SEC Considering More Stringent Requirements For Cybersecurity Disclosures in the Wake of Stock Manipulating Hacking Case

Following up on clues earlier this year that the SEC may increase its scrutiny of cybersecurity disclosures, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White has asked the Commission to evaluate current guidance for cybersecurity disclosures and to consider whether more stringent requirements are necessary.  White asked the Commission to assemble a report on general practice and compliance with existing guidelines, and to make recommendations for future guidance.  White did not yet commit to changes to the current guidelines, issued in October 2011, pending issuance of the report.

Senator Jay Rockefeller, who disclosed the Chairman’s directive, has recently encouraged the SEC to provide further guidance on cybersecurity disclosures.  He has already sponsored legislation in this arena, including the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which would have pushed the private sector to share internal information within the industry and with government agencies.  The proposed legislation in 2012 would have also encouraged the enactment of protective measures for computer networks.  Senator Rockefeller has expressed concern about the lack of information regarding cybersecurity risks, and appears poised to push for additional disclosures.  Read More

What’s the Right Way to Respond to a Shareholder Books and Records Request?

Delaware law gives shareholders the right to request corporate books and records in order to investigate issues that are of interest to them. For several decades now, Delaware courts have encouraged shareholders to take advantage of this right as a matter of first course, to use the “tools at hand” and seek company records before filing litigation or making a litigation demand. In recent years, more shareholders (and their attorneys) have been following that advice, and the so-called “Section 220 books and records demand” is more common than ever.

Delaware courts have acknowledged, however, that the shareholder’s right to obtain corporate records must be balanced against the board’s right to manage the company’s business without undue interference. Accordingly, where a shareholder requests mundane company materials like stock ledgers or shareholder lists, the company generally must produce. But where the shareholder seeks more sensitive company records, the law puts the burden on the shareholder to show why the production is necessary. Read More

A Look Ahead at SEC Enforcement Actions – with Orrick’s Jim Meyers

Orrick partner Jim Meyers provides his perspective to JD Supra in the May 14, 2013 article, “A Look Ahead at SEC Enforcement Actions – with Orrick’s Jim Meyers.” Jim comments on trends in Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement, the new arrivals of SEC chairwoman, Mary Jo White and Enforcement Unit co-head, Andrew Ceresney, the recent “Non-Prosecution Agreement” with Ralph Lauren, and more.

To read the full JD Supra article, please click here.

Where There’s Smoke, There’s FIRREA

Few can ignite a legal firestorm like U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York. Last week, in a mortgage fraud suit against Bank of America and Countrywide, Judge Rakoff refused to dismiss a novel claim for civil penalties under the obscure Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”). The ruling will surely encourage civil prosecutors to make wider use of FIRREA, which provides a generous ten-year statute of limitations and low burden of proof, in pursuing financial fraud cases.

FIRREA was enacted in response to the Savings and Loan debacle of the 1980s, as well as the fraud scandals that emerged during that era. The statute includes a clause imposing a civil penalty for mail and wire fraud and other violations “affecting a federally insured financial institution.” Until recently the civil penalty provision has been ignored by prosecutors, leaving courts without occasion to decide what exactly the statute means by “affecting” a financial institution. Read More

“We’re Considering Selling the Company – How Can a Special Committee Help?”

In any change-of-control business transaction, the decision by the target company’s board of directors to approve the deal is subject to heightened scrutiny by the courts. These days, virtually every M&A deal is sure to attract at least one strike suit challenging the board’s decision, so it is essential that the board’s decision-making process be robust and untainted by any conflicts of interest.

One way in which a board can insulate its decision-making process is to employ a special committee of independent, outside directors to evaluate and negotiate any potential sale. Although boards are not required by law to use special committees when brokering change of control transactions, Delaware courts have repeatedly held that the use of a special committee can be powerful evidence of a fair and adequate process. That is especially true where (i) the contemplated transaction is with a controlling stockholder or (ii) a majority of the directors are conflicted, two situations where courts will employ the even-more exacting “entire fairness” standard of review. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently noted, “the effective use of a properly functioning special committee of independent directors” is an “integral” part “of the best practices that are used to establish a fair dealing process.” Read More

The SEC Says Cities (and City Officials!) Must Obey Securities Laws, Too

Yesterday the SEC filed an Order Instituting Cease and Desist Proceedings against the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for violations of Rule 10b-5. The City consented to entry of a Cease and Desist Order. The SEC also issued a Report of Investigation under Section 21(a) discussing “Potential Liability of Public Officials With Regard to Disclosure Obligations in the Secondary Market.”

The headline message from this proceeding is that the SEC found that the City had violated the securities laws through public statements made by public officials, as well as budget documents released during a certain time period, which allegedly failed to disclose material information about the City’s dire financial condition (primarily related to its obligations on certain waste-to-energy project bonds which the City had guaranteed). The reason these statements were deemed so significant is that during this period the City had fallen far behind in releasing its Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (“CAFRs”), so that investors had no other available current financial information. The SEC used this proceeding and its Report of Investigation to re-emphasize the statements made in its 1994 Interpretive Guidance on the obligations of participants in the municipal securities markets, and its 1996 Report following the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, that statements made by public officials which might be “reasonably expected to reach investors and the trading markets” can be subject to antifraud rules, even when such statements are not part of a specific securities offering. Read More

Making a Statement: The Two Faces of Janus in the SDNY

Almost two years after the Supreme Court issued its momentous decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), lower courts continue to reach significantly different conclusions concerning its scope. The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of SEC Rule 10b-5, “the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” Id. at 2302. Specifically, in Janus, the Supreme Court held that an investment advisor could not be liable for statements in prospectuses filed by a related, but legally separate entity. Because the investment advisor did not “make” the statements—that is, did not have “ultimate authority” over them—it could not be liable as a primary violator of Rule 10b-5 for any misstatements or omissions contained therein.

Janus established a bright-line rule. But the Southern District of New York, in particular, has split over whether Janus applies beyond the context of private actions brought under Rule 10b-5(b). In the most recent decision from that district to address the issue, SEC v. Garber, No. 12 Civ. 9339, 2013 WL 1732571 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013), Judge Shira A. Scheindlin deepened this divide. Read More

What Makes a Director “Independent”?

What makes a director “independent”? That question is important, not only to investors who want to ensure that boards of directors exercise objective judgment on corporate affairs, but also to companies, who need assurance that their boards will not run afoul of exchange listing requirements, and to directors themselves, for protection against shareholder lawsuits challenging board decisions.

Listing requirements for both the New York Stock Exchange  and NASDAQ provide basic checklists for directors independence, and state generally that directors cannot be employed by the company, cannot have family members who are employed by the company and cannot have a controlling interest in the company’s substantial business partners. But the exchanges’ listing requirements also contemplate that the question of independence is far broader than any checklist. The NYSE’s listing requirements further note that directors should have “no material relationship” with the Company; NASDAQ’S requirements state directors should have no relationship which “would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.” Read More

News of the (Shareholder Derivative) World: Record-High $139 Million Settlement in News Corp. Phone Hacking Suit

Putting an end to shareholder derivative litigation arising from News Corp.’s phone-hacking scandal, the company’s directors agreed last week to a record-breaking $139 million cash settlement. According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the deal is the “largest cash derivative settlement on record.” The settlement will be funded by directors’ and officers’ insurance proceeds.

Plaintiffs initially filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery in March 2011, asserting claims based on the company’s proposed acquisition (since completed) of Shine Group Ltd., a television and movie production company owned by the daughter of News Corp. Chairman Rupert Murdoch. According to plaintiffs, the News Corp. directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting the purchase of Shine at an excessive price. The court later consolidated various related cases, and plaintiffs’ allegations expanded to include claims that the company’s directors failed to properly investigate the UK phone-hacking allegations that led to the demise of News Corp.’s News of the World. Read More

PCAOB Issues Its First Cooperation Policy Statement

On April 24, 2013, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board issued its inaugural “Policy Statement Regarding Credit for Extraordinary Cooperation in Connection with Board Investigations.” The Policy Statement reiterates many of the themes of the SEC’s “Seaboard Report,” and therefore many may view it as largely plowing over well-trodden ground. But, the Policy Statement merits close attention, because it is the first such statement the Board has issued since it was formed, it sets forth specific examples of conduct that is likely to earn credit for cooperation, and it focuses specifically on the auditing profession.

The Policy Statement identifies three forms of “extraordinary” cooperation that could result in audit firms and/or individuals receiving credit in enforcement investigations:

  • self-reporting;
  • remedial or corrective action; and
  • substantial assistance.

According to the Board, “[a] firm or associated person may earn credit for self-reporting by making voluntary, timely and full disclosure of the facts relating to violations before the conduct comes to the attention of the Board or another regulator.” And, the sooner self-reporting is made, the more likely it will result in credit. The Board stressed, however, that self-reporting is “not eligible for cooperation credit” if it is “required by legal or regulatory obligations,” e.g., the auditor’s obligation under Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to report a client’s illegal acts. Read More