment class actions. Read More
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles confirms that a plaintiff cannot avoid federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) by stipulating that the class will seek less than CAFA’s $5 million amount in controversy threshold. Read More
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Wang v. Chinese Daily News is the latest to affirm that Wal-Mart v. Dukes is controlling in wage-and-hour class action cases. Read More
Earlier last month, the California Supreme Court denied petitions to review and depublish the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District’s decision in See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 4th 889 (2012), a case of first impression on whether an employer can round an employee’s clocked time under California law. As a result, the Court of Appeal’s decision on the topic of employers’ rounding of employee time entries remains the law of the land in California.
On October 29, 2012, the California Court of Appeal confirmed that California law—like federal law—permits an employer to implement a policy rounding its employees’ recorded time so long as the policy is neutrally applied and does not systematically under-compensate employees for time worked.
The plaintiff in See’s Candy hoped to blunt this helpful precedent by asking the California Supreme Court to depublish the Court of Appeal’s ruling. However, thanks to the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s petitions, employers and courts may continue to look to See’s Candy for guidance in the implementation of their timekeeping policies.
Last week in Green v. Bank of America Corp., No. 11.56365 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that “suitable seats” lawsuits cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage based on an employee’s failure to allege that he or she requested suitable seating. The Ninth Circuit’s reversal raises significant questions regarding one of the more common employer defenses to the recent wave of “suitable seats” litigation based upon IWC Wage Order 7-2001.
Filed in April 2011, the plaintiffs in Green raised standard “suitable seats” allegations by claiming Bank of America failed to comply with the requirement of Section 14 of IWC Wage Order 7-2001 that employees be provided with “suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits use of seats.” The district court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss, holding that the bank only needed to provide tellers access to seats if seats were requested. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court mistakenly assumed a requirement that employees allege that they requested seats where the text of the Wage Order does not expressly require such a request. The Court’s brief opinion also clarified that its reversal did not present an opinion on whether any seating provided to the employees was “suitable” or whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits use of seats” because these issues would be developed at the district court upon remand.
Though Green is confined to its context and should not be read to preclude employers from raising the defense of a failure to request suitable seating, it nonetheless raises the critical question of whether employers have an affirmative obligation to provide suitable seats in the absence of any employee requests. As more “suitable seats” lawsuits reach the summary judgment and trial stages, and as state appellate courts begin to take up the issue, employers should expect more clarity. In the meantime, employers should stay tuned for further updates regarding this rapidly changing area of employment law.
A recent opinion by the Seventh Circuit holds that the standard for certifying a collective action under the FLSA is the same as the standard applied to a class action under Rule 23. In Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, No. 12-1943 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013), the court considered decertification by a Western District of Wisconsin District Court of more than 2,000 satellite technicians in an action alleging technicians did not receive overtime and were not compensated for certain hours. In analyzing the standard to apply in evaluating the decertification decision, the court contrasted the opt-in procedure of FLSA collective actions with the opt-out procedure of Rule 23 actions, as well as noted that the FLSA lacks “the kind of detailed procedural provisions found in Rule 23” that set forth the standard for certification. Read More
A recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision striking down several recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board has cast doubt over one of the NLRB’s most controversial decisions from 2012.
In Noel Canning v. NLRB, F. 3d (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), the D.C. Circuit held that President Obama lacked constitutional authority to use recess appointments to name three new members to the NLRB because the vacancies did not arise, and the appointments were not made, during a “Recess of the Senate,” which is defined as “the period between sessions that would end with the ensuing session of the Senate.” Slip op. at 18; 39-40. As a result, the court held that the NLRB lacked a quorum when it decided the underlying case, rendering its decision void ab initio.
The holding in Noel Canning raises questions about the viability of In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 184 – 2012, one of the most widely discussed NLRB decisions of 2012. In D.R. Horton, the Board held that arbitration clauses that prohibit employees from pursuing class or collective actions violate employee rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to engage in protected concerted activity. D.R. Horton’s appeal will be heard by the Fifth Circuit on February 4.
D.R. Horton was decided the day before President Obama made the recess appointments at issue in Noel Canning. However, Craig Becker, one of the three NLRB members who decided D.R. Horton, was the subject of an earlier recess appointment in 2010. D.R. Horton filed a letter with the Fifth Circuit on January 29, 2013, arguing that the holding in Noel Canning should be applied to Becker’s appointment and render the decision void. The Fifth Circuit is expected to address this issue together with D.R. Horton’s existing arguments during oral argument on February 4.