Halliburton Oral Argument: The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory is “Basic”ally a Sore Thumb

On March 5, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Halliburton v. The Erica P. John Fund.  As discussed in previous blog posts, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider Petitioner Halliburton’s argument to modify or overturn the fraud-on-the market presumption that the Court first articulated more than a quarter century ago in Basic  v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-50 (1988).  As our readers know, the fraud-on-the market theory allows investors to bring securities class action suits under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act by using a rebuttable presumption that public information about a company is reflected in its stock price because of the efficient markets hypothesis.  Basic significantly relaxes the burden on securities class action plaintiffs because they do not need to show actual reliance on a purported misstatement when deciding to buy or sell stock.  Overturning or modifying Basic would significantly dampen shareholder litigation by making it more difficult to obtain class certification or to survive a motion to dismiss. Read More

Halliburton’s Brief Asks The U.S. Supreme Court To Overturn The Not So Brief 25-Year-Old Fraud-On-The-Market Presumption

As discussed in a previous December 3, 2013 post, the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear Halliburton’s pitch to overrule or modify the decades old fraud-on-the-market presumption established in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-50 (1988).  This theory effectively allows shareholders to bring class action suits under Section 10 of the 1934 Act by presuming that plaintiffs, in purchasing stock in an efficient market, relied on alleged material misstatements made by defendants because such public statements were reflected in the company’s stock prices.

Urging the reversal of Basic, Halliburton filed its opening brief on December 30, 2013, in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, No. 13-317.  Halliburton makes several arguments in its brief in support of overturning Basic, including many familiar legal arguments relating to statutory interpretation, congressional intent and public policy objectives.  Perhaps most interesting, however, is the brief’s focus on the academic literature regarding the economic assumptions underlying Basic that may not be as familiar to practitioners.  Specifically, Halliburton argues that academics have discredited and rejected Basic’s key premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information.  In particular, Halliburton argues that: Read More

Basic Gets Complicated: Vivendi Rebuts Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption

In what Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York called an “extraordinary case,” French multimedia company Vivendi, S.A. has scored an unusual victory based on a successful rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which the Supreme Court established 15 years ago in the seminal decisions of Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1998). Though the stakes were relatively small—the Vivendi investor alleged only $3.5 million in damages—the decision is significant. It is one of the few in which a defendant successfully rebutted the almost impenetrable fraud-on-the-market presumption.

The court’s opinion in Gamco Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A. came after a two day bench trial on the limited issue of whether Vivendi could rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Vivendi was collaterally estopped from challenging any elements of the plaintiff’s 10b-5 claims, other than reliance, following an earlier class action jury verdict concerning similar claims regarding Vivendi’s liquidity status. Read More