Alex Okuliar

Partner

Washington, D.C.


Read full biography at www.orrick.com

Alex is a litigator and former senior DOJ and FTC official representing clients in high-profile deals, investigations, and disputes. He frequently works for leading global companies, including recently Microsoft, Cisco, and Schlumberger, and has been recognized by Chambers USA and Global Competition Review, among others. Who's Who Legal reports that Alex is “a highly skilled competition lawyerapplauded for "his strong knowledge of and experience with the US authorities."

Drawing on his agency experience, Alex regularly appears before federal, state, and foreign authorities in connection with conduct and merger investigations, including the Federal Trade Commission and US Department of Justice. He also advocates for client's interests on numerous competition and consumer protection issues before the agencies. In addition to his agency work, Alex has litigated large antitrust, unfair competition, and consumer protection class actions in federal and state courts around the United States.

From 2012-2015, Alex served as advisor to FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen, counseling her on the agency's numerous investigations, enforcement actions, and policies. He focused heavily on technology and telecommunications-related issues, including big data, the growth of online technology platforms, and the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust. Earlier, from 2010-2012, Alex was a trial attorney at the DOJ Antitrust Division focused on mergers and conduct in the technology and finance sectors. He also worked on dozens of energy, health care and hospital matters while at the FTC and DOJ and continues to practice in those sectors. Before serving in the government, Alex spent ten years in private practice at leading international law firms.

Alex is frequently acknowledged for the quality of his work and client service. Chambers USA has recognized Alex in its ranking of top DC antitrust lawyers (2018, 2019). He was recommended for antitrust litigation defense (2019) and merger control (2017-2019) in Legal 500 and was listed in Who's Who Legal: Future Leaders (2017, 2018) and Who's Who Legal: Competition (2019). He was also individually noted as "excellent" by Global Competition Review in its 2018 ranking of the world's antitrust practices. 

Before law school, Alex co-founded and sold an online technology company.

Posts by: Alex Okuliar

DOJ Changes Course and Announces That It Will Favorably Consider “Robust” Antitrust Compliance Programs at Both the Charging and Sentencing Stages in Criminal Cases

Benjamin Franklin once observed that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” In the antitrust context, this means that most, if not all, companies will want as a matter of course to adopt and maintain an antitrust compliance program, because doing so will help avoid antitrust problems before they occur.

Until recently, however, the U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division gave no weight to corporate antitrust compliance programs at the charging stage of criminal cases, and provided little public guidance as to how they would be considered at the sentencing stage of such proceedings. As former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder noted in 2014, there were once two hard truths about compliance programs. The first was that the “existence of a compliance program almost never allows the company to avoid criminal antitrust charges.” [1] The second was that “the Division, like the Department of Justice as a whole, almost never recommends that companies receive credit at sentencing for a preexisting compliance program.” [2] That changed late last week with an important announcement by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim. Delrahim described the changes to the Division’s treatment of antitrust compliance programs and also announced the publication of a Division guidance document that Division lawyers will use to apply the policy.

Prior to the policy change, a corporate compliance policy would itself garner no credit at the criminal charging stage; instead, the Division took an “all-or-nothing” approach, rewarding the first company in a cartel to come forward with leniency, and possibly advocating for criminal penalty reductions for other companies that fully cooperate in the investigation.

No longer. Going forward, a company with a “robust” compliance program (even if it is not the first to seek leniency) may be eligible for a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”). As Delrahim stated in his recent speech, “a company with a robust compliance program actually can prevent crime or detect it early, thus reducing the need for enforcement activity; minimizing the harm to consumers earlier and saving precious taxpayer resources” even if the compliance program is not 100% effective.

In evaluating whether a compliance program is robust, pursuant to its guidance document, the Division will ask three fundamental questions at the charging stage: (1) Is the corporation’s compliance well designed? (2) Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith? and (3) Does the corporation’s compliance program work?

In asking and answering these three fundamental questions, the Division will consider nine factors, which the guidance document stresses are not a checklist or formula. The first factor looks to the program’s design and comprehensiveness, and considers whether the program is merely a “paper” program or whether it was designed, implemented, reviewed and revised as appropriate in an effective manner. The second factor looks to the culture of compliance, and asks whether management has clearly articulated —and conducted themselves in accordance with— the company’s commitment to good corporate citizenship. And the third factor looks to whether those with operational responsibility for the program have sufficient autonomy, authority and seniority, as well as adequate resources to implement the program. Other factors include whether the program: is tailored to the best practices of the industry and to the unique circumstances of the company; provides training and communication that is clear and empowers employees to act with confidence of the rules; requires periodic review, monitoring, and auditing; establishes reporting mechanisms to allow for anonymous or confidential reports without fear of retaliation; creates a system of incentives and discipline to ensure the program is well-integrated into the company’s operations and workforce; and implements mechanisms for self-policing, remedying issues and improving the program to prevent future issues. Although many of the factors are fairly straightforward and some reflect prior statements by agency officials, the guidance constitutes the first time in the Division’s criminal program history that it has issued formal guidance regarding how it evaluates antitrust compliance programs.

Perhaps not surprisingly, merely having a robust compliance program will not guarantee a DPA. Instead, the Division will also consider whether the company self-reported the misconduct, whether it cooperated with government investigations, and whether it took remedial action.

The new guidance document also clarifies how the Division will consider compliance programs at the sentencing stage. A company may receive a three-point reduction in its “culpability score” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines if it has an “effective” compliance program. However, there is no reduction if there has been an unreasonable delay in reporting illegal conduct to the government, and there is a rebuttable presumption that a compliance program is not effective when certain “high-level personnel” or “substantial authority personnel” participated in, condoned or were willfully ignorant of the offense. An effective guidance program may also avoid the need for the DOJ to recommend corporate probation. Finally, the Division’s guidance provides that a dedicated effort by the company’s senior management to change company culture after an antitrust violation and corporate actions to prevent the recurrence of an antitrust violation are relevant to whether the DOJ should recommend a criminal fine reduction.

In sum, for most companies, it has always made good sense to have, and to periodically update and review, an antitrust compliance policy. Of course, no one ever wants or expects to be involved in a criminal antitrust investigation, but in light of the Antitrust Division’s recent announcement about and guidance concerning how it will take such policies favorably into account in such investigations, it likely makes sense for many companies to dust off their programs to ensure that they are adequately robust in the eyes of the Division.

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[1] Snyder, supra note 1, at 9.

[2] Brent Snyder, Compliance is a Culture, Not Just a Policy, at 8 (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517796/download.

DOJ Publishes Statements Clarifying Its Analysis of No-Poach Agreements – But Questions Remain

Since issuing the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals in 2016, the DOJ Antitrust Division has remained active in enforcing and commenting on agreements among employers not to compete for hiring employees (“no-poach” agreements). DOJ filed several statements of interest in private antitrust suits involving no-poach provisions to provide guidance to the courts on the proper application of the federal antitrust laws to such restraints. Although the statements of interest provided clarity on the analysis of “naked” no-poach agreements, questions remain about the appropriate standard for analyzing no-poach restraints in franchise agreements.

Naked No-Poach Agreements Are Per Se Unlawful

DOJ recently took the unusual step of filing an unopposed motion to intervene in a class action no-poach settlement to enforce the injunctive relief agreed upon by the parties. The proposed class action alleged that a no-poach agreement between Duke/Duke University Health System and UNC/UNC Health Care System harmed competition for skilled medical labor. The named plaintiff alleged she was denied a lateral move to UNC from Duke because of agreements between senior administrators and deans at the institutions. On May 22 the court approved DOJ’s motion to intervene.

In its statement of interest, DOJ argued that such restrictions on hiring are per se unlawful market-allocation agreements between competing employers. These agreements harm consumers (employees) by depriving them of the benefits of competition that may lead to better wages or terms of employment. A court or agency will not evaluate the competitive effects of a per se unlawful agreement. Unlike such “naked” restraints, agreements that are ancillary to a separate, legitimate competitor collaboration are not considered per se unlawful and are analyzed under the rule of reason. In this case, DOJ argued that Duke had not presented evidence to show that the restraint was ancillary to a legitimate collaboration. DOJ’s analysis of the alleged agreements in its statement further cements the agency’s stance that “naked” no-poach agreements are per se unlawful. DOJ’s statement of interest sends a strong signal that it is actively monitoring no-poach cases and will readily offer its views where a party is making arguments inconsistent with the agency’s interpretation of the law. DOJ’s intervention will also deter the parties from violating the settlement and send a clear signal to others that DOJ will aggressively pursue firms that enter into naked no-poach agreements.

Questions Remain as to the Appropriate Standard for Analyzing Employment Restrictions in Franchise Agreements

Also making their way through the courts are several cases against fast-food chains alleging that franchisor agreements prohibiting poaching among franchisees are unlawful. For example, a complaint against Jimmy John’s alleged that Jimmy John’s orchestrated no-solicitation and no-hire agreements between and among franchisees. Similar claims were made against Auntie Ann’s, Carl’s Jr., Domino’s Pizza and Arby’s, among others, with some food chains settling.

DOJ filed a statement of interest in Harris v. CJ Star, LLC, Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., and Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. In its statement, DOJ took the position that most franchisor-franchisee restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason. It reasoned the agreement was vertical in nature because it is between a franchisor and a franchisee (parties “at different levels of the market structure”). By way of example, DOJ pointed to territorial allocations among franchises that restrict intrabrand competition but increase interbrand competition (i.e. competition among other food chains). Such restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason.

DOJ also argued that where there is “direct competition between a franchisor and its franchisees to hire employees with similar skills, a no-poach agreement between them is correctly characterized as horizontal and, if not ancillary to any legitimate and procompetitive joint venture, would be per se unlawful.” But then DOJ stated that the hub-and-spoke nature of the franchise agreement was an ancillary restraint because “the typical franchise relationship itself is a legitimate business collaboration in which the franchisees operate under the same brand.” According to DOJ, if the no-poach agreements are reasonably necessary to the franchise collaboration and not overbroad, they constitute an ancillary restraint subject to the rule of reason.

By contrast, the Attorney General of Washington took the position in an amicus brief that franchise agreements that “restrict solicitation and hiring among franchisees and a corporate-owned store” should be analyzed as per se unlawful, at least under state law. The AG argued that these agreements have both vertical and horizontal characteristics. Given the horizontal component, the AG took the position that such agreements do not warrant analysis under the more lenient rule of reason. The AG further argued that franchisors have “a heavy burden” in showing that these restraints can be justified as ancillary to a legitimate collaboration. The American Antitrust Institute similarly critiqued DOJ’s approach in a letter. It argued that the franchise no-poach agreements at issue are not ancillary because “[a]greements that have no plausible justifications or cognizable efficiencies are never ancillary” since they “do not hold the promise of procompetitive benefits and are not ‘necessary’ to the broader integration.”

Courts hearing the fast-food cases will have to resolve these conflicting arguments as they consider various motions to dismiss. In late May, a judge refused to grant Domino’s Pizza’s motion to dismiss concerning a no-hire provision that was included in the chain’s franchise agreements. The clause prohibited franchisees from recruiting or hiring other Domino’s franchisee employees without prior written consent. The judge found that plaintiff had sufficiently pled a horizontal restraint between franchisees and did not need to decide at the motion to dismiss stage which standard should ultimately be applied. The court reasoned that more factual development would be needed to decide that issue, unpersuaded by Domino’s Pizza’s reliance on summary judgment and trial decisions that contained a more robust factual record. A recent order by a district court evaluating similar claims against Jimmy John’s highlighted the varying positions emerging, referring to a “dichotomy” between DOJ’s position and the American Antitrust Institute. Although it acknowledged that DOJ is a “titan in this arena,” the court stressed that the agency is “not the ultimate authority on the subject.”

For now, employers that are members of any no-poach agreement with a vertical component should proceed with caution. Although DOJ’s position is favorable to no-poach agreements they deem vertical in nature, questions remain as to whether these agreements warrant per se, quick look, or rule of reason analysis.[1] Courts are proceeding cautiously, and a consensus has not yet emerged. As the court in Jimmy John’s succinctly summarized: “[T]hese questions here are in their infancy, and this battle looks like one that will make its way through the courts for years to come.”

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[1] A “quick look” analysis is used “when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.” California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).

Courts Question FTC Enforcement Method

The FTC has long asserted it has the authority to bring actions in federal court to obtain injunctive relief and equitable monetary remedies (e.g. disgorgement, consumer redress) for unfair and deceptive practices. This view of the agency’s scope of authority has stood for years without much question or challenge. But two recent district court decisions may change all that by limiting the agency’s ability to petition a federal court to those situations in which it can demonstrate a defendant is “about to violate” the law. On December 11, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court heard oral argument in one of the district court cases – FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc. – with a decision expected in the first half of 2019. If the Third Circuit upholds the district court’s ruling, it will complicate FTC enforcement efforts and push more cases into the agency’s administrative process.

The FTC’s Enforcement Powers

The FTC can initiate an enforcement action if it has “reason to believe” that the consumer protection or antitrust laws are being violated. Before 1973, the FTC could exercise its enforcement powers only through administrative adjudications, which do not allow for financial relief or an immediate prohibition on future wrongdoing.[1] While the FTC has the power to seek financial remedies through its administrative process, the penalties are limited by a three-year statute of limitations, and the FTC must demonstrate that the conduct was clearly “dishonest or fraudulent.”[2]

In 1973, Congress amended the FTC Act to add Section 13(b) and give the FTC the authority to (1) seek injunctive relief in federal court pending the completion of the FTC administrative proceeding when the FTC “has reason to believe” that a person or entity “is violating, or is about to violate” any law enforced by the FTC, and (2) seek a permanent injunction “in proper cases.” Following the enactment of Section 13(b), the FTC adopted an expansive view of its power to bring federal court enforcement actions, and started bringing cases in federal court seeking monetary relief under equitable doctrines such as restitution, disgorgement, and rescission of contracts. The FTC also asserted that its statutory power to seek a “permanent injunction” was a standalone grant of authority that entitled the FTC to bring a federal court action irrespective of whether a defendant “is violating, or is about to violate” the law. By tying its theories to these doctrines, the FTC took much of its enforcement activity outside otherwise applicable requirements, including the three-year statute of limitations and proof of a defendant’s dishonesty or fraud. Until this year, courts universally accepted the FTC’s expansive view of its authority under Section 13(b). As a result, it is the FTC’s policy that “[a] suit under Section 13(b) is preferable to the adjudicatory process because, in such a suit, the court may award both prohibitory and monetary equitable relief in one step.”[3]

Recent Decisions

Two recent court decisions have raised questions about the FTC’s view of its authority to sue in federal court solely over a defendant’s prior conduct. In FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., the FTC sued the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that between 2006 and 2012 ViroPharma had engaged in an anticompetitive campaign of repetitive and meritless filings with the FDA to delay generic competition and therefore maintain its monopoly on its branded drug. ViroPharma moved to dismiss the FTC’s complaint, arguing that the FTC had exceeded its authority under Section 13(b). Specifically, ViroPharma asserted that Section 13(b) does not provide the FTC with independent authority to seek a permanent injunction under Section 13(b), but rather limits permanent injunction actions to those cases where the FTC can show that a defendant “is violating or is about to violate” the law. On March 20, 2018, Judge Richard Andrews granted ViroPharma’s motion to dismiss, and rejected the FTC’s long-held assertion that Section 13(b) provides it with the independent authority to seek permanent injunctive relief in federal court, including relief for past violations of the FTC Act and regulations.[4] Judge Andrews held that the FTC’s authority to seek permanent injunctive relief is dependent on the FTC alleging facts that plausibly suggest a defendant is either (1) currently violating a law enforced by the FTC or (2) is about to violate such a law. Because the FTC’s complaint against ViroPharma was based on conduct that occurred five years before the filing of the complaint, the court found that the FTC failed to plead facts that demonstrate that ViroPharma was either violating or “about to” violate the law.

Subsequently, on October 15, 2018, Judge Timothy Batten, in the Northern District of Georgia, cited the ViroPharma decision in finding that the FTC’s permanent injunction authority under 13(b) authority is limited to situations where a defendant is “about to” violate the law. In FTC v. Hornbeam the FTC brought a federal court enforcement action alleging that the defendants were marketing memberships in online discount clubs to consumers seeking payday, cash advance or installment loans, in ways that violated the FTC Act, the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule, and the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act. The court rejected the FTC’s argument that courts must defer to the FTC’s determination that it has “reason to believe” that the defendants were about to violate the law.[5] Rather, the court – citing the decision in ViroPharma – held that when the FTC exercises its Section 13(b) authority it must meet federal court pleading standards and set forth sufficient facts that each defendant is “about to” violate the law.

Takeaways

If followed, the ViroPharma and Hornbeam decisions could significantly limit the FTC’s ability and willingness to pursue claims in federal court, and shift enforcement actions to the FTC’s administrative process. It is unclear how such a shift to administrative enforcement will impact how the FTC approaches enforcement actions and negotiates consent orders to resolve its investigations. On the one hand, companies may be hesitant to go through the FTC’s administrative process given that it is a notoriously slow process over which the FTC Commissioners exercise the final decision-making authority. On other hand, the FTC’s limited ability to seek financial remedies through the administrative process may provide companies greater leverage in negotiating consent decrees.

The FTC is acutely aware of the potential threat posed by these decisions, as evidenced by its decision to forgo filing an amended complaint in favor of immediately appealing the court’s ruling in ViroPharma to the Third Circuit. In its appeal to the Third Circuit, the FTC stated that if the ViroPharma holding had been applied in past cases it “would likely have doomed hundreds of other Section 13(b) actions that the FTC has filed over the years – cases that collectively have recovered many billions of dollars for victimized American consumers.”[6]

On December 11, 2018, the Third Circuit heard oral argument in ViroPharma. During oral argument the three-judge panel expressed skepticism at the FTC’s argument that Judge Andrews applied the wrong pleading standard by requiring that the FTC plead sufficient facts to show that a violation of federal law was “imminent.” A decision by the Third Circuit is expected in the first half of 2019. The Hornbeam case is still pending in the Northern District of Georgia as the FTC decided to amend its complaint following the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.

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[1] 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).

[2] 15 U.S.C. § 57b.

[3] https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.

[4] FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., No. 17-131-RGA, 2018 WL 1401329 (D. Del. 2018).

[5] FTC v. Hornbeam, No. 1:17-cv-03094-TCB (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018).

[6] FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., No. 18-1807, Document No. 003112960825 at 47 (3d Cir. June 19, 2018).

The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019

As part of Global Competition Review’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, Orrick attorneys Jay Jurata, Alex Okuliar, and Emily Luken contributed a chapter titled “IP and Antitrust,” examining three important developments this year evolving from recent trends at the intersection of IP and antitrust law.  The chapter is part of GCR’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, first published in September 2018.

The whole publication can be found here.

DOJ Encourages Self-Disclosure of FCPA Violations Discovered Through M&A Activity

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner, head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section, recently discussed the DOJ’s efforts to address corruption discovered during mergers and acquisitions. During his remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance In High Risk Markets, DAAG Miner explained that the DOJ would apply the principles in the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (“FCPA Policy”) to successor companies that disclose and cooperate with the agency after discovering wrongdoing in connection with a merger or acquisition.

The FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits corporate bribery of foreign officials and requires strong accounting practices. Last year, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced a revised FCPA Policy to help companies understand the costs and benefits of cooperation when deciding whether to voluntarily disclose misconduct. Absent aggravating circumstances or recidivism, and provided certain conditions are met, companies that voluntarily disclose, cooperate and remediate misconduct benefit from a presumption that they will receive a declination. (9-47-120 – FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.) Where a criminal resolution is warranted and (again) absent recidivism, the DOJ will recommend a reduction in the fine range. (Id.)

Application in the Mergers and Acquisition Context. With respect to M&A activity, especially in high-risk industries and markets, DAAG Miner explained that application of the FCPA Policy will give companies and their advisors more certainty when evaluating a foreign deal and determining how, and whether, to proceed with the transaction. (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.) Recognizing the benefits of having companies with strong compliance programs entering high-risk markets, the DOJ wants to encourage acquiring companies to “right the ship” by enforcing robust compliance. (Id.) Not only does application of the FCPA Policy in the M&A context encourage greater corporate compliance, it also frees up DOJ resources and enables the agency to focus on other matters. (Id.)

If potential misconduct is discovered during due diligence, the DOJ recommends the company seek guidance through its FCPA Opinion Procedures. (Id.) These procedures allow a party to assess the risk by obtaining an opinion about whether certain conduct conforms with the DOJ’s FCPA Policy. (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure.) Even for companies that discover misconduct after the acquisition, the DOJ wants to “encourage its leadership to take the steps outlined in the FCPA Policy, and when they do … reward them[.]” (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.)

Takeaways. The DOJ’s approach highlights the need for strong cross-disciplinary team staffing on mergers and acquisitions. For example, white-collar counsel can advise buyers on strategy once misconduct is flagged by corporate or antitrust counsel during the M&A process. Counsel for sellers that learns of misconduct during due diligence can discuss options with the client and coordinate as necessary to take advantage of the DOJ’s policies and guidance in mitigating any issues. Moreover, counsel for either party may uncover conduct from documents reviewed or conversations with the client that should be flagged to further assess whether misconduct has occurred. It is important to keep in mind that some of these documents may get produced to the DOJ or FTC during a merger review. Entities involved in deals in high-risk markets or industries should therefore involve deal, regulatory and enforcement experts where necessary.

Is Big Data a Big Deal? A Competition Law Approach to Big Data

Big Data Wordcloud Concept with the word big data in large block letters in red color surrounded by a cloud of related words in blue European Competition Journal article proposing a framework to determine the competitive significance of big data

Orrick Antitrust & Competition partner Alex Okuliar has co-authored an article in the European Competition Journal with Greg Sivinski, Assistant General Counsel in the Competition Law Group at Microsoft, and Lars Kjolbye, a partner at Latham & Watkins in Brussels, in which they propose a framework to determine the competitive significance of data.  The framework first considers whether the parties own or control the relevant data. The second consideration is whether the relevant data is commercially available as a product or as an input for products of downstream competitors. The third consideration is whether the relevant data is proprietary to the owner’s or controller’s products or services and a competitively critical input. The last consideration is whether reasonably available substitutes for the relevant data exist or whether the data is unique.

The article can be accessed here.

 

Pricing Algorithms: Conscious Parallelism or Conscious Commitment?

Blue screen of multi colored computer code Pricing Algorithms: Conscious Parallelism or Conscious Commitment?

Antitrust partner Alex Okuliar and associate Elena Kamenir published a column on Competition Policy International about recent commentary by the global enforcement community on pricing algorithms, the legal precedent supporting the US antitrust agencies’ views, and the possible antitrust implications for businesses. To view the column, please visit here.

 

 

DOJ and FTC Set Possible Criminal Liability Trap for HR Professionals

DOJ FTC October 20, 2016 release Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals application of antitrust laws to employee hiring and compensation criminal liabilty trap for HR professionals

In an October surprise, the DOJ and FTC (collectively, the “Agencies”) released guidance for HR professionals on the application of the antitrust laws to employee hiring and compensation.  The Agencies’ October 20, 2016 release, Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, announced that “naked” agreements among employers not to poach each other’s employees and to fix wages and other terms of employment are per se illegal.  Critically, for the first time, the Agencies warn that such agreements could result in criminal prosecution against individual HR professionals, other company executives, as well as the company.  This Guidance, coupled with repeated requests to approach the Agencies to report such agreements, signals a significant shift in enforcement focus for the Agencies, including a further move to individual prosecutions, particularly when taken together with last year’s DOJ Yates Memorandum calling for more emphasis on individual executive liability.

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Antitrust and Competition Law Is Being Wielded as an Increasingly Effective Weapon to Diminish Patent Rights in the U.S.

IP Antitrust Law diminish patent rights in the US

Partners Jay Jurata and Alex Okuliar recently published a chapter on IP and Antitrust in The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2017 published by Global Competition Review. They note that antitrust and competition law is being wielded as an increasingly effective weapon to diminish patent rights in the US. Follow the link to the chapter.

Federal Trade Commission Publishes Study Analyzing Patent Assertion Entity Organization and Behavior

For years, a debate has swirled in Washington and around the country about the role and economic value of “patent assertion entities” – often referred to derisively in the press as “patent trolls.” Some of these PAEs have been known to blanket small businesses with threatening letters claiming infringement of sometimes questionable patents hoping to receive a quick payout. The Federal Trade Commission just recently published a long-awaited Patent Assertion Entity Activity Study that analyzes the structure, organization, and behavior of PAEs, hoping to inform the debate about these entities. Using responses from a sample of 22 PAEs and more than 2,500 PAE affiliates and related entities, the study analyzes PAE acquisitions, litigation, and licensing practices over a six-year period. The findings in the study are extensive and are likely to provoke further discussion and debate. The Commission’s key findings and recommendations are discussed below. READ MORE

Are Patent Rights Poised for a Resurgence?

Patent Rights Resurgence Word Cloud

Partners Alex Okuliar and Jim Tierney recently published a piece in the National Law Journal entitled Are Patent Rights Poised for a Resurgence?  They argue that after several years of retrenchment, economic trends in the US and China, as well as developments at the federal agencies and US courts, could signal a return to stronger protections for patent owners. Follow the link to the article.

 

FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division Request Comments on Proposed Revisions to Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing IP

After several turbulent years of litigation and policy wrangling, many have asked whether the federal antitrust agencies should rewrite their two-decade old Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Guidelines”).  Should they provide clearer guidance regarding thorny questions about licensing standard essential patents (SEPs), patent assertion entities (PAEs), reverse payment settlements, or other matters that have prompted new guidelines from other enforcers around the world?  On August 12, the Federal Trade Commission and US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division responded with modest updates to the Guidelines, likely setting themselves up for considerable commentary in the weeks to come.

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Second Circuit Rules That Judges Can Decertify a Class After a Jury Verdict

The Second Circuit recently held that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a district court judge can decertify a class after a jury verdict in favor of the class but before entering judgment, upholding a Southern District Court of New York decision granting defendants’ post-verdict motion to decertify the class.  Joseph Mazzei v. The Money Store, TMS Mortgage Inc., HomEq Servicing Corp., No. 15-2054 (2d Cir. July 15, 2016).  The Second Circuit’s decision confirms that after a court certifies a class, defendants should continue to develop evidence to seek to decertify the class even after a jury verdict in favor of the class.

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Court Awards $3M Sanction and Adverse Inference for Spoliation in Antitrust Case

On July 6, 2016, Judge Leonard P. Stark, of the federal district court in Delaware, ordered a $3 million punitive monetary sanction, and an adverse inference jury instruction, against antitrust defendant Plantronics after finding that a top executive at the company had deleted thousands of potentially relevant emails.  This case is noteworthy both because of the severity of the sanction and the court’s decision to impute the conduct of an employee to the company even though numerous preservation practices were in place and the employee was instructed not to destroy information.

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ValueAct Settlement Marks Record Penalty in Heightened Agency Efforts Against HSR Act Violations

Where is the line drawn between acquisitions of securities made “solely for the purpose of investment” on one hand, and influencing control, thereby requiring regulatory approval, on the other hand? That is the central cautionary question that was reinforced by the July 12, 2016, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) settlement with ValueAct Capital.  The well-known activist investment firm agreed to pay $11 million to settle a suit alleging that it violated the premerger reporting and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).  ValueAct purchased more than $2.5 billion of shares in two oil companies, Baker Hughes Inc. and Halliburton Co., after they announced they would merge.  The DOJ alleged that ValueAct used its ownership position to influence the proposed merger and other aspects of Baker Hughes and Halliburton, and thus could not rely on the exemption.

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U.S. District Court Denies FTC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Blocking Chicago-area Advocate Health / NorthShore Hospital Merger

On June 14, 2016, U.S. District Judge Jorge Alonso, of the Northern District of Illinois, denied a motion for preliminary injunction by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, seeking to block the proposed merger between Advocate Health Care and the NorthShore University Health System (“NorthShore”) in the Chicago metropolitan area.[1]  According to Judge Alonso’s opinion released on June 20, the Plaintiffs failed to prove a relevant geographic market, the lack of which the Court deemed fatal to the Plaintiffs’ case.[2]

This loss could be a blow for the FTC’s health care competition enforcement program.  It is the agency’s second loss in district court this year in a hospital merger challenge.  Additionally, as we noted in our May 13, 2016 blog post concerning the FTC’s earlier loss on the Hershey merger—now on appeal to the Third Circuit—both cases reflect push-back by courts against what to this point have been highly successful FTC market definition and consumer harm arguments in hospital merger cases.

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No Easy Answers: Ohlhausen Challenges Notion of “Monopoly Problem” In the US

On June 1, 2016, FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen delivered remarks in Hong Kong, pushing back on recent news reports implying that the United States currently suffers from a “monopoly problem” causing a reduction of competition in the marketplace.  Recent articles and opinion pieces in The Economist and The New York Times suggest that the consolidation of market power, and lack of antitrust enforcement preventing such consolidation, are having a noticeable effect and harming consumers and innovation.  Indeed, the precursor to these reports—an April 14, 2016 report from the Council of Economic Advisers (“CEA”), entitled “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” argues there has been a decline of competition in certain parts of the U.S. economy due the concentration of monopoly power in the hands of a select few players in certain industries (e.g., airlines, cable, networking).  The CEA report suggests U.S. agencies should explore how certain factors—the use of Big Data, increased price transparency, and common stock ownership—affect competition.  As a result of the CEA report, President Obama issued an Executive Order on April 15, 2016, directing antitrust enforcement agencies to use their authority to “promote competition.”

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U.S. District Court Denies FTC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Blocking Penn State Hershey / PinnacleHealth Hospital Merger

On May 9, 2016, U.S. District Judge John Jones III, of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, rejected a motion for preliminary injunction by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Pennsylvania Attorney General to halt the proposed merger between Penn State Hershey Medical Center (“Hershey”) and PinnacleHealth System (“Pinnacle”).  The Court’s decision represents a potential setback for the FTC’s enforcement against hospital consolidation around the country.  The opinion raises further questions about recent analyses endorsed by the agency and other federal courts when reviewing hospital mergers.  The Court has extended the temporary restraining order in effect until May 27, 2016, to allow the FTC and the Attorney General to seek relief from the 3d Circuit.

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1st Circ. Charts Conservative Post-Actavis Course In Loestrin

Members of Orrick’s Life Sciences practice with experience addressing pharmaceutical industry antitrust and IP issues recently published an article analyzing the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Loestrin, No. 14-2071 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).  In that decision—only the second appellate decision applying the Supreme Court’s seminal 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis , the First Circuit addresses a few of the antitrust issues surrounding so-called “reverse-payment” settlements of patent infringement litigation between branded and generic drug manufacturers.  To read the published article, please click here.

FTC Puts “Standalone” Section 5 Enforcement Approach on the Record

For the first time in its 101-year history, the Federal Trade Commission yesterday issued a policy statement outlining the extent of its authority to police “unfair methods of competition” on a “standalone” basis under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.[1]  In a terse Statement of Enforcement Principles, the Commission laid out a framework for its Section 5 jurisprudence that was predictably tethered to the familiar antitrust “rule of reason” analysis but also sets forth a potentially expansive approach to enforcement.[2]  Indeed, the Commission’s approach could encompass novel enforcement theories premised on acts or practices that “contravene the spirit of the antitrust laws” as well as those incipient acts that, if allowed to mature or complete, “could violate the Sherman or Clayton Act.”[3]  Commissioner Ohlhausen’s lone dissent recognizes these potentially disconcerting developments for private industry.[4] READ MORE