As noted in a previous blog, in Police & Fire Retirement Systems of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit held that tolling under American Pipe – which plaintiffs had often used to revive claims by relying on earlier-filed class actions – does not apply to statutes of repose, including Section 13 of the ’33 Act. The significance of IndyMac was felt in New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, et al. v. Residential Capital, et al., No. 08 CV 8781, 08 CV 5093 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2013), where Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. was asked to reconsider his pre-IndyMac order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a securities class action involving mortgage-backed securities. Upon reconsideration, Judge Baer dismissed one of the defendants, Deutsche Securities Inc., and several claims against other defendants, finding that intervening plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because the claims were not filed within the ’33 Act’s three-year statute of repose. As the case highlights, IndyMac’s effect will continue to be felt in pending cases – Judge Baer held that it should be applied retroactively – and will significantly limit the timing of future lawsuits.
The second quarter of 2013 saw the largest quarterly percentage decline in new securities actions since before the 2007/2008 financial crisis. New filings in the first quarter plummeted by 41 percent, from 352 in the first quarter to 234 in the second quarter. This drop represents a 55 percent decrease in the number of new securities actions filed as compared to same period last year (Q2 2012). It has been approximately five years since we have seen a lower number of quarterly filings.
The number of new securities fraud cases also plummeted, falling 59 percent from the prior quarter, with the number of new filings decreasing from 149 to 61. There were also quarterly declines in newly-filed shareholder derivative actions, which decreased from 43 filings in the first quarter to 37 in the second quarter, and breach of fiduciary duty cases, which fell from 99 new filings in the first quarter to 71 in the second quarter.
Not only did the number of securities actions filed drop significantly, but so too did the average settlement amounts. The average settlement for all types of securities cases in the second quarter was just over $37 million, a marked decrease from the average settlement amount of $69.3 million during the first quarter of 2013.
What’s going on? There are a number of factors that may be contributing to these downward filing trends. The stock market has been strong, so many investors have little to complain about. Moreover, the surge in suits against U.S.-listed Chinese companies appears to have run its course, and no new scandal or market development has yet become the next “big thing” that will drive increased filings. In addition, SEC enforcement activities have continued to shift into areas (such as insider trading and whistleblowing) that do not always spawn parallel private litigation. It remains to be seen whether the recent appointment of new SEC personnel or a renewed focus on accounting fraud cases by regulators, which is anticipated by some analysts, will cause a variation in these trends moving forward.
Source = Advisen D&O Claims Trends: 2013 Report (July 2013)
The Second Circuit last week ruled on a key aspect of the timing of securities suits. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), plaintiffs are often able to revive claims by relying on earlier-filed class actions to toll the statute of limitations. RMBS plaintiffs have recently turned to American Pipe when their putative class actions are dismissed for lack of standing.
In In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation, lead plaintiffs lacked standing to bring certain claims, which were dismissed by the district court. Other members of the asserted class—who had not been named as plaintiffs—sought to intervene in the action in order to bring those dismissed claims. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the investors’ motions to intervene. Read More
Can shareholders of a government-sponsored enterprise successfully challenge the constitutionality of a government takeover of the entity? Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will try to do so in a $41 billion class action filed against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims on June 10, 2013. Plaintiffs allege that even though the Federal Housing Finance Authority’s 2008 takeover of the mortgage giants benefited the nation as a whole, it harmed the companies’ shareholders and violated their constitutionally protected private ownership rights.
Congress established Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to expand the nation’s secondary mortgage market by increasing the availability of funds to finance mortgages and home ownership. The government operated Fannie and Freddie until 1968 and 1989, respectively, when the companies were reorganized as “government-sponsored enterprises,” or federally chartered private corporations. Since then, both companies have operated as shareholder-owned, publicly traded corporations. But in 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, both companies were placed under the conservatorship of FHFA, pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).
Plaintiffs allege that prior to the 2008 takeover, the government adjusted the companies’ lending standards and capital restraints to encourage the companies to purchase a greater number of risky subprime securities. While this ultimately led to significant weaknesses in the companies’ portfolios, Plaintiffs contend that the companies nonetheless remained adequately capitalized and financially sound, and did not need the conservatorships. According to Plaintiffs, the government improperly bullied the companies’ boards into acquiescing in the takeover. Read More
Securities class action lawyers are looking to the U.S. Supreme Court this term to clear up an issue that has been at the center of several prominent securities class actions, specifically, what is the standard for class certification where the class members’ reliance on defendants’ alleged misstatements is presumed under the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance. Last term, in a class action ruling in an employment case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 1541 (2011), the Court signaled that class certification may require “a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit,” singling out elements of the fraud-on-the-market theory as an example.
On November 5, the Supreme Court heard argument in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, a securities fraud putative shareholder class action presenting the question of how far a court should consider a merits issue when deciding whether to certify a class. The appeal in Amgen is from a Ninth Circuit decision that affirmed the district court’s order certifying a plaintiff class of purchasers of Amgen stock. Defendants opposed class certification on the ground that the rebuttable presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory requires not only that the market for Amgen stock was efficient, but that the alleged misstatements were material. Defendants offered evidence that the alleged misstatements in the case were immaterial. Therefore, according to defendants, reliance could not be presumed, and the proposed plaintiff class could not be certified because common issues did not predominate. The Supreme Court took the case in order to determine whether the district court was correct to disregard defendants’ evidence of immateriality on the ground that materiality is an issue appropriately considered at trial or at summary judgment rather than at the class certification stage. Read More
On September 6, the Second Circuit expanded class standing in a mortgage-backed securities class action suit for alleged misrepresentations in a shelf registration statement. NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 11-2763 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2012). The plaintiff, an investment fund, sued Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and GS Mortgage Securities Corp. (“GS”) alleging violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of a putative class of persons who acquired mortgage-backed certificates underwritten by Goldman and issued by GS. The plaintiff alleged that a single shelf registration statement connected with 17 separate offerings sold by 17 separate trusts contained false and misleading statements concerning underwriting guidelines, property appraisals, and risks and that these alleged misstatements were repeated in prospectus supplements.
The lower court had granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff—who had purchased securities from only two of the seventeen trusts—lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of purchasers of securities of the other fifteen trusts.
The Second Circuit disagreed that the plaintiff lacked class standing. Although the plaintiff had individual standing only as to the securities it purchased from the two trusts, the court held that the analysis for class standing is different. According to the court, to assert class standing, a plaintiff has to allege (1) that he personally suffered an injury due to the defendant’s illegal conduct and (2) that the defendant’s conduct implicates the “same set of concerns” as the conduct that caused injury to other members of the putative class. Read More
Imagine a plaintiff who buys stock in a company that subsequently discloses a misstatement in its financial statements that existed at the time plaintiff invested. The stock price drops upon the initial disclosure, and then rebounds back above the purchase price. Can that plaintiff plead economic loss, as is required under Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)? According to the Second Circuit, the answer is yes. Read More