Posts by: Diana Gillis

DECREASING HSR Premerger Notification Thresholds in 2021

Posted on

Takeaways

  • The new minimum HSR threshold is DECREASING from $94 million to $92 million.
  • New thresholds apply to any transaction closing on or after March 4, 2021.
  • Failure to file may result in a fine of up to $43,792 per day of non-compliance.
  • The HSR Act casts a wide net, catching mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

The Federal Trade Commission has announced new HSR thresholds for 2021, which are lower than the existing thresholds. The thresholds typically increase year-over-year, but are decreasing in 2021 from $94 million to $92 million, potentially requiring HSR premerger notification filings to the U.S. antitrust agencies for smaller transactions. The new threshold will begin to apply to transactions closing on March 4, 2021. The HSR Act and Rules require that parties to certain transactions submit an HSR filing and wait up to 30 days (or more, if additional information is formally requested) before closing, which gives the government time to review the transaction for potential antitrust concerns. The HSR Act applies to a wide variety of transactions, including those outside the usual M&A context. Potentially reportable transactions include mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

Determining reportability: Does the transaction meet the Size of Transaction test?

The potential need for an HSR filing requires determining whether the acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests, and/or assets valued in excess of the HSR “Size of Transaction” threshold that is in place at the time of closing. Calculating the Size of Transaction may require aggregating voting securities, non-corporate interests, and assets previously acquired, with what will be acquired in the contemplated transaction. It may also include more than the purchase price, such as earnouts and liabilities. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine what must be included in determining your Size of Transaction.

If the transaction will close before March 4, 2021, the $94 million threshold still applies; closings as of March 4, 2021 will be subject to the lower $92 million threshold.

Determining reportability: Do the parties to the transaction have to meet the Size of Person test?

Transactions that satisfy the Size of Transaction threshold may also have to satisfy the “Size of Person” thresholds to be HSR-reportable. These new thresholds are also effective for all closings on or after March 4, 2021. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine which entity’s sales and assets must be evaluated.

Filing Fee

For all HSR filings, one filing fee is required per transaction. The amount of the filing fee is based on the Size of Transaction.

Failure to File Penalty

Failing to submit an HSR filing can carry a significant financial penalty for each day of non-compliance.

Always consult with HSR counsel to determine if your transaction is HSR-reportable, especially before concluding that a filing is not required. Even if the Size of Transaction and Size of Person tests are met, the transaction may be exempt from the filing requirements.

M&A HSR Premerger Notification Thresholds Increase in 2020

Posted on

Chinese: 美国提高2020年HSR法案并购前申报门槛

Takeaways

  • The new minimum HSR threshold is $94 million and applies to transactions closing on or after February 27, 2020.
  • The current threshold of $90 million is in effect for all transactions that will close through February 26, 2020.
  • Failure to file may result in a fine of up to $43,280 per day of non-compliance.
  • The HSR Act casts a wide net, catching mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

The Federal Trade Commission has announced new HSR thresholds for 2020. Transactions closing on or after February 27, 2020 that are valued in excess of $94 million potentially require an HSR premerger notification filing to the U.S. antitrust agencies. The HSR Act and Rules require that parties to certain transactions submit an HSR filing and wait up to 30 days (or more, if additional information is formally requested) before closing, which gives the government time to review the transaction for potential antitrust concerns. The HSR Act applies to a wide variety of transactions, including those outside the usual M&A context. Potentially reportable transactions include mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

Determining reportability: Does the transaction meet the Size of Transaction test?

The potential need for an HSR filing requires determining whether the acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests, and/or assets valued in excess of the HSR “Size of Transaction” threshold that is in place at the time of closing. Calculating the Size of Transaction may require aggregating voting securities, non-corporate interests, and assets previously acquired, with what will be acquired in the contemplated transaction. It may also include more than the purchase price, such as earnouts and liabilities. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine what must be included in determining your Size of Transaction.

If the transaction will close before February 27, 2020, the $90 million threshold still applies; closings as of February 27, 2020 will be subject to the new $94 million threshold.

Determining reportability: Do the parties to the transaction have to meet the Size of Person test?

Transactions that satisfy the Size of Transaction threshold may also have to satisfy the “Size of Person” thresholds to be HSR-reportable. These new thresholds are also effective for all closings on or after February 27, 2020. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine which entity’s sales and assets must be evaluated.

Filing Fee

For all HSR filings, one filing fee is required per transaction. The amount of the filing fee is based on the Size of Transaction.

Failure to File Penalty

Failing to submit an HSR filing can carry a significant financial penalty for each day of non-compliance.

Always consult with HSR counsel to determine if your transaction is HSR-reportable, especially before concluding that a filing is not required. Even if the Size of Transaction and Size of Person tests are met, the transaction may be exempt from the filing requirements.

No HSR Filing Means No Antitrust Issues? Think Again!

and Posted on

My transaction does not require an HSR filing. That means we don’t have to worry about potential antitrust issues, right? WRONG.

The HSR Act requires that parties to certain transactions submit a premerger notification filing to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and then observe a waiting period before closing. Any transaction valued in excess of the HSR threshold – currently $90 million – may require an HSR filing and expiration of the HSR waiting period as conditions to closing. An HSR filing may not be required where the transaction does not meet the minimum jurisdictional thresholds or an exemption to filing is available. Parties, however, should not equate “no HSR filing” with “no antitrust issues.”

The FTC just ordered the unwinding of a 2017 merger that was not HSR-reportable. German company Otto Bock HealthCare acquired private equity-backed Freedom Innovations; both companies supplied prosthetics and were the #1 and #3 manufacturers of microprocessor-equipped prosthetic knees. Otto Bock and Freedom confused “no HSR filing” with “no antitrust issues,” stating in the press release that “Anti-trust matters have already been clarified and a ‘simultaneous signing and closing’ was carried out.”

DOJ and FTC History of Investigating HSR Non-Reportable Deals – Even Very Small Deals

The DOJ and FTC have a history of launching investigations into transactions that did not require an HSR filing – including very small deals. Two examples are the DOJ’s post-consummation challenge of George’s $3 million acquisition of a chicken plant from Tyson Foods Inc., and the FTC’s challenge of American Renal’s $4.4 million acquisition of Fresenius dialysis clinics.

Even HSR-Cleared Deals Can Be Challenged Later

Parties also should not confuse HSR “clearance” with substantive “antitrust clearance.” While rarely used, the DOJ and FTC have the ability to later challenge transactions that were HSR-reportable and cleared. Recently, DOJ allowed the HSR waiting period to expire for Parker-Hannifin’s $4.3 billion acquisition of CLARCOR, Inc., and then challenged the consummated merger nine months later.

When the Federal Antitrust Agencies Pass, Others May Step Up to Investigate

The DOJ and FTC are not the only antitrust enforcers who can investigate a deal, and State Attorneys General (AGs) are becoming more active in merger investigations. For example, when the FTC decided against challenging Valero’s proposed acquisition of two Plains All American petroleum terminals in California, the California AG filed suit to block the deal.

All Deals Can Raise Concerns about Sharing Competitively Sensitive Information

Even after Valero abandoned the Plains All American terminal acquisition, the FTC continued to investigate if Plains improperly shared competitively sensitive information with prospective bidders, which could have been used to harm competition during or after the sale process.

Takeaways

Regardless of whether an HSR filing will be required:

  • Parties should always consider the antitrust risk of a transaction, no matter how big or small the deal or competitive overlap. Antitrust concerns can emerge from potential competition, too, in which case there may be no directly competing sales at the time the deal documents are executed. Before or after closing, filing HSR or not, the deal could face questions or a challenge from the federal antitrust agencies, State AGs or others.
  • Parties should always practice good document hygiene, bearing in mind that anything could be produced to the government or come to their attention. For example, Freedom’s own press release flagged that the merger combined the “number one and the number three” players.
  • Parties should implement practices to safeguard any competitively sensitive information that is shared through due diligence or otherwise during the bid/sale process. They also should ensure they do not violate anti-gun jumping laws that prohibit a buyer from taking control of a target or its operations pre-close.

 

Merger Non-Compete Clauses – Be Lawful or Be Gone

and Posted on

Non-compete clauses are commonly included in M&A agreements. Although generally recognized as lawful, non-competes must fulfill certain requirements to comply with antitrust and competition laws. A recent FTC enforcement action further clarifies these requirements for the U.S., and serves as a reminder that U.S. antitrust authorities are actively reviewing these provisions.

In January 2019 NEXUS Gas Transmission LLC entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) to acquire Generation Pipeline LLC, a 23-mile natural gas pipeline in the Toledo, Ohio area, from a group of sellers for $160 million.

In the Complaint and Proposed Consent announced on September 13, 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took issue with the non-compete clause in the PSA, which would have prohibited one seller, North Coast Gas Transmission (NCGT), from competing with the Generation Pipeline for three years. NCGT not only holds a minority interest in the Generation Pipeline, but also holds the North Coast Pipeline, a 280-mile natural gas pipeline partially serving the same region. In the FTC’s view, the non-compete clause was effectively an agreement by two competitors to cease competition for a period of time. As a condition to receiving antitrust clearance to proceed with the transaction, the parties were required to amend the PSA to eliminate the non-compete clause, enabling NCGT’s North Coast Pipeline to continue competing with the Generation Pipeline. The parties will also be subject to various reporting and compliance requirements for ten years.

It is important to note that even where a transaction does not itself raise antitrust issues – as here, where the FTC did not find any issues with NEXUS’s acquisition of the Generation Pipeline – the antitrust agencies may nonetheless take issue with the ancillary agreements to a transaction. Here, the FTC looked beyond the competitive implications of the primary transaction and investigated the impact of the non-compete clause. Parties should carefully draft and negotiate all M&A agreement clauses that may impact competition, and consult with antitrust counsel as needed.


Companies, Board Members and Officers Take Note: U.S. Antitrust Agencies Are Focused on Interlocking Directorates

and Posted on

The FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division have again warned companies, along with their board members and officers, of the legal prohibition on interlocking directorates: when an individual, or an organization’s agent(s), simultaneously serves as an officer or director of two competing companies. In a recent FTC blog, and prior post, the agency flagged the importance of monitoring for interlock issues during standard antitrust compliance. The DOJ Antitrust Division likewise recently made clear in remarks by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Andrew Finch, that it, too, is closely monitoring interlocks, particularly during transaction reviews. In-house counsel, board members and executive officers must routinely monitor interlock issues, or risk an independent government investigation or side investigation to an M&A review.

The Law

Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19, prohibits “interlocking directorates.” The concern is that officer or director interlocks between competitors could result in inappropriate coordination or the sharing of competitively sensitive information, in violation of antitrust laws. The purpose of Section 8 is therefore to “nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates.” U.S. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).

Q: Which positions are covered?

A: “Director” means a member of the board of directors, and “officer” means a position elected or chosen by the board. The prohibition applies not only to the same individual serving as an officer and/or director of two competing companies but also to entities (like private equity firms) that have their agent(s) or representative(s) serving in these roles.

Q: Which entities are covered?

A: While the statute specifically refers to interlocks among “corporations,” DOJ Antitrust Division AAG Delrahim recently signaled a willingness to enforce Section 8 against unincorporated entities such as LLCs, as the potential harm is “the same regardless of the forms of the entities.” The FTC has taken similar positions in, for example, investigating interlocks involving banks, which Section 8 exempts, and competing non-bank corporations.

Q: What are “competitive sales”?

A: “Competitive sales” are “the gross revenues for all products and services” sold by one company in competition with the other, “determined on the basis of annual gross revenues for such products and services in [the company’s] last completed fiscal year.” Companies are “competitors” if an agreement between them would violate antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B), (a)(2). The FTC has advised companies to look at their ordinary course business documents and to speak to knowledgeable employees in determining if two companies compete.

Q: Is there a grace period for compliance?

A: If an interlock did not violate Section 8 at the time it was established but, later, changed circumstances cause a prohibited interlock (such as two companies that previously did not compete becoming competitors), the companies or individuals will have one year to cure. During that time frame, parties must remember that other antitrust laws still apply.

When an interlock violates Section 8 from the time it was established, there is no grace period to cure.

The Risks

Section 8 violations are inherently illegal and do not require proof that the interlock resulted in harm to competition. The government’s remedy for a Section 8 violation is injunctive relief—elimination of the offending interlock, typically with an officer or director’s resignation. But any interlock — in violation of Section 8 or not—could give rise to claims under other antitrust laws. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in restraint of commerce. The FTC has stated it may use Section 5 to reach interlocks that may not “technically meet” the ban in Section 8 of the Clayton Act but which the agency determines may “violate the policy against horizontal interlocks expressed in Section 8.” Private plaintiffs also could bring a Sherman Act claim for treble damages.

DOJ Publishes Statements Clarifying Its Analysis of No-Poach Agreements – But Questions Remain

, and Posted on

Since issuing the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals in 2016, the DOJ Antitrust Division has remained active in enforcing and commenting on agreements among employers not to compete for hiring employees (“no-poach” agreements). DOJ filed several statements of interest in private antitrust suits involving no-poach provisions to provide guidance to the courts on the proper application of the federal antitrust laws to such restraints. Although the statements of interest provided clarity on the analysis of “naked” no-poach agreements, questions remain about the appropriate standard for analyzing no-poach restraints in franchise agreements.

Naked No-Poach Agreements Are Per Se Unlawful

DOJ recently took the unusual step of filing an unopposed motion to intervene in a class action no-poach settlement to enforce the injunctive relief agreed upon by the parties. The proposed class action alleged that a no-poach agreement between Duke/Duke University Health System and UNC/UNC Health Care System harmed competition for skilled medical labor. The named plaintiff alleged she was denied a lateral move to UNC from Duke because of agreements between senior administrators and deans at the institutions. On May 22 the court approved DOJ’s motion to intervene.

In its statement of interest, DOJ argued that such restrictions on hiring are per se unlawful market-allocation agreements between competing employers. These agreements harm consumers (employees) by depriving them of the benefits of competition that may lead to better wages or terms of employment. A court or agency will not evaluate the competitive effects of a per se unlawful agreement. Unlike such “naked” restraints, agreements that are ancillary to a separate, legitimate competitor collaboration are not considered per se unlawful and are analyzed under the rule of reason. In this case, DOJ argued that Duke had not presented evidence to show that the restraint was ancillary to a legitimate collaboration. DOJ’s analysis of the alleged agreements in its statement further cements the agency’s stance that “naked” no-poach agreements are per se unlawful. DOJ’s statement of interest sends a strong signal that it is actively monitoring no-poach cases and will readily offer its views where a party is making arguments inconsistent with the agency’s interpretation of the law. DOJ’s intervention will also deter the parties from violating the settlement and send a clear signal to others that DOJ will aggressively pursue firms that enter into naked no-poach agreements.

Questions Remain as to the Appropriate Standard for Analyzing Employment Restrictions in Franchise Agreements

Also making their way through the courts are several cases against fast-food chains alleging that franchisor agreements prohibiting poaching among franchisees are unlawful. For example, a complaint against Jimmy John’s alleged that Jimmy John’s orchestrated no-solicitation and no-hire agreements between and among franchisees. Similar claims were made against Auntie Ann’s, Carl’s Jr., Domino’s Pizza and Arby’s, among others, with some food chains settling.

DOJ filed a statement of interest in Harris v. CJ Star, LLC, Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., and Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. In its statement, DOJ took the position that most franchisor-franchisee restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason. It reasoned the agreement was vertical in nature because it is between a franchisor and a franchisee (parties “at different levels of the market structure”). By way of example, DOJ pointed to territorial allocations among franchises that restrict intrabrand competition but increase interbrand competition (i.e. competition among other food chains). Such restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason.

DOJ also argued that where there is “direct competition between a franchisor and its franchisees to hire employees with similar skills, a no-poach agreement between them is correctly characterized as horizontal and, if not ancillary to any legitimate and procompetitive joint venture, would be per se unlawful.” But then DOJ stated that the hub-and-spoke nature of the franchise agreement was an ancillary restraint because “the typical franchise relationship itself is a legitimate business collaboration in which the franchisees operate under the same brand.” According to DOJ, if the no-poach agreements are reasonably necessary to the franchise collaboration and not overbroad, they constitute an ancillary restraint subject to the rule of reason.

By contrast, the Attorney General of Washington took the position in an amicus brief that franchise agreements that “restrict solicitation and hiring among franchisees and a corporate-owned store” should be analyzed as per se unlawful, at least under state law. The AG argued that these agreements have both vertical and horizontal characteristics. Given the horizontal component, the AG took the position that such agreements do not warrant analysis under the more lenient rule of reason. The AG further argued that franchisors have “a heavy burden” in showing that these restraints can be justified as ancillary to a legitimate collaboration. The American Antitrust Institute similarly critiqued DOJ’s approach in a letter. It argued that the franchise no-poach agreements at issue are not ancillary because “[a]greements that have no plausible justifications or cognizable efficiencies are never ancillary” since they “do not hold the promise of procompetitive benefits and are not ‘necessary’ to the broader integration.”

Courts hearing the fast-food cases will have to resolve these conflicting arguments as they consider various motions to dismiss. In late May, a judge refused to grant Domino’s Pizza’s motion to dismiss concerning a no-hire provision that was included in the chain’s franchise agreements. The clause prohibited franchisees from recruiting or hiring other Domino’s franchisee employees without prior written consent. The judge found that plaintiff had sufficiently pled a horizontal restraint between franchisees and did not need to decide at the motion to dismiss stage which standard should ultimately be applied. The court reasoned that more factual development would be needed to decide that issue, unpersuaded by Domino’s Pizza’s reliance on summary judgment and trial decisions that contained a more robust factual record. A recent order by a district court evaluating similar claims against Jimmy John’s highlighted the varying positions emerging, referring to a “dichotomy” between DOJ’s position and the American Antitrust Institute. Although it acknowledged that DOJ is a “titan in this arena,” the court stressed that the agency is “not the ultimate authority on the subject.”

For now, employers that are members of any no-poach agreement with a vertical component should proceed with caution. Although DOJ’s position is favorable to no-poach agreements they deem vertical in nature, questions remain as to whether these agreements warrant per se, quick look, or rule of reason analysis.[1] Courts are proceeding cautiously, and a consensus has not yet emerged. As the court in Jimmy John’s succinctly summarized: “[T]hese questions here are in their infancy, and this battle looks like one that will make its way through the courts for years to come.”

________________

[1] A “quick look” analysis is used “when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.” California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).

M&A HSR Premerger Notification Thresholds Increase in 2019

Posted on

Takeaways

  • The new minimum HSR threshold is $90 million and applies to transactions closing on or after April 3, 2019.
  • The current threshold of $84.4 million is in effect for all transactions that will close through April 2, 2019.
  • Failure to file may result in a fine of up to $42,530 per day of non-compliance.
  • The HSR Act casts a wide net, catching mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

The Federal Trade Commission has announced new HSR thresholds for 2019. The thresholds are adjusted annually, and were delayed this year by the government shutdown. Transactions closing on or after April 3, 2019 that are valued in excess of $90 million potentially require an HSR premerger notification filing to the U.S. antitrust agencies. The HSR Act and Rules require that parties to certain transactions submit an HSR filing and wait up to 30 days (or more, if additional information is formally requested) before closing, which gives the government time to review the transaction for potential antitrust concerns. The HSR Act applies to a wide variety of transactions, including those outside the usual M&A context. Potentially reportable transactions include mergers and acquisitions, minority stock positions (including compensation equity and financing rounds), asset acquisitions, joint venture formations, and grants of exclusive licenses, among others.

Determining reportability: Does the transaction meet the Size of Transaction test?

The potential need for an HSR filing requires determining whether the acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests, and/or assets valued in excess of the HSR “Size of Transaction” threshold that is in place at the time of closing. Calculating the Size of Transaction may require aggregating voting securities, non-corporate interests, and assets previously acquired, with what will be acquired in the contemplated transaction. It may also include more than the purchase price, such as earnouts and liabilities. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine what must be included in determining your Size of Transaction.

If the transaction will close before April 3, 2019, the $84.4 million threshold still applies; closings as of April 3, 2019 will be subject to the new $90 million threshold.

Determining reportability: Do the parties to the transaction have to meet the Size of Person test?

Transactions that satisfy the Size of Transaction threshold may also have to satisfy the “Size of Person” thresholds to be HSR-reportable. These new thresholds are also effective for all closings on or after April 3, 2019. Talk to your HSR counsel to determine which entity’s sales and assets must be evaluated.

Filing Fee

For all HSR filings, one filing fee is required per transaction. The amount of the filing fee is based on the Size of Transaction.

Failure to File Penalty

Failing to submit an HSR filing can carry a significant financial penalty for each day of non-compliance.

Always consult with HSR counsel to determine if your transaction is HSR-reportable. Even if the Size of Transaction and Size of Person tests are met, the transaction may be exempt from the filing requirements.

Know Your Investors – Their Holdings and Board Seats Can Create Antitrust Risk for Your Company

Posted on

A recent divesture ordered by the Federal Trade Commission should serve as a reminder that private equity- and venture capital-backed companies need to evaluate the other holdings of their investors and directors to avoid potential antitrust problems.

Background

Red Ventures and Bankrate are marketing companies that connect consumers with providers in various industries. In 2017, Red Ventures entered into an agreement to acquire Bankrate for $1.4 billion. Among other interests, Bankrate operated “Caring.com,” a website used to generate customer leads for providers of senior living facilities. Red Ventures did not offer a competing product in this space, but the FTC nonetheless required the divestiture of Caring.com, citing competitive concerns generated by operations of Red Ventures’ investors and directors.

Specifically, two of the largest shareholders in Red Ventures are private equity firms General Atlantic and Silver Lake Partners, with a combined 34 percent stake, two of seven board seats, and other substantial rights over operations. General Atlantic and Silver Lake separately owned “A Place for Mom” which, like Caring.com, provides an online referral service for providers of senior living facilities. According to the FTC’s complaint, “A Place for Mom” and “Caring.com” were each other’s closest competitors, with the number one and number two positions in the market. Here, the FTC looked behind the actual parties to the transaction to identify potential competitive concerns.

Takeaways

Private equity- and venture capital-backed companies must be aware of the competitive, or potentially competitive, holdings of their investors and directors.

  • As in the Red Ventures/Bankrate acquisition, the separate holdings of significant investors may become a focus of the government’s antitrust review of a transaction.
  • An investor simultaneously holding seats on the boards of two competing companies may violate the statute prohibiting interlocking directorates.[1]
  • Finally, companies should ensure that protections are in place to prevent any scenario – real or implied – where the investor or director could serve as a conduit for the sharing of competitively sensitive information between competing companies.[2]

___________________________

[1] See 15 USC § 19.

[2] See 15 USC § 1.

DOJ Encourages Self-Disclosure of FCPA Violations Discovered Through M&A Activity

and Posted on

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner, head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section, recently discussed the DOJ’s efforts to address corruption discovered during mergers and acquisitions. During his remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance In High Risk Markets, DAAG Miner explained that the DOJ would apply the principles in the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (“FCPA Policy”) to successor companies that disclose and cooperate with the agency after discovering wrongdoing in connection with a merger or acquisition.

The FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits corporate bribery of foreign officials and requires strong accounting practices. Last year, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced a revised FCPA Policy to help companies understand the costs and benefits of cooperation when deciding whether to voluntarily disclose misconduct. Absent aggravating circumstances or recidivism, and provided certain conditions are met, companies that voluntarily disclose, cooperate and remediate misconduct benefit from a presumption that they will receive a declination. (9-47-120 – FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.) Where a criminal resolution is warranted and (again) absent recidivism, the DOJ will recommend a reduction in the fine range. (Id.)

Application in the Mergers and Acquisition Context. With respect to M&A activity, especially in high-risk industries and markets, DAAG Miner explained that application of the FCPA Policy will give companies and their advisors more certainty when evaluating a foreign deal and determining how, and whether, to proceed with the transaction. (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.) Recognizing the benefits of having companies with strong compliance programs entering high-risk markets, the DOJ wants to encourage acquiring companies to “right the ship” by enforcing robust compliance. (Id.) Not only does application of the FCPA Policy in the M&A context encourage greater corporate compliance, it also frees up DOJ resources and enables the agency to focus on other matters. (Id.)

If potential misconduct is discovered during due diligence, the DOJ recommends the company seek guidance through its FCPA Opinion Procedures. (Id.) These procedures allow a party to assess the risk by obtaining an opinion about whether certain conduct conforms with the DOJ’s FCPA Policy. (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure.) Even for companies that discover misconduct after the acquisition, the DOJ wants to “encourage its leadership to take the steps outlined in the FCPA Policy, and when they do … reward them[.]” (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.)

Takeaways. The DOJ’s approach highlights the need for strong cross-disciplinary team staffing on mergers and acquisitions. For example, white-collar counsel can advise buyers on strategy once misconduct is flagged by corporate or antitrust counsel during the M&A process. Counsel for sellers that learns of misconduct during due diligence can discuss options with the client and coordinate as necessary to take advantage of the DOJ’s policies and guidance in mitigating any issues. Moreover, counsel for either party may uncover conduct from documents reviewed or conversations with the client that should be flagged to further assess whether misconduct has occurred. It is important to keep in mind that some of these documents may get produced to the DOJ or FTC during a merger review. Entities involved in deals in high-risk markets or industries should therefore involve deal, regulatory and enforcement experts where necessary.

Stock Compensation May Trigger HSR Filing

Posted on

The requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act and Rules are well known to companies that engage in significant M&A transactions. But less well known is their applicability to acquisitions of stock by individuals as part of compensation practices. Especially where relatively young and successful companies are involved, HSR obligations may unexpectedly arise where equity compensation is given to founders, board members, executives, and other employees (whom we will group together and call “Insiders”). Companies and individuals potentially caught in the HSR process for this reason should ensure they are aware of the trigger rules, as a failure to file can result in significant fines.
READ MORE →