Richard Gallagher is a partner in Orrick's Silicon Valley office. His practice focuses on litigation and pre-litigation advice involving securities and corporate governance issues, including representation of companies, directors and officers involved in class action litigation, derivative actions, internal investigations, shareholder demands, and regulatory investigations and enforcement actions brought under the federal and state securities laws.
Mr. Gallagher also has significant experience advising companies, boards of directors and special committee members in M&A litigation brought under the laws of Delaware, California and other states throughout the country. He has successfully defeated multiple cases seeking to enjoin proposed mergers, acquisitions and other business combinations involving both public and private companies.
Mr. Gallagher has also litigated numerous disputes involving founders and investors in start-up companies, as well as matters involving venture capital disputes, executive compensation issues, intellectual property rights, unfair competition, breaches of partnership and shareholder agreements, employment and fraud claims, significant real estate disputes, and fiduciary obligations.
He has also advised U.S., Asian and EU companies regarding securities litigation and corporate governance risks arising from cross-border activities.
Mr. Gallagher has first-chair trial and arbitration experience in both civil and criminal matters, including the prosecution of several jury trials with the San Francisco District Attorney's office. Some of his recent representations include:
winning dismissal of multiple shareholder challenges to one of the largest ever technology company mergers;
winning dismissal of a fiduciary duty case challenging a spin-off transaction involving board of directors of Fortune 100 company;
winning dismissal of multiple class actions targeting a leading mutual fund company, its board members and executives;
winning dismissal of securities class action seeking hundreds of millions of dollars from a leading software firm, its board members and executives; and
prevailing in an arbitration dispute between founders of an Internet start-up company.
We previously discussed how important a special negotiating committee of independent directors can be when defending against stockholder challenges to change-of-control transactions – particularly for going private transactions with controlling stockholders, which usually require boards to be able to prove the “entire fairness” of the transaction. This week, in an important decision that may reach the Delaware Supreme Court, In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery again affirmed the importance of special committees in those circumstances, and offered a road map to companies and controlling stockholders on how to structure going private transactions.
Nearly two decades ago, in Kahn v. Lynch, the Delaware Supreme Court held that where (1) a special committee of independent directors or (2) a majority of the non-controlling stockholders approves a merger with a controlling stockholder, it shifts the burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction from the defendants to the stockholder challenging the transaction. Last year, in Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that the use of a properly functioning special committee of independent directors is an integral part of the best practices that are used to establish the entire fairness of a merger with a controlling stockholder. Read More
Delaware law gives shareholders the right to request corporate books and records in order to investigate issues that are of interest to them. For several decades now, Delaware courts have encouraged shareholders to take advantage of this right as a matter of first course, to use the “tools at hand” and seek company records before filing litigation or making a litigation demand. In recent years, more shareholders (and their attorneys) have been following that advice, and the so-called “Section 220 books and records demand” is more common than ever.
Delaware courts have acknowledged, however, that the shareholder’s right to obtain corporate records must be balanced against the board’s right to manage the company’s business without undue interference. Accordingly, where a shareholder requests mundane company materials like stock ledgers or shareholder lists, the company generally must produce. But where the shareholder seeks more sensitive company records, the law puts the burden on the shareholder to show why the production is necessary. Read More
In any change-of-control business transaction, the decision by the target company’s board of directors to approve the deal is subject to heightened scrutiny by the courts. These days, virtually every M&A deal is sure to attract at least one strike suit challenging the board’s decision, so it is essential that the board’s decision-making process be robust and untainted by any conflicts of interest.
One way in which a board can insulate its decision-making process is to employ a special committee of independent, outside directors to evaluate and negotiate any potential sale. Although boards are not required by law to use special committees when brokering change of control transactions, Delaware courts have repeatedly held that the use of a special committee can be powerful evidence of a fair and adequate process. That is especially true where (i) the contemplated transaction is with a controlling stockholder or (ii) a majority of the directors are conflicted, two situations where courts will employ the even-more exacting “entire fairness” standard of review. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently noted, “the effective use of a properly functioning special committee of independent directors” is an “integral” part “of the best practices that are used to establish a fair dealing process.” Read More
The SEC issued a release today confirming that companies can use social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn to announce information in compliance with Regulation FD (“Reg FD”) so long as investors have been alerted in advance about which social media will be used to send the information.
The SEC’s release grows out of an inquiry involving the CEO of a major Internet television network. The CEO posted on his Facebook page that his company’s online viewing had exceeded a key milestone for the first time. His Facebook statement was not accompanied or preceded by any company press release or 8-K. The stock jumped substantially, and the SEC came knocking.
The SEC’s release confirms that companies are permitted to announce material news through social media, provided investors know when and where to expect it. In response to the SEC’s latest release on Reg FD, we expect that public companies will update their social media protocols and, as appropriate, integrate investor relations communications more closely with links to sites like Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.
In what Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York called an “extraordinary case,” French multimedia company Vivendi, S.A. has scored an unusual victory based on a successful rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which the Supreme Court established 15 years ago in the seminal decisions of Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1998). Though the stakes were relatively small—the Vivendi investor alleged only $3.5 million in damages—the decision is significant. It is one of the few in which a defendant successfully rebutted the almost impenetrable fraud-on-the-market presumption.
The court’s opinion in Gamco Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A. came after a two day bench trial on the limited issue of whether Vivendi could rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Vivendi was collaterally estopped from challenging any elements of the plaintiff’s 10b-5 claims, other than reliance, following an earlier class action jury verdict concerning similar claims regarding Vivendi’s liquidity status. Read More
Earlier this month, Orrick partner Rick Gallagher joined an interesting panel discussion on the latest trends in executive compensation litigation. The full transcript can be viewed here. Special thanks for Broc Romanek and CompensationStandards.com for organizing and hosting a terrific panel.
Agreeing to take up yet another securities case, the Supreme Court granted cert on January 18 in three related appeals arising out of the alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme involving R. Allen Stanford’s Stanford International Bank. The Court’s decision in this case will likely resolve a circuit split over the scope of the preclusion provision of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).
Congress passed SLUSA in 1998 because plaintiffs were bringing class actions in state court to get around the tough pleading standards and other limitations imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. SLUSA precludes state law class actions involving misrepresentations made “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security covered under SLUSA. Lower courts have struggled with the meaning of those three words: “in connection with.” If a state court case has anything at all to do with securities, will it fail?How closely must a claim relate to the sale of covered securities before SLUSA bars state law remedies? The Supreme Court is about to weigh in on these questions.
In the Stanford ponzi scheme cases, the plaintiffs are investors who purchased CDs issued by Stanford International Bank. The investors asserted claims against third-party advisors (including law firms and an insurance broker) under Texas and Louisiana law, alleging that the investors were duped into believing the CDs were backed by safe securities. Although the CDs themselves were not securities covered by SLUSA, the third-party advisors argued that SLUSA nevertheless barred the state law claims because the alleged misrepresentations related to the SLUSA-covered securities that purportedly backed the CDs. The district court agreed, dismissing the actions. But the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the alleged fraudulent scheme was only “tangentially related” to the trading of securities covered by SLUSA. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that misrepresentations are not made “in connection with” sales of SLUSA-covered securities when they are only “tangentially related” to those sales. This means the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are at odds with the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have all adopted broader views of SLUSA’s preclusion provision.
The third-party advisor defendants asked the Supreme Court to resolve the split, and the Supreme Court agreed, given that the circuit split threatensinconsistent outcomes in some of the biggest, mostcomplex, and multi-layered securities cases. The Court’s resolution will likely go a long way towards defining the role of state courts in adjudicating important class actions relating to securities issues.
The plaintiffs’ bar has taken new aim at public companies’ annual meetings: filing lawsuits to enjoin annual shareholder approval of stock plan proposals and “Say-On-Pay” (“SOP”) votes, typically arguing that the proxy disclosures regarding these topics are inadequate. Dozens of cases have been filed this year to date. The Santa Clara Superior Court recently denied plaintiff’s attempt to delay Symantec’s SOP vote, finding no precedent for such an injunction. Yet new cases continue to come.
In Symantec, plaintiffs argued that proxy disclosures failed to provide enough information to allow shareholders to make an informed decision regarding executive compensation proposals. Plaintiffs argued that shareholders needed more detailed information, including an analysis conducted by the company’s compensation consultants and any compensation risk assessment undertaken by the company. Symantec v. Gordon, et al., Case No. 1-12-CV-231541 (Cal. Santa Clara County Superior Court). The Symantec Court disagreed.
The Symantec case suggests that judges will look to industry practices in evaluating the adequacy of disclosures on executive compensation. The court considered an expert opinion from a Stanford Professor (Robert Daines) surveying disclosures made by other companies in the industry. Professor Daines concluded that Symantec’s disclosures were at least as detailed as the industry standard. Lacking any factual support or legal precedent for such an injunction, the court denied the motion. Read More
Last Friday, Judge Kleinberg of the California Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, dismissed two shareholder class actions against the former directors of Actel Corporation and Applied Signal Technology, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duties arising out of the sales of Actel and Applied Signal to third-party buyers. In doing so, Judge Kleinberg stated that, under California law, damages claims brought by shareholders of California corporations against directors for breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the approval of a merger are derivative, not direct. Thus, because a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit must maintain continuous stock ownership throughout the pendency of the litigation, and the plaintiffs ceased to be stockholders of Actel and Applied Signal by reason of a merger, Judge Kleinberg held that they lacked standing to continue the litigation.
In holding that post-merger claims against directors of California acquired corporations are derivative, Judge Kleinberg relied on the pre-Tooley rationale (which is no longer controlling in Delaware and has been questioned in California) that a harm suffered equally by all shareholders in proportion to their pro rata ownership of the company is a derivative harm. Judge Kleinberg rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Delaware’s Tooley standard for determining whether a claim was direct or derivative was adopted by the California Court of Appeal in Bader v. Andersen, 179 Cal. App. 4th 775 (2009). According to Judge Kleinberg, in stating that California and Delaware law were “not inconsistent,” the Bader court was merely observing that the results of applying California versus Delaware law in that case were not inconsistent; it was not saying that California and Delaware law are the same on the direct versus derivative issue.
Judge Kleinberg’s holding is a victory for the defense bar, as it means that merger litigation involving California incorporated targets will be susceptible to dismissal by demurrer or summary judgment following the preliminary injunction stage.
On October 15, 2012, Chief Judge Claudia Wilken of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied defendants’ motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal of the court’s prior order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. SEC v. Sells, No. 11-04941 (N. D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012). A split will therefore remain amongst district courts as to whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011), applies to cases involving Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 or in cases alleging scheme liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Janus held that a defendant could only be liable under Rule 10b-5(b) for material misstatements if the defendant “made” the statements.
Last October, the SEC filed suit against defendants Christopher Sells and Timothy Murawski, former executives at medical device company Hansen Medical, Inc., for their alleged involvement in a financial manipulation scheme designed to enhance the company’s sales and income. Defendants sought dismissal of the action in part on Janus grounds. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that to allow liability for defendants’ alleged conduct would not be inconsistent with Janus. Defendants subsequently sought certification to the Ninth Circuit of two Janus-related issues: first, whether the SEC could bring scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) based upon an alleged misstatement that the defendant did not “make” under Janus; and second, whether Janus applied to claims under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Read More
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