Ever have that feeling that your arbitrator just doesn’t understand you? You may be right, but there’s not much you can do about it. A recent unanimous ruling by the United States Supreme Court should encourage employers to review the language in their arbitration agreements to ensure clarity on the issue of class arbitration. In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, No. 12-135, slip op. at 4-5, 8-9 (U.S. June 10, 2013), the Supreme Court reiterated that parties who agree to arbitration and ask the arbitrator to decide an issue are stuck with the “good, bad, or ugly” decision of the arbitrator. Even where, as in this case, the arbitrator makes a dubious decision that the parties’ contract allows class arbitration, Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(4) does not allow a court to second-guess that decision.
Sutter, a pediatrician, and Oxford Health Plans, an insurance company, entered into a contract for services that included the following arbitration clause: “[n]o civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration . . . .” Id. at 1-2. Later, Sutter brought suit in state court on behalf of himself and a proposed class of other doctors alleging that Oxford Health Plans had violated their contracts and various state laws. Id. Upon Oxford Health Plans’ motion, the case was compelled to arbitration. Id. at 2. Critically, the parties agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether their contract authorized class arbitration, and the arbitrator determined that, based on the terms of the clause quoted above, it did. See id. at 2, 3. Oxford Health Plans brought a motion in federal court arguing the arbitrator’s decision should be vacated on the ground that he had “exceeded [his] powers” under Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(4). Id. Read More
Reversing a denial of a motion to compel arbitration in Parisi et al. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. et al., the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff does not have a substantive right to bring a pattern and practice claim under Title VII. The plaintiff at issue in Parisi alleged gender discrimination under Title VII, seeking to bring her claims on behalf of herself and a putative class of female Goldman Sachs employees. During her employment, the plaintiff signed a broad arbitration agreement, which covered her discrimination claims and did not contain a provision providing for class-wide arbitration. Read More
Employers in California have been watching closely to see how courts will apply the United States Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), which held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state law concerning the enforceability of class action waiver provisions, in which a party waives his or her right to arbitrate claims on a class basis. Read More
In a succinct opinion issued on November 26, 2012, the Supreme Court delivered a stern warning to state courts that fail to enforce arbitration clauses accompanying noncompetition agreements. In Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. ____ (2012), the employment contracts between two energy-sector employees and their employer contained a two-year noncompetition provision and a mandatory arbitration clause. After the employees joined a competitor, the employer commenced an arbitration proceeding, prompting the employees to bring suit in Oklahoma state court seeking an injunction preventing enforcement of the noncompetition agreements. Despite the mandatory arbitration clauses, Oklahoma’s highest court declared the noncompetition agreements unenforceable under a state law prohibiting restraints on an employee’s ability to work in the same industry. Read More
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, more and more employers have sought to get out of court and into arbitration when dealing with employee disputes. The California Courts of Appeal, however, are not making that easy when it comes to an employer’s burden to show the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. Several months ago, the Second Appellate District held in Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services that an arbitration policy in an employee handbook was not enough to force arbitration. Similar decisions have reached the same conclusion, e.g., Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., (5th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012). Read More
In a July 30, 2012 decision the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal ruled that an employee was not bound by the arbitration clause in his employee handbook for a slew of reasons:
the clause itself was buried (or as the Court said “not specifically highlighted”) in a lengthy handbook and was not called to the employee’s attention;
the employee did not specifically acknowledge the clause or agree to arbitrate, but merely signed an acknowledgment of receipt of the handbook itself;
the handbook contained a (relatively) standard clause that it was not intended to create a contract but, the employer also “had it both ways” and retained the rights to unilaterally amend the handbook’s provisions;
the employer failed to provide the employee with the specific arbitration rules; and
the clause itself was found unconscionable: procedurally, because the employer did not distribute the rules governing the arbitration to employees and because the issue of arbitration was not negotiable and, substantively, because it required the employee to relinquish administrative and judicial rights and made no express provision for discovery rights.
While this decision points out the pitfalls of this particular factual scenario, it also highlights some nuances. As courts reinvigorate their scrutiny of arbitration clauses and agreements, due to what this Court called “the increasing phenomenon of depriving employees of the right to a judicial forum,” employers may want to revisit and revise their handbook language.
In its landmark Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that courts must enforce private agreements to arbitrate according to their terms, even if doing so results in the enforcement of a class action waiver provision or otherwise compels a plaintiff to arbitrate her claims on an individual basis. Perhaps the biggest issue facing California employers since Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen has been whether Gentry v. Superior Court – in which the California Supreme Court articulated a four-factor test for invalidating class arbitration waivers – remains viable. Thus far, California and federal courts addressing Gentry in light of Concepcion have done so in one of two diametrically-opposed ways: by upholding Gentry’s rationale and applying it, or by declaring its end. Read More
A California Court of Appeal recently required a plaintiff to forego class and representative action claims in Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., No. A132927 (Cal. App. July 18, 2012) finding that she failed to show the employer’s arbitration agreement was unconscionable or that compelling individual arbitration would violate state or federal law or public policy. Knocking down the attempt to keep class and representative claims alive in either a judicial or arbitration proceeding, the First Appellate District held that all of the plaintiff’s California Labor Code claims, as well her claim for injunctive relief, had to be arbitrated on an individual basis. Read More
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, (Cal. Ct. App. June 4, 2012), the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed a decision to compel individual arbitration of wage-and-hour claims pursuant to an employment agreement that contained class and representative action waivers, holding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion was controlling. Read More
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