Blake L. Osborn

Associate
Securities Litigation & Regulatory Enforcement
(213) 612-2497
bosborn@orrick.com
Read full biography at www.orrick.com

Blake Osborn is an associate with the Securities Litigation and Regulatory Enforcement Group.  He is located in the Los Angeles office.

Before joining Orrick, Mr. Osborn worked as a Deputy Public Defender in Orange County.  In that capacity, Mr. Osborn individually tried 12 misdemeanor cases, argued more than 20 motions, and managed a heavy case load by representing clients at pretrial conferences.

Blake Osborn

Posts by Blake L. Osborn

SEC

Here’s Looking At You, Money Market Funds

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While money market funds did not exist when Humphrey Bogart spoke his famous line in Casablanca, since the 2008 financial crisis, reforming money market funds have been the subject of high drama and intense scrutiny on Capitol Hill. Advocates for reform finally got their long awaited breakthrough last Wednesday, June 5, 2013, when the Securities and Exchange Commission voted unanimously to propose legislation that would reform money market funds. The SEC’s goal with the reform is to make money market funds less susceptible to “runs” that could harm investors.

The SEC’s goal of reform has been in the works for a long time, was championed by former Chair of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, and has been continued by current Chair Mary Jo White. A money market fund is a type of fixed-income mutual fund that invests in debt securities with short maturities and minimal credit risk. They first developed in the early 1970s as an option for investors to purchase a pool of securities that generally provided higher returns than interest-bearing bank accounts. Money market funds have grown considerably since then and currently hold more than $2.9 trillion in assets.

Money market funds seek stability and security with the goal of never losing money and keeping their net asset value (“NAV”) at $1.00. However, many felt reform was necessary after a money market fund “broke the buck” at the height of the financial crisis in September 2008 and re-priced its shares below its $1.00 stable share price to $0.97. Investors panicked and within a few days, investors had pulled approximately $300 billion from similar money market funds. Intervention from the United States Treasury Department prevented further runs on the funds. Read More

SEC

Stop! In the Name of … 28 U.S.C. §2462

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Last week we heard from RUSH. This week we’re tuning in to The Supremes.

On January 8, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission, No. 11-1274, concerning when the clock begins to run on the five-year statute of limitations for civil penalty claims by the SEC and other federal agencies. The 200-year-old statute at the heart of the dispute (28 U.S.C. §2462) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .” Taking their cue from the Supremes that, “No, you just have to wait,” the SEC argues that “accrued” means when the government discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the alleged wrongdoing (in this case, market timing by two executives of investment adviser Gabelli Funds, LLC ). On the other hand, the two executives want to know, “How long must I wait, How much more can I take?” arguing that “accrued” means when the government can first bring the action (typically when the alleged wrongdoing occurs), regardless of whether the government knows about it.

What can be divined from the oral argument? The justices appeared skeptical of the government’s position. It was pointed out that this was not a position that had ever been taken by any other government agency, and not by the SEC until 2004, even though the statute had been on the books for almost 200 years. Justice Breyer went so far as to press, “All I’m asking you for is one case [prior to 2004],” but the government’s attorney could not provide one.

Some of justices also commented that it would almost be impossible for a defendant to prove that the government “should have known” about something. There would be no bright-line rules to such an approach. Whether an agency “should have known” could potentially depend on any number of circumstances, for example whether the agency had 100 or 1,000 people reviewing things to shed light on a violation or even whether the agency was overworked or underfunded at the time of the violation. In other words, SEC, “Think it over.” Read More

Securities Exchange Act

Can We Be Classmates?

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On September 6, the Second Circuit expanded class standing in a mortgage-backed securities class action suit for alleged misrepresentations in a shelf registration statement. NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 11-2763 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2012). The plaintiff, an investment fund, sued Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and GS Mortgage Securities Corp. (“GS”) alleging violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of a putative class of persons who acquired mortgage-backed certificates underwritten by Goldman and issued by GS. The plaintiff alleged that a single shelf registration statement connected with 17 separate offerings sold by 17 separate trusts contained false and misleading statements concerning underwriting guidelines, property appraisals, and risks and that these alleged misstatements were repeated in prospectus supplements.

The lower court had granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff—who had purchased securities from only two of the seventeen trusts—lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of purchasers of securities of the other fifteen trusts.

The Second Circuit disagreed that the plaintiff lacked class standing. Although the plaintiff had individual standing only as to the securities it purchased from the two trusts, the court held that the analysis for class standing is different. According to the court, to assert class standing, a plaintiff has to allege (1) that he personally suffered an injury due to the defendant’s illegal conduct and (2) that the defendant’s conduct implicates the “same set of concerns” as the conduct that caused injury to other members of the putative class. Read More