Emily Luken

Senior Associate

Washington, D.C. Office


Read full biography at www.orrick.com

Emily Luken is a Senior Associate in Orrick's Washington, D.C., office and a member of the Antitrust and Competition practice group.

Emily’s practice focuses on issues at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property, with a particular emphasis on standards-essential patents (SEPs) subject to a commitment to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms (FRAND). She also has experience litigating other complex commercial disputes.

Prior to law school, Emily worked as a research assistant and project coordinator at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

Posts by: Emily Luken

U.S. v. Sabre: Putting the Innovation Theory of Harm to the Test?

In its recent complaint challenging the $360 million acquisition of Farelogix by Sabre, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) appears to have left the door open to offering proof that harm to innovation in the market for airline bookings is a separate and independent basis to block the merger. When the case goes to trial in January 2020, watch to see if DOJ uses this case to provide a roadmap for the evidence and analytical tools to analyze innovation effects in a technology merger.

The Sabre/Farelogix Lawsuit

The DOJ complaint alleges that Sabre’s acquisition of Farelogix is a “dominant firm’s attempt to eliminate a disruptive competitor after years of trying to stamp it out.” Sabre operates the largest global distribution system (“GDS”) in the United States. A GDS is a computerized system that allows brick-and-mortar and online travel agents to search for fares and schedules and book flights across multiple airlines. The complaint alleges Farelogix is a disruptive competitor that has eroded Sabre’s dominance in airline bookings. Farelogix offers an innovative booking service that allows airlines to bypass GDSs and connect directly to travel agencies. Farelogix has also pioneered the next-generation technology standard, called “New Distribution Capability” (“NDC”). NDC offers more advanced communications between airlines and travel agents and gives airlines greater flexibility to offer travelers ancillary products and services, such as priority boarding and Wi-Fi.

The complaint alleges that over the years Sabre has used its dominant position to engage in a broad range of anticompetitive conduct to delay adoption of NDC and to impede Farelogix’s ability to compete . Despite Sabre’s efforts, Farelogix has loosened Sabre’s grip on the market for airline bookings which has given the airlines leverage to negotiate lower fees from the GDSs. In addition, competition from Farelogix has pushed Sabre to update its own outdated airline booking technology. In spite of Sabre’s efforts to hobble Farelogix, demand for NDC has steadily grown and Sabre has recognized Farelogix as an existential threat to its business model. According to DOJ, “[i]nstead of innovating to compete with Farelogix, Sabre has resorted to eliminating the competitive threat by acquiring Farelogix” and the “acquisition would wipe out this competition and innovation, harming airlines and American travelers.”

In a press statement released the same day the complaint was filed, Sabre wrote that the “DOJ’s claims lack a basis in reality and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding” of the airline booking market. In its answer, Sabre argues the transaction is procompetitive because it will accelerate the delivery of new technology to the airline booking market by combining Farelogix’s NDC technology and retailing capabilities with Sabre’s travel agent network and global footprint. Sabre challenges DOJ’s conclusion that Farelogix is a particularly disruptive and innovative competitor. Sabre contends Farelogix is “not disruptive today and will not become so in the future.” Farelogix’s booking service earned only $7 million in revenues in 2018 and has close to a zero percent share of the airline booking markets alleged in the complaint. Sabre further contends Farelogix is not poised to disrupt the market because there is nothing unique about Farelogix’s technology. NDC is an open standard that is freely available and at least 39 other firms are certified to provide NDC solutions.

Harm to Innovation

Traditional merger analysis has focused on price competition—the merged firm’s ability to raise price or reduce output. In recent decades, nonprice competition—the merged firm’s ability to reduce quality and innovation—has become an important dimension of merger analysis. The emphasis on innovation is nothing new. Section 6.4 of the DOJ/FTC 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines makes clear that competition may be harmed if a merger reduces the merged firm’s incentives to innovate:

The Agencies may consider whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.

Alleging harm to innovation is a well-accepted theory and many DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) complaints have alleged technology mergers will reduce incentives to innovate. For example, in U.S. v. Bazaarvoice, a litigated case involving the consummated merger of the two leading ratings and review platforms, the DOJ introduced substantial evidence that competition between the parties was the primary driver of innovation in the market. In another recent DOJ case, the proposed acquisition of Tokyo Electron by Applied Materials, the parties abandoned the merger when they were unable to address the DOJ’s innovation concerns. Similarly, the FTC has challenged mergers to protect innovation in high-tech markets. For example, in Nielsen/Arbitron, the FTC required divestitures to protect future competition in the market for cross-platform audience-measurement services and in NXP/Freescale the FTC required divestitures to protect future competition in the semiconductor industry. FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen explained the importance of innovation in the review of high-tech mergers:

Higher prices are obviously a fundamental concern in reviewing mergers of close competitors. The loss of competition to innovate and to develop better, faster, more efficient products, however can be just as concerning – particularly in the technology area, where essential competition often is not on price, but rather on product features.

Assessing Harm to Innovation

Most of these enforcement actions were resolved by consent where the agencies did not go into detail regarding the evidence considered and the analytic tools used to assess harm to innovation. In Bazaarvoice, the one litigated case, DOJ alleged harm to innovation along with effects on price and quality. DOJ did not ask, and the court did not find, that harm to innovation was a separate and independent basis to find the merger substantially reduced competition in the ratings and review market.

The Sabre complaint alleges two separate and distinct theories of competitive harm: (i) higher prices due to the elimination of head-to-head competition between Sabre and Farelogix, and (ii) reduced incentives to invest and innovate next-generation technology. The structure of the Sabre complaint and the extensive references to innovation competition suggests that DOJ may ask the court to make a separate finding that the merger should be blocked based on an innovation theory of harm.

The DOJ’s focus on innovation effects is likely a response to criticism that the agencies have placed excessive focus on price effects and failed to intervene when dominant firms acquire smaller, disruptive competitors. DOJ may seek to use the Sabre case to put harm to innovation on equal footing with price effects. Discovering whether DOJ intends to allege harm to innovation as a separate and independent basis to block the merger will have to wait until DOJ files its pretrial brief and presents expert and other testimony at trial. But if this is DOJ’s intention, the trial may very well answer some open questions about how the agencies approach the elimination of small, innovative competitors. For example, will DOJ articulate a clear standard for blocking a dominant firm’s acquisition of a smaller, innovative competitor? Even if Farelogix has been an aggressive and innovative competitor, will DOJ be able to prove Farelogix is uniquely positioned to push the airline booking industry forward? Expect Sabre to offer evidence that the GDSs have been a source of innovation and that there are many other similarly situated competitors that can match Farelogix’s NDC technology. Will DOJ be able to prove how Farelogix would have developed without the merger? Expect Sabre to argue that Farelogix is a weak competitor that does not have the resources to implement NDC technology at scale. What weight will DOJ give to any integration efficiencies of combining Sabre’s and Farelogix’s respective technologies? Expect Sabre to argue that the merger will lead to better products that will enhance, rather than stifle, innovation. Finally, what, if any, economic tools will DOJ use to measure any potential reduction in innovation in the airline booking market?

Toward Uncharted Waters – The CVS-Aetna Merger

On June 4 – 5, 2019, Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held an extraordinary and unprecedented evidentiary hearing to decide whether to enter the proposed Final Judgment in U.S. v. CVS/Aetna requiring the divestiture of Aetna’s Medicare Part D business. Judge Leon has been highly critical of DOJ’s proposed remedy and has disrupted long-established DOJ practices to resolve competitive concerns in merger cases. A decision to reject the Division’s proposed remedy would upend established law, interfere with DOJ’s ability to negotiate merger settlements, and create uncertainty in DOJ’s merger enforcement program.

Procedural History

Following an 11-month investigation, the Antitrust Division on October 10, 2018 filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin CVS Health Corporation’s $69 billion acquisition of Aetna, Inc. The complaint alleged the transaction would substantially lessen competition for the sale of individual prescription drug plans (“individual PDPs”) in 16 regions in the U.S. Individual PDPs provide Medicare beneficiaries with insurance coverage for their prescription drugs (Medicare Part D). To address the harm alleged in the Complaint, the Division filed a proposed Final Judgment that required CVS to divest Aetna’s nationwide individual PDP business to WellCare Health Plans, Inc.

When settling an antitrust case, DOJ must comply with the Tunney Act, which establishes various procedures the parties must follow, after which the settlement can be submitted to the court to determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment “is in the public interest.”[1] Consistent with standard Tunney Act practice, Judge Leon entered an order permitting the parties to close their transaction and requiring CVS to hold separate Aetna’s individual PDP business until the assets are divested to WellCare. Pursuant to Judge Leon’s order, the parties closed their transaction on November 28, 2018, and two days later completed the divestiture to WellCare.

Despite having authorized the parties to close the transaction, Judge Leon became concerned the status quo would not be preserved in the event he subsequently concluded the proposed Final Judgment would not be in the public interest. Judge Leon was very critical of the proposed remedy, which he said involved “about one-tenth of one percent” of the value of the transaction. He also expressed concern that the proposed Final Judgement failed to address potential harm in the market for pharmacy benefit management (“PBM”) services. PBM providers manage pharmacy benefits for health plans and negotiate their drug prices with pharmaceutical companies and retail pharmacies. Specifically, Judge Leon wanted to preserve the option to reject the proposed Final Judgment if he found that DOJ, in failing to allege harm in the PBM market, had drafted the Complaint so narrowly as “to make a mockery of judicial power.”[2]

Judge Leon ordered the parties to explain why CVS should not be required to hold Aetna separate and insulate the management of the two companies during the pendency of the Tunney Act process. DOJ vigorously objected that the court did not have the power to consider possible harm in the PBM market because the complaint did not allege harm in the PBM market and the record before the court did not implicate the judicial mockery standard. Ultimately, CVS diffused the issue when it voluntarily agreed to stop further integration efforts and to preserve the status quo by operating Aetna’s health insurance business as a separate unit from CVS’s businesses.

The Tunney Act requires the publication of the proposed Final Judgment followed by a 60-day public comment period. DOJ received 173 comments about the proposed settlement, many criticizing the remedy. DOJ filed its response to the public comments on February 13, 2019. It concluded that the proposed Final Judgment provides an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust violation alleged in the Complaint and is therefore in the public interest. Thereafter, the Division filed a motion requesting that Judge Leon enter the proposed Final Judgment.

Tunney Act Hearing

In most Tunney Act proceedings, courts make their public interest determination based on the Complaint, the terms of the proposed Final Judgment, public comments, and DOJ’s response to the public comments. In rare cases, the court will consider argument from the parties and on very rare occasions will hear from other interested parties. Here, Judge Leon accepted briefs opposing the remedy filed by amici curiae the American Medical Association, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, and Consumer Action and U.S. PIRG. In an unprecedented move, Judge Leon ordered a hearing to take live testimony from witnesses presented by the amici and the parties. In connection with the ordered hearing, Judge Leon directed the parties and amici to submit lists of witnesses and a summary of their testimony and issued the following rulings concerning the conduct of the hearing:

  • From the list submitted by the amici, Judge Leon selected three witnesses: an economic expert, the President of the American Antitrust Institute and the Chief Medical Officer from the AIDS Healthcare Foundation.
  • From the CVS list, Judge Leon selected CVS’s economic expert, Aetna’s Vice President of its Medicare Part D business and CVS’s Chief Transformation Officer.
  • Judge Leon refused to hear testimony from DOJ’s economic expert and WellCare’s Executive Vice President of Clinical Operations and Business Development.
  • Judge Leon ordered that witnesses will not be subject to cross-examination and there would be no opening and closing arguments.
  • Judge Leon overruled DOJ’s objection that the proposed hearing procedures gave the amici the ability to frame the issues and denied the DOJ from meaningful participation in the proceedings.

Over the two-day hearing, Judge Leon heard testimony from the amici’s expert witnesses that WellCare is not a suitable divestiture buyer because: (i) WellCare does not have Aetna’s brand recognition, (ii) WellCare will be dependent on CVS to provide PBM services and (iii) the divestiture itself raises concentration levels in several regions. Judge Leon also heard testimony from two amici witnesses that the merger raises vertical competitive concerns. By combining CVS’s thousands of pharmacies and 92 million PBM members with Aetna’s 22 million insurance customers, the merged firm will have a greater ability and incentive to deny its PBM services to rival health plans or raise the prices for its PBM services to rival plans. After the two-day hearing, Judge Leon indicated that he would accept final briefs and hear closing arguments next month.

What’s Next

The CVS/Aetna merger entered murky waters some months ago and is now headed toward uncharted waters. Pressuring merging parties to hold the two companies separate while the Tunney Act process plays out is unnecessary and unwarranted. Nothing in the Tunney Act bars the parties from consummating their merger, and consumers may be harmed by delaying integration activities that may generate efficiencies. Nor does closing prevent DOJ from obtaining additional relief if necessary. Parties that close before the settlement receives final approval by the court bear the risk the proposed remedy is not in the public interest and therefore may have to make additional concessions to obtain court approval. The Tunney Act evidentiary hearing was also highly unusual and did not give DOJ a fair opportunity to defend its settlement. In particular, DOJ had no cross-examination rights and no opportunity to offer expert testimony to rebut the testimony from the amici’s expert. Also unusual was Judge Leon’s decision to reject testimony from WellCare, even though the amici challenged WellCare’s suitability as a divestiture buyer.

The CVS/Aetna proceeding highlights a tension in the Tunney Act. Judge Leon’s public interest determination is limited by binding D.C. Circuit precedent U.S. v. Microsoft. Under Microsoft, DOJ has considerable discretion to settle antitrust cases and the court’s review is limited to reviewing the proposed remedy in relationship to the allegations in the complaint. A Tunney Act court does not have the authority to inquire into matters outside the scope of the complaint. Judge Leon clearly bristles at playing such a limited role. At a November 29, 2018 status hearing, Judge Leon said that he would not take a “rubber stamp” approach to approving the proposed Final Judgment. Judge Leon’s May 13, 2019 order regarding the Tunney Act hearing noted that Microsoft authorized a Tunney Act court to reject a settlement that makes a “mockery of judicial power.” The court’s actions clearly suggest that DOJ’s failure to allege and remedy harm in the PBM market may satisfy the “judicial mockery” standard.

It remains to be seen if Judge Leon, based on a two-day hearing, will second-guess DOJ’s decision that the merger will not harm competition in the PBM market. Given controlling authority in the D.C. Circuit and the irregularities in the Tunney Act proceeding, Judge Leon may conclude his only option is to enter the proposed Final Judgement. If, on the other hand, he rejects the proposed Final Judgment for failing to address concerns outside the scope of the Complaint, he will likely be overruled by the D.C. Circuit.

___________________

[1] The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§16(b)-(h).

[2] U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

 

Whistling in the Wind? DOJ’s Unusual Statement of Interest in FTC v. Qualcomm Case Highlights Disparity Between U.S. Antitrust Agencies on FRAND, SEPs, & Competition Law

In a highly unusual move, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) recently filed a statement of interest in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s unfair competition case against Qualcomm. The statement asks the court to order additional briefing and hold a hearing on a remedy if it finds Qualcomm liable for anticompetitive abuses in connection with its patent licensing program. As the FTC pointed out in its short response to the DOJ, the court had already considered and addressed the question of whether liability and remedies should be separately considered, and the parties had already submitted extensive briefing regarding remedies.

The DOJ’s “untimely” statement of interest, in the words of the FTC, comes three months after a bench trial concluded in January of this year, while the parties are awaiting a decision on the merits from Judge Koh. The DOJ’s filing represents the most direct clash between the DOJ and the FTC on the issue of standard-essential patents (SEPs) subject to a commitment to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms (FRAND). The two agencies have expressed divergent positions but up until recently had not directly taken any affirmative actions in the other’s cases or enforcement activities.

Though the statement of interest notes that the DOJ “takes no position . . . on the underlying merits of the FTC’s claims,” the DOJ’s views on this subject are well known. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Makan Delrahim has been a prominent and outspoken critic of the principal theory of the FTC’s entire case—that breach of a FRAND commitment can amount to an antitrust violation—despite the fact that legal precedent is well-settled in favor of the FTC’s position.

The Filing Represents Another Step by DOJ to Protect SEP Holders

For some time now, the DOJ has articulated a position largely hostile to the FTC’s underlying theory in its case against Qualcomm: the applicability of competition law upon a breach of a FRAND commitment. As background, SEPs are patents that have been voluntarily submitted by the owner and formally incorporated into a particular technological standard by a standard-setting organization (SSO). Because standardization can eliminate potential competitors for alternative technologies and confer significant bargaining power upon SEP holders vis-à-vis potential licensees, many SSOs require that the patent holder commit to license its SEPs on FRAND terms.

Beginning in late 2017, AAG Delrahim made a series of speeches presenting the DOJ’s new position on SEPs, FRAND commitments, and competition law. Among other issues, AAG Delrahim stated that the antitrust laws should not be used to police the FRAND commitments of SEP holders, insisting that such issues are more properly addressed through contract and other common law remedies. This new position by the DOJ was notable not only because it reversed the approach of the prior administration but also because it was largely inconsistent with numerous U.S. court decisions—including Judge Koh’s denial of Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss the FTC’s case. At a conference last week, AAG Delrahim doubled down on the DOJ’s position and stated he is looking for the “right case” to test the DOJ’s views on this issue. But if the DOJ were to press its views in court, it would find itself in a difficult and awkward position of having to argue that other cases that have ruled on these issues were wrongly decided.

In addition to the speeches, the DOJ has taken measures to implement its new approach, which up until recently, stopped short of effectively challenging the FTC. First, the DOJ opened several investigations of potential anticompetitive conduct in SSOs by companies that make devices implementing standards. Second, the DOJ withdrew its support from a 2013 joint statement issued by the DOJ and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office on remedies for FRAND-encumbered SEPs because of the DOJ’s view, as explained by AAG Delrahim recently, that the policy statement “put a thumb on the scale” in favor of licensees. Third, the DOJ sought to submit another statement of interest in a private lawsuit filed by u-Blox alleging that InterDigital breached its FRAND commitments by demanding supra-competitive royalty rates for various wireless communications SEPs.

The DOJ’s current position fails to recognize the market distortion that can result when an SEP owner fails to comply with a voluntary commitment to limit those same patents rights—and the market power that is conferred on SEP holders in return for that commitment. It also fails to recognize that such policy actions ultimately will embolden certain SEP owners to engage in even more aggressive behavior at a critical period when innovative companies are beginning to incorporate wireless communications SEPs into entirely new industries, such as automobiles and the Internet of Things.

DOJ’s Filing Is Highly Unusual

The DOJ’s decision to insert itself into a case brought by another enforcement agency is exceedingly rare (although not entirely unprecedented). This is especially true because the FTC is representing the interest of consumers by acting pursuant to its authority under the FTC Act. The timing is also curious because the DOJ waited three months after the bench trial ended to file its statement, likely long after the court began drafting its opinion. The statement could be seen as a warning to the court that if it finds an antitrust violation it should not impose a remedy based on the evidence presented at trial.

The DOJ’s statement of interest further begs the question of why the agency thought it was necessary to bring itself into the case. To the extent that Qualcomm believes that the court should order additional briefing and a hearing on the issue of a remedy, even though the issue has seemingly already been addressed, Qualcomm is perfectly capable of presenting those views to the court on its own. In its response, the FTC made clear that it “did not participate in or request” the DOJ to weigh in on the case.

DOJ’s filing notes it is concerned about the risk that an “overly broad remedy” could “reduce competition and innovation in markets for 5G technology and downstream applications that rely on that technology.” But such a statement is remarkable. First, it suggests that the DOJ believes its sister enforcement agency is not concerned about fostering competition and innovation. Second, the statement suggests that the DOJ is willing to second-guess from the sidelines the judgment of both a court and competition agency that have been evaluating in detail the effect of Qualcomm’s business practices. Even if both of those positions are true, it is surprising to see the DOJ submit such a controversial filing in a matter in which AAG Delrahim is recused.

Ultimate Impact of Filing

The DOJ could have had multiple underlying motivations for choosing to submit this filing. Consistent with the split between the DOJ and FTC noted above, the DOJ could be signaling to the court that it disagrees with the FTC’s theory of competitive harm in an effort to influence the outcome on the merits. The DOJ could also be attempting to apply subtle pressure on the FTC to reach a settlement with Qualcomm to avoid drawing further attention to the two agencies’ divergent views on breach of a FRAND commitment. The statement could also be intended to discourage litigants from bringing antitrust cases premised on a breach of FRAND theory, demonstrating that, like in the u-Blox case, the DOJ is not reluctant to intervene.

However, regardless of the DOJ’s intention, its filing is unlikely to achieve any of those objectives. Judge Koh is an experienced judge who is well versed in issues at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law and does not shy away from ruling on difficult issues. Notably, when the FTC and Qualcomm jointly requested that she delay ruling on the FTC’s motion for partial summary judgment to pursue settlement negotiations, she denied the request and issued a significant decision holding that Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment means that it must offer licenses to its SEPs to competing chipset suppliers. Judge Koh may also exercise discretion to deny the DOJ’s statement, as the FTC pointed out in its response. More broadly, it is also unlikely that such a public airing of disagreement will go over well with an agency very focused on the state of competition in technology sectors. And the statement is also unlikely to deter private plaintiffs in light of the well-established and increasing body of case law holding that a breach of FRAND can violate competition law. The DOJ’s statement of interest, as unusual as it is, may ultimately amount to nothing more than whistling in the wind.

The New Madison Approach Goes to Court

On January 11, 2019, the U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division (Division) filed a Notice of Intent to File a Statement of Interest in a lawsuit filed by u-blox against Interdigital in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California to obtain a license consistent with Interdigital’s voluntary commitment to license its 2G, 3G and 4G telephony Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. Simultaneous with the filing of its Complaint, u-blox filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to prevent Interdigital from further interfering with u-blox’s customer relationships. The Division argued that the Court would benefit from hearing its views on granting a TRO based on u-blox’s claim that Interdigital monopolized the 2G, 3G and 4G cellular technology markets. Intervening in a District Court case is highly unusual and is yet another clear signal that the Division has reversed the Obama Antitrust Division’s antitrust treatment of FRAND violations, despite the disparity between the Division’s current position and numerous well-reasoned U.S. court decisions that have carefully considered these issues and come to precisely the opposite conclusions.

Retro-Jefferson Approach[1]

By way of background, standard setting involves competitors and potential competitors, operating under the auspices of Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs), agreeing on a common standard and incorporating patented technology. Patents that are incorporated into a standard become much more valuable once a standard becomes established and commercially deployed on a widespread level, and it becomes impossible for companies manufacturing devices that incorporate standardized technology to switch to alternative technologies. In these circumstances, patent holders may gain market power and the ability to extract higher royalties than would have been possible before the standard was set. This type of opportunistic conduct is referred to as “patent hold-up.” To address the risk of patent hold-up, many SSOs require patent holders to commit to license their SEPs on FRAND terms. FRAND commitments reduce the risk that SEP holders will exercise market power by extracting exorbitant licensing fees or imposing other more onerous licensing terms. One way to address patent hold-up is through breach of contract and antitrust suits against holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.

The Obama Antitrust Division advocated the position that, under appropriate circumstances, the antitrust laws may reach violations of FRAND commitments. This position was, and remains, consistent with applicable legal precedent. For example, in 2007 the Third Circuit recognized in Broadcom v. Qualcomm, 501 F.3d 297, that a SEP-holder’s breach of a FRAND commitment can constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act where the SEP-holder makes a false FRAND promise to induce an SSO to include its patents in the standard and later, after companies making devices that incorporate the standard are locked in, demands exorbitant royalties in violation of the FRAND commitment. Numerous other cases similarly stand for the proposition that it is appropriate to apply competition law to the realm of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. See, e.g., Research in Motion v. Motorola, 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Microsoft Mobile v. Interdigital, 2016 WL 1464545 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016).

The Obama Antitrust Division also took the position that in most cases it is inappropriate to seek injunctive relief in a judicial proceeding or an exclusion order in the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) as a remedy for the alleged infringement of a FRAND-encumbered SEP. Injunctions and exclusion orders (or the threat of one) are generally incompatible with a FRAND commitment and unfairly shift bargaining power to the patent holders. In the Obama Antitrust Division’s view, money damages, rather than injunctive or exclusionary relief, are generally the more appropriate remedy. Again, the Obama Antitrust Division’s policy reflected case law recognizing the same principles. See, e.g., Apple v. Motorola, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The Obama Antitrust Division articulated its views on the use of exclusion orders against the infringing use of SEPs in a joint statement issued by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office on January 8, 2013 entitled “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments” (Joint Policy Statement). The Joint Policy Statement urged the ITC to consider that “the public interest may preclude issuance of an exclusion order in cases where the infringer is acting within the scope of the patent holder’s F/RAND commitment and is able, and has not refused, to license on F/RAND terms.”

New Madison Approach

The Division is now of the view that the Obama Antitrust Division’s focus on patent implementers and its concerns with hold-up were misplaced, even though many courts and other regulatory bodies around the world have noted the significance of the hold-up problem. The Division currently does not believe that hold-up is an antitrust problem. According to the Division, the more serious risk to competition and innovation is the “hold-out” problem. The hold-out problem arises when companies making products that innovate upon and incorporate the standard threaten to under-invest in the implementation of a standard, or threaten not to take a license at all, until their royalty demands are met. The Division further has questioned the role of antitrust law in regulating the FRAND commitment, even though the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – and numerous other competition agencies around the world – has engaged in enforcement efforts to curb allegedly anticompetitive SEP licensing practices, many of which are directed at Qualcomm (which is the subject of an ongoing trial between the FTC and Qualcomm in Federal District Court in California).

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim coined the term the “New Madison Approach” to describe his approach to the application of antitrust law to patent rights.[2] The four premises of the New Madison Approach are:

  • The antitrust laws should not be used as a tool to police FRAND commitments that patent holders make to SSOs.
  • To ensure maximum incentives to innovate, SSOs should focus on implementer hold-out, rather than focus on patent hold-up.
  • SSOs and courts should not restrict the right of a patent holder to seek or obtain an injunction or exclusion order.
  • A unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a patent should be considered per se legal.

The Division has taken at least three concrete steps to implement the New Madison Approach. First, it has opened several investigations of potential anticompetitive conduct in SSOs by implementers, for example to exclude alternative technologies. Second, in a December 7, 2018 speech in Palo Alto, California, AAG Delrahim announced that DOJ was withdrawing its support of the Joint Policy Statement. According to AAG Delrahim, the Joint Policy Statement created confusion to the extent it suggests a FRAND commitment creates a compulsory licensing scheme and suggests exclusion orders may not be appropriate in cases of FRAND-encumbered patents. AAG Delrahim noted he would engage with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office to draft a new statement. Finally, the Division intervened in the u-blox case.

u-blox v. Interdigital

u-blox presents a fact pattern that commonly arises in FRAND cases. Since 2011, u-blox has licensed Interdigital patents that had been declared essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G standards. U-blox relied on Interdigital’s FRAND commitments, and its devices are now allegedly locked into 2G, 3G and 4G cellular technology. u-blox alleges that in its most recent round of negotiations, Interdigital is demanding supra-competitive royalty rates. Among its various claims, u-blox alleges Interdigital breached its contractual obligation to offer its SEPs on FRAND terms and has monopolized the 2G, 3G and 4G technology markets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. u-blox also alleges that Interdigital threatened its customers to force u-blox to pay excessive, non-FRAND royalties. u-box has asked the court to set a FRAND rate and filed a TRO to prevent Interdigital from interfering with its contractual relationships.

On January 11, 2019, the Division filed its Notice of Intent to explain its views concerning u-blox’s monopolization cause of action. The Division further explained that due to the partial government shutdown, it was unable to submit a brief before the TRO hearing scheduled for January 31, 2019, and asked that the TRO hearing be delayed until after DOJ appropriations have been restored, or in the alternative, to order DOJ to respond. Although not stated in the Notice of Intent, the Division can be expected to argue that it would be improper to grant a TRO based on a claim of monopolization because the antitrust laws should play no role in policing Interdigital’s FRAND commitment where contract or common law remedies are adequate. On January 14, 2019, u-blox responded that it would withdraw reliance on its monopolization claim to support its request for a TRO and instead rely on its breach of contract and other claims.

Implications of the Division’s Intervention in the u-blox Case

The Division’s filing of a Notice of Interest in the u-blox case is highly unusual. The Division rarely intervenes in district court cases, and it may be unprecedented for the Division to intervene at the TRO stage. It is also difficult to explain why the Division chose to intervene on this motion. While u-blox was relying on its antitrust claim, among several other claims, to support its TRO request, u-blox was only seeking an order to prevent Interdigital from interfering with its customer relationships while the court adjudicated its request for a FRAND rate. It is also notable that the Division put its thumb on the scale in the aid of Interdigital, a company that often finds itself in FRAND litigation.

The Division appears to be attempting to aggressively implement the New Madison Approach that the antitrust laws should protect innovators. The Division’s decision to withdraw its assent to the Joint Policy Statement appears to have been a clear signal to the ITC that it is free to grant an exclusion order in SEP cases. The Division’s intervention in the u-blox case is a clear signal that it is willing to intervene at the district court level to advance its view that the antitrust laws are not an appropriate vehicle to enforce FRAND commitments where there are adequate remedies sounding in contract or other common law theories.

To date, the Division has used speeches to make policy arguments that the antitrust laws should not be used to enforce FRAND commitments. If the Division ever gets the opportunity to present its views to a district court, watch to see what legal arguments it can marshal to support its policy position. Also watch to see whether the Division attempts to participate in other FRAND cases.

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[1] Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim coined the phrase in his March 16, 2018 speech at the University of Pennsylvania entitled “The ‘New Madison’ Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law” based on the initial understanding of patent rights held by Thomas Jefferson, the first patent examiner of the U.S. (and a former president and principal author of the Declaration of Independence). AAG Delrahim describes the retro-Jefferson view of patents as conferring too much power on patent holders at the expense of patent implementers and that such power should be constrained by the antitrust laws or Standard Setting Organizations.

[2] The term “New Madison Approach” is based on the understanding of intellectual property rights held by James Madison, the principal drafter of the U.S. Constitution. Madison believed strong IP protections were necessary to encourage innovation and technological progress.

The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019

As part of Global Competition Review’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, Orrick attorneys Jay Jurata, Alex Okuliar, and Emily Luken contributed a chapter titled “IP and Antitrust,” examining three important developments this year evolving from recent trends at the intersection of IP and antitrust law.  The chapter is part of GCR’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, first published in September 2018.

Japan SEP Licensing Guide Also Aims To Prevent Abuse

In response to a recent article by former director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office David Kappos, Orrick Antitrust attorneys John “Jay” Jurata and Emily Luken weigh in with their perspective on the Japan Patent Office’s “Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents.” While they agree that the Guide provides a balanced approach to the issues, they also provide insight into how the Guide acknowledges and expands upon potential abuses of standard essential patents. Read more here.

Out of Sync? : DOJ’s Policy Reversal Towards SEPs Lacks Legal Support

Jay Jurata and Emily Luken co-authored an article for Global Competition Review about the troubling policy shift by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division regarding the application of competition law to the assertion of standard-essential patents.

Please click here to read the full article.

UK High Court of Justice Issues an Injunction Prohibiting Huawei from Selling Wireless Telecommunications Products in Britain Due to its Failure to Enter Into a Worldwide Patent License

Orrick antitrust practice team attorneys Matthew G. Rose, Jay Jurata and Emily Luken recently published an article in the e-Competitions Bulletin August 2017 discussing the implications of the UK High Court of Justice ruling that enjoins Huawei from selling wireless telecommunications products in Britain due to Huawei’s failure to enter into a patent license for Unwired Planet’s worldwide portfolio of standard-essential patents (SEPs), even though Huawei was willing to enter into a license for Unwired Planet’s United Kingdom (UK) SEPs.

The article examines the potential competitive harms that would result from a regime in which licensees are required to take worldwide SEP licenses.

FTC Sues Louisiana Appraisers for Price Fixing

Close-up Of Person Hand Filling Real Estate Appraisal Form With House Model At Desk FTC Sues Louisiana Appraisers for Price Fixing

On May 31, 2017, the FTC filed an administrative complaint alleging that the Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Board (“Board”), a state agency controlled by real estate appraisers, violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by fixing real estate appraisal fees paid by appraisal management companies (“AMCs”). AMCs act as agents for lenders in arranging real estate appraisals and are licensed and regulated by the Board.  The FTC alleges that the Board required AMCs to pay appraisal fees that are equal to or exceed the median fees identified in survey reports commissioned and published by the Board.  This action represents the FTC’s first enforcement action against a state agency since its victory in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015).  An administrative trial is scheduled to begin on January 30, 2018.

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District Court Tosses Last Remaining Plaintiffs in Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation

District Court Tosses Last Remaining Plaintiffs in Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation Aluminum Picure of Industrial Warehouse with Aluminum Sheets

Judge Katherine Forrest of the Southern District of New York recently dismissed another set of complaints in what she described as “the next chapter in the saga” of the In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation cases, No. 13-md-024710-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016).  Referring to her previous October 5, 2016 ruling, which dismissed claims asserted by certain first-level purchasers of aluminum products, Judge Forrest found (in a ruling dated November 30, 2016) that the remaining complaints by additional first-level purchasers were equally defective because they too failed to establish antitrust injury. The October 5, 2016 ruling, in turn, substantially relied on the Second Circuit’s August 9, 2016 opinion, which affirmed dismissal of claims brought by indirect purchasers of aluminum or aluminum products.  Broadly, the various complaints alleged that aluminum futures traders, banks, and others conspired to manipulate the warehouse storage costs of aluminum, resulting in higher prices in the market for physical aluminum.

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The FTC Expands the Scope of Documents Needed for an HSR Filing

As of November 28, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission expanded the filing obligations under teh Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act. Mergers and Acquisitisions Office folder on Desktop on table with Office Supplies and Ipad.

As of November 28, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expanded the filing obligations under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act by requiring filers to submit certain documents analyzing a deal or affected markets even where the evaluation or analysis is limited to geographies or operations outside of the United States. This is a significant shift in the Agency’s interpretation of Items 4(c) and 4(d) of the HSR Notification and Report Form.

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FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division Request Comments on Proposed Revisions to Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing IP

After several turbulent years of litigation and policy wrangling, many have asked whether the federal antitrust agencies should rewrite their two-decade old Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Guidelines”).  Should they provide clearer guidance regarding thorny questions about licensing standard essential patents (SEPs), patent assertion entities (PAEs), reverse payment settlements, or other matters that have prompted new guidelines from other enforcers around the world?  On August 12, the Federal Trade Commission and US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division responded with modest updates to the Guidelines, likely setting themselves up for considerable commentary in the weeks to come.

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