Orrick partner Jay Jurata has published an article in Competition Policy International weighing in on the important issues raised in the closely-watched trial now under way in FTC v. Qualcomm. This article analyzes important developments in the case as it has proceeded – including the significant motion to dismiss and partial summary judgment rulings – and offers thoughts on the just commenced trial. To read the full article, please visit here.
The FTC has long asserted it has the authority to bring actions in federal court to obtain injunctive relief and equitable monetary remedies (e.g. disgorgement, consumer redress) for unfair and deceptive practices. This view of the agency’s scope of authority has stood for years without much question or challenge. But two recent district court decisions may change all that by limiting the agency’s ability to petition a federal court to those situations in which it can demonstrate a defendant is “about to violate” the law. On December 11, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court heard oral argument in one of the district court cases – FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc. – with a decision expected in the first half of 2019. If the Third Circuit upholds the district court’s ruling, it will complicate FTC enforcement efforts and push more cases into the agency’s administrative process.
The FTC’s Enforcement Powers
The FTC can initiate an enforcement action if it has “reason to believe” that the consumer protection or antitrust laws are being violated. Before 1973, the FTC could exercise its enforcement powers only through administrative adjudications, which do not allow for financial relief or an immediate prohibition on future wrongdoing. While the FTC has the power to seek financial remedies through its administrative process, the penalties are limited by a three-year statute of limitations, and the FTC must demonstrate that the conduct was clearly “dishonest or fraudulent.”
In 1973, Congress amended the FTC Act to add Section 13(b) and give the FTC the authority to (1) seek injunctive relief in federal court pending the completion of the FTC administrative proceeding when the FTC “has reason to believe” that a person or entity “is violating, or is about to violate” any law enforced by the FTC, and (2) seek a permanent injunction “in proper cases.” Following the enactment of Section 13(b), the FTC adopted an expansive view of its power to bring federal court enforcement actions, and started bringing cases in federal court seeking monetary relief under equitable doctrines such as restitution, disgorgement, and rescission of contracts. The FTC also asserted that its statutory power to seek a “permanent injunction” was a standalone grant of authority that entitled the FTC to bring a federal court action irrespective of whether a defendant “is violating, or is about to violate” the law. By tying its theories to these doctrines, the FTC took much of its enforcement activity outside otherwise applicable requirements, including the three-year statute of limitations and proof of a defendant’s dishonesty or fraud. Until this year, courts universally accepted the FTC’s expansive view of its authority under Section 13(b). As a result, it is the FTC’s policy that “[a] suit under Section 13(b) is preferable to the adjudicatory process because, in such a suit, the court may award both prohibitory and monetary equitable relief in one step.”
Two recent court decisions have raised questions about the FTC’s view of its authority to sue in federal court solely over a defendant’s prior conduct. In FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., the FTC sued the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that between 2006 and 2012 ViroPharma had engaged in an anticompetitive campaign of repetitive and meritless filings with the FDA to delay generic competition and therefore maintain its monopoly on its branded drug. ViroPharma moved to dismiss the FTC’s complaint, arguing that the FTC had exceeded its authority under Section 13(b). Specifically, ViroPharma asserted that Section 13(b) does not provide the FTC with independent authority to seek a permanent injunction under Section 13(b), but rather limits permanent injunction actions to those cases where the FTC can show that a defendant “is violating or is about to violate” the law. On March 20, 2018, Judge Richard Andrews granted ViroPharma’s motion to dismiss, and rejected the FTC’s long-held assertion that Section 13(b) provides it with the independent authority to seek permanent injunctive relief in federal court, including relief for past violations of the FTC Act and regulations. Judge Andrews held that the FTC’s authority to seek permanent injunctive relief is dependent on the FTC alleging facts that plausibly suggest a defendant is either (1) currently violating a law enforced by the FTC or (2) is about to violate such a law. Because the FTC’s complaint against ViroPharma was based on conduct that occurred five years before the filing of the complaint, the court found that the FTC failed to plead facts that demonstrate that ViroPharma was either violating or “about to” violate the law.
Subsequently, on October 15, 2018, Judge Timothy Batten, in the Northern District of Georgia, cited the ViroPharma decision in finding that the FTC’s permanent injunction authority under 13(b) authority is limited to situations where a defendant is “about to” violate the law. In FTC v. Hornbeam the FTC brought a federal court enforcement action alleging that the defendants were marketing memberships in online discount clubs to consumers seeking payday, cash advance or installment loans, in ways that violated the FTC Act, the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule, and the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act. The court rejected the FTC’s argument that courts must defer to the FTC’s determination that it has “reason to believe” that the defendants were about to violate the law. Rather, the court – citing the decision in ViroPharma – held that when the FTC exercises its Section 13(b) authority it must meet federal court pleading standards and set forth sufficient facts that each defendant is “about to” violate the law.
If followed, the ViroPharma and Hornbeam decisions could significantly limit the FTC’s ability and willingness to pursue claims in federal court, and shift enforcement actions to the FTC’s administrative process. It is unclear how such a shift to administrative enforcement will impact how the FTC approaches enforcement actions and negotiates consent orders to resolve its investigations. On the one hand, companies may be hesitant to go through the FTC’s administrative process given that it is a notoriously slow process over which the FTC Commissioners exercise the final decision-making authority. On other hand, the FTC’s limited ability to seek financial remedies through the administrative process may provide companies greater leverage in negotiating consent decrees.
The FTC is acutely aware of the potential threat posed by these decisions, as evidenced by its decision to forgo filing an amended complaint in favor of immediately appealing the court’s ruling in ViroPharma to the Third Circuit. In its appeal to the Third Circuit, the FTC stated that if the ViroPharma holding had been applied in past cases it “would likely have doomed hundreds of other Section 13(b) actions that the FTC has filed over the years – cases that collectively have recovered many billions of dollars for victimized American consumers.”
On December 11, 2018, the Third Circuit heard oral argument in ViroPharma. During oral argument the three-judge panel expressed skepticism at the FTC’s argument that Judge Andrews applied the wrong pleading standard by requiring that the FTC plead sufficient facts to show that a violation of federal law was “imminent.” A decision by the Third Circuit is expected in the first half of 2019. The Hornbeam case is still pending in the Northern District of Georgia as the FTC decided to amend its complaint following the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.
 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
 FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., No. 17-131-RGA, 2018 WL 1401329 (D. Del. 2018).
 FTC v. Hornbeam, No. 1:17-cv-03094-TCB (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018).
 FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., No. 18-1807, Document No. 003112960825 at 47 (3d Cir. June 19, 2018).
The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has opened abuse proceedings against Amazon for practices related to the German marketplace amazon.de. This move comes not long after the European Commission initiated a preliminary investigation into Amazon’s use of transaction data.
In both the German and the EU case, the competition concerns appear to be linked to Amazon being not only the largest online retailer but also the largest online marketplace for competing retailers. There are, however, important differences between the two investigations: While the Commission is looking at “exclusionary abuse,” i.e. conduct hindering the competitive opportunities of its rivals, the FCO investigates potential “exploitative abuse,” i.e. imposing conditions that are significantly more onerous for retailers using the marketplace than they would be in a competitive environment (see the FCO’s press release).
The approach of the FCO is based on special features of German competition law, which facilitate proceedings against abuses of market power:
First, regarding the issue of market power, the German prohibition on abusive market conduct applies not only to companies with a dominant market position (as under EU law) but also to companies with “relative market power,” which is a less demanding standard. A company has relative market power if small or medium-sized customers or suppliers are dependent on it and cannot reasonably switch to other companies for the supply or the sale of a particular type of goods or services. The FCO believes that Amazon may be dominant or may have relative market power because it functions as a “gatekeeper.” In fact, Amazon has become so powerful in Germany that many retailers and manufacturers depend on the reach of its marketplace for their online sales.
Second, regarding the existence of abuse, the FCO suspects that Amazon is abusing its market position to the detriment of sellers active on its marketplace by imposing unfair terms and conditions. Here, the FCO relies on the case law of the German Supreme Court, which has decided that the use of unfair terms and conditions by a dominant firm can constitute an abuse – provided it is because of its dominance or relative market power that the firm is able to impose such terms and conditions. In other words: there must be a causal link between the firm’s market power or dominance and the unfair terms and conditions. It is not yet clear how the FCO will establish such a link.
Regarding the terms and practices that will be scrutinized, the FCO has listed the following provisions as being potentially illegal:
- liability provisions
- choice of law and jurisdiction clauses
- rules on product reviews
- the non-transparent termination and blocking of sellers’ accounts
- withholding or delaying payment
- clauses assigning rights to use the information material that a seller has to provide with regard to the products offered
- terms of business on pan-European dispatch
The FCO’s Amazon investigation shows some similarities to its ongoing proceedings against Facebook (see our previous Blog post). Both cases are focused on the use of unfair terms and conditions. The FCO has said that it will issue its Facebook decision in early 2019. We expect that decision to set the direction for the Amazon investigation.
Since last year’s “Coty” judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), it may have seemed settled that authorized dealers in a selective distribution network can be prohibited from selling products via third-party marketplaces, i.e. online platforms operated by third parties such as Amazon. However, in a recent position paper, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has expressed a much more nuanced view.
According to the Coty judgment, EU competition law generally allows the banning of online third-party platforms in selective distribution systems, especially for luxury goods. First, where such a ban is applied without discrimination and in a proportionate manner to the distribution of luxury goods and with the objective of preserving the luxury image of such goods, the ban is not considered a restriction of competition. Second, in all other cases – for example where the goods in question are not “luxury goods” – the ban may be justified by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER), provided the market shares of the parties are below 30 percent.
The FCO, however, makes it clear that there are several issues that remain unsolved, even after the Coty ruling.
First, the FCO points out that the Coty judgment deals with “luxury goods” and that it cannot simply be applied one-to-one to other types of products, including high-quality products. Thus platform bans for non-luxury goods may, in fact, infringe competition law, even within selective distribution systems. In the absence of a clear definition separating “luxury goods” from other (high-quality) branded products, accepting outright bans of online platforms will, therefore, be anything but automatic.
Second, the FCO explains the policy that it proposes to apply outside the (limited) scope of the Coty ruling, i.e. to non-luxury goods, including high-quality branded products: it considers that a general prohibition on using third-party online platforms is likely excessive and that less restrictive measures, such as specific quality requirements, will normally suffice to protect a brand image. For example, the FCO explains that dealers could be required to have their own online shop on the marketplace rather than share a product page with other dealers.
Third, the FCO also puts a question mark over the application of the VBER to third-party platform bans. The ECJ decided in its “Pierre Fabre” judgment that manufacturers generally cannot prevent their distributors from using the internet as a sales channel. An outright ban on internet sales is normally an infringement of EU competition law. However, in “Coty,” the ECJ added that a mere ban of third-party platforms does not amount to a prohibition on using the internet – provided distributors are able to run their own online shops and are unrestricted in using the internet for advertising and marketing purposes so that customers can find their online offers via online search engines. The FCO now points out that consumer preferences and the relative importance of different sales channels may vary between EU member states. According to the FCO, marketplaces and price comparison sites are much more significant in Germany than in other EU member states. In Germany, banning the use of marketplaces could reduce a distributor’s visibility to such an extent that the ban becomes equivalent to a complete ban of online sales and, thus, unlawful.
In a nutshell, the FCO is not prepared to generally accept the legality of third-party platform bans and it can be expected that it will continue to challenge such prohibitions if they have restrictive effects on competition.
However, the FCO also recognizes that Amazon Marketplace has become increasingly important for manufacturers and that many manufacturers can no longer afford to exclude this particular sales channel from their distribution system. The rising market power of Amazon Marketplace is of particular concern for the authority because of Amazon’s dual business model. Amazon is a “hybrid platform” that acts both as an intermediary for online dealers and as an authorized dealer for the same products. The FCO highlights the risks that follow from this setup: in particular, independent dealers could be disadvantaged or squeezed out of the market. The FCO is very clear about its intention to keep online markets open and that it will closely monitor Amazon’s growing market power with this in mind.
 EU Court of Justice judgment of December 6, 2017, Coty Germany GmbH vs. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, C-230/16, EU:C:2017:941.
 “Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy: Competition restraints in online sales after Coty and Asics – what’s next?” published on the FCO website (link).
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of April 20, 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices.
 EU Court of Justice judgment of October 13, 2011, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS vs. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence a.o., C-439/09,  ECR I-9447.
A recent divesture ordered by the Federal Trade Commission should serve as a reminder that private equity- and venture capital-backed companies need to evaluate the other holdings of their investors and directors to avoid potential antitrust problems.
Red Ventures and Bankrate are marketing companies that connect consumers with providers in various industries. In 2017, Red Ventures entered into an agreement to acquire Bankrate for $1.4 billion. Among other interests, Bankrate operated “Caring.com,” a website used to generate customer leads for providers of senior living facilities. Red Ventures did not offer a competing product in this space, but the FTC nonetheless required the divestiture of Caring.com, citing competitive concerns generated by operations of Red Ventures’ investors and directors.
Specifically, two of the largest shareholders in Red Ventures are private equity firms General Atlantic and Silver Lake Partners, with a combined 34 percent stake, two of seven board seats, and other substantial rights over operations. General Atlantic and Silver Lake separately owned “A Place for Mom” which, like Caring.com, provides an online referral service for providers of senior living facilities. According to the FTC’s complaint, “A Place for Mom” and “Caring.com” were each other’s closest competitors, with the number one and number two positions in the market. Here, the FTC looked behind the actual parties to the transaction to identify potential competitive concerns.
Private equity- and venture capital-backed companies must be aware of the competitive, or potentially competitive, holdings of their investors and directors.
- As in the Red Ventures/Bankrate acquisition, the separate holdings of significant investors may become a focus of the government’s antitrust review of a transaction.
- An investor simultaneously holding seats on the boards of two competing companies may violate the statute prohibiting interlocking directorates.
- Finally, companies should ensure that protections are in place to prevent any scenario – real or implied – where the investor or director could serve as a conduit for the sharing of competitively sensitive information between competing companies.
 See 15 USC § 19.
 See 15 USC § 1.
As part of Global Competition Review’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, Orrick attorneys Jay Jurata, Alex Okuliar, and Emily Luken contributed a chapter titled “IP and Antitrust,” examining three important developments this year evolving from recent trends at the intersection of IP and antitrust law. The chapter is part of GCR’s The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2019, first published in September 2018.
The whole publication can be found here.
Douglas Lahnborg and Matthew Rose present a comparative discussion on the recently issued National Security and Investment White Paper, which proposes a significant expansion of the UK government’s powers to scrutinize foreign investment beyond those available in other leading economies. The white paper introduces powers to intervene in a broad range of transactions in any sector, regardless of deal value, the transaction parties’ market shares, or their revenues. If the proposals are brought into force in their current form, the UK regime would be one of the most stringent in the world, with wide-ranging implications for foreign and domestic companies and projects in sensitive sectors, including technology, energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, real estate and financial services. Read more here.
In response to a recent article by former director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office David Kappos, Orrick Antitrust attorneys John “Jay” Jurata and Emily Luken weigh in with their perspective on the Japan Patent Office’s “Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents.” While they agree that the Guide provides a balanced approach to the issues, they also provide insight into how the Guide acknowledges and expands upon potential abuses of standard essential patents. Read more here.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew Miner, head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section, recently discussed the DOJ’s efforts to address corruption discovered during mergers and acquisitions. During his remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance In High Risk Markets, DAAG Miner explained that the DOJ would apply the principles in the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (“FCPA Policy”) to successor companies that disclose and cooperate with the agency after discovering wrongdoing in connection with a merger or acquisition.
The FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits corporate bribery of foreign officials and requires strong accounting practices. Last year, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced a revised FCPA Policy to help companies understand the costs and benefits of cooperation when deciding whether to voluntarily disclose misconduct. Absent aggravating circumstances or recidivism, and provided certain conditions are met, companies that voluntarily disclose, cooperate and remediate misconduct benefit from a presumption that they will receive a declination. (9-47-120 – FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.) Where a criminal resolution is warranted and (again) absent recidivism, the DOJ will recommend a reduction in the fine range. (Id.)
Application in the Mergers and Acquisition Context. With respect to M&A activity, especially in high-risk industries and markets, DAAG Miner explained that application of the FCPA Policy will give companies and their advisors more certainty when evaluating a foreign deal and determining how, and whether, to proceed with the transaction. (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.) Recognizing the benefits of having companies with strong compliance programs entering high-risk markets, the DOJ wants to encourage acquiring companies to “right the ship” by enforcing robust compliance. (Id.) Not only does application of the FCPA Policy in the M&A context encourage greater corporate compliance, it also frees up DOJ resources and enables the agency to focus on other matters. (Id.)
If potential misconduct is discovered during due diligence, the DOJ recommends the company seek guidance through its FCPA Opinion Procedures. (Id.) These procedures allow a party to assess the risk by obtaining an opinion about whether certain conduct conforms with the DOJ’s FCPA Policy. (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure.) Even for companies that discover misconduct after the acquisition, the DOJ wants to “encourage its leadership to take the steps outlined in the FCPA Policy, and when they do … reward them[.]” (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew S. Miner Remarks at the American Conference Institute 9th Global Forum on Anti-Corruption Compliance in High Risk Markets.)
Takeaways. The DOJ’s approach highlights the need for strong cross-disciplinary team staffing on mergers and acquisitions. For example, white-collar counsel can advise buyers on strategy once misconduct is flagged by corporate or antitrust counsel during the M&A process. Counsel for sellers that learns of misconduct during due diligence can discuss options with the client and coordinate as necessary to take advantage of the DOJ’s policies and guidance in mitigating any issues. Moreover, counsel for either party may uncover conduct from documents reviewed or conversations with the client that should be flagged to further assess whether misconduct has occurred. It is important to keep in mind that some of these documents may get produced to the DOJ or FTC during a merger review. Entities involved in deals in high-risk markets or industries should therefore involve deal, regulatory and enforcement experts where necessary.
Blockchain technology has burst onto the scene and into the public consciousness over the last few years. While the securities and privacy law questions surrounding blockchain technology have received much attention, perhaps less obvious are the potential antitrust issues raised by the technology.
Although these issues are nascent, they are not wholly theoretical. For example, on March 16 the FTC announced that it is creating a Blockchain Working Group to look at, inter alia, competition policy. “Cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies could disrupt existing industries. In disruptive scenarios, incumbent companies may sometimes seek to hobble potential competitors through regulatory burdens. The FTC’s competition advocacy work could help ensure that competition, not regulation, determines what products will be available in the marketplace” (FTC Blog Post). And in January of this year, the Japan Fair Trade Commission also indicated that it may look into the competition policy issues involving blockchain-based cryptocurrencies.
This blog post briefly discusses some of the potential antitrust issues associated with blockchain technology. READ MORE
The UK government considers that transactions in the following sectors can raise national security concerns:
1. quantum technology;
2. computing hardware; and
3. the development or production of items for military or military and civilian use.
In order to allow the UK’s Secretary of State to intervene in transactions in these sectors, the UK government has proposed amendments to the Enterprise Act 2002 that would expand the Competition & Markets Authority’s (“CMA”) jurisdiction to review transactions in these sectors from a competition perspective. READ MORE
On February 1, 2018, the Northern District of California court handling the sprawling In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation (“CRT”) declined to enter a default judgment against related Chinese defendants, finding the companies had made a sufficient showing of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) for the issue to be addressed on the merits more fully. The decision by Judge Tigar turned on the court’s interpretation of the “commercial activity” exception to the FSIA’s general preclusion of jurisdiction against foreign sovereigns and their agencies and instrumentalities, an exception that requires conduct having a “direct effect” in the United States. That statutory construction in turn was drawn from the alternative test for Sherman Act claims under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”) that requires foreign conduct have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on U.S. commerce. In looking to the FTAIA to interpret the FSIA, the court made a pair of assumptions that are not thought to be correct in all circuits: That the similar (but different) FTAIA and FSIA “direct effect” provisions have the same meaning, and that the correct meaning is one in which a “direct” effect must follow ‘immediately” from the defendant’s predicate act. The court’s decision may have implications for the construction of both the FTAIA and the FSIA, certainly in antitrust cases and, while this remains to be seen, perhaps more broadly. READ MORE
Online platforms have become a crucial infrastructure for businesses. They enable small businesses to have easy access to millions of potential customers and create an unprecedented choice of products and services for them. According to a recent Eurobarometer survey on the use of online marketplaces and search engines by small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”), 42% of the respondents declared that they use online platforms and marketplaces to sell their products or services. This survey also indicates that 82% of the respondents rely on search engines to promote and sell their products or services. In short, online platforms play a key role in the growth of the economy and help the digital transformation of small businesses. READ MORE
Antitrust partner David Goldstein recently wrote an article for the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy section of the State Bar of California regarding Intellectual Venture’s recent summary judgment win to defeat Capital One’s antitrust counterclaims asserted in response to IV’s patent infringement claims. The decision addresses recurring issues involving patent assertion entities, including the definition of the relevant market, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and collateral estoppel. The article can be accessed here.
The famously “convoluted” language of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6a, is typically smoothed out and restated before application by courts. The actual statutory language must be honored, however, and occasionally fidelity to that language has led to the dismissal of claims on grounds that they seek an impermissibly extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. A few illuminating examples appear in the recent Southern District of New York decision in Biocad, JSC v. F. Hoffmna-La Roche, Ltd.
Orrick Antitrust & Competition partner Alex Okuliar has co-authored an article in the European Competition Journal with Greg Sivinski, Assistant General Counsel in the Competition Law Group at Microsoft, and Lars Kjolbye, a partner at Latham & Watkins in Brussels, in which they propose a framework to determine the competitive significance of data. The framework first considers whether the parties own or control the relevant data. The second consideration is whether the relevant data is commercially available as a product or as an input for products of downstream competitors. The third consideration is whether the relevant data is proprietary to the owner’s or controller’s products or services and a competitively critical input. The last consideration is whether reasonably available substitutes for the relevant data exist or whether the data is unique.
The article can be accessed here.
As more internet users entrust their personal data to operators of websites, operators’ use of this “Big Data” has become a growing concern. As a result, government agencies around the world are grappling with whether and how to regulate “Big Data” in the context of social networking websites. This includes some competition authorities that are trying to expand their purview by using competition laws to regulate “Big Data” in the context of social media. The possibility that competition authorities around the world may try to become super regulators of “Big Data” should be of concern to all operators of social networking websites.
A case in point is the German competition authority (FCO), which in March 2016 initiated proceedings against one of the most popular social networking sites – Facebook – purportedly based on a concern that it may have infringed data protection rules. Since the case is the first of its kind in Europe, the outcome – which is expected before the end of the year – is awaited with great interest.
Orrick antitrust practice team attorneys Matthew G. Rose, Jay Jurata and Emily Luken recently published an article in the e-Competitions Bulletin August 2017 discussing the implications of the UK High Court of Justice ruling that enjoins Huawei from selling wireless telecommunications products in Britain due to Huawei’s failure to enter into a patent license for Unwired Planet’s worldwide portfolio of standard-essential patents (SEPs), even though Huawei was willing to enter into a license for Unwired Planet’s United Kingdom (UK) SEPs.
The article examines the potential competitive harms that would result from a regime in which licensees are required to take worldwide SEP licenses.
A common question for companies contemplating mergers or acquisitions is how the Hart-Scott-Rodino process works and how long it takes for different kinds of transactions to be reviewed and cleared. The FTC posted a helpful article here today which provides practitioners with guidance regarding timing parameters under the HSR Act, including a helpful HSR timeline graph which can be accessed here.
On June 6, 2017, a committee within Japan’s Fair Trade Commission published a report on competition policy and big data. The report is based on a concern that dominance of big data by certain major technology companies could impede competition and innovation, and addresses how Japan’s Antitrust Act (Act) could be applied in this context.
A main focus of the report is how certain cases of “collection of data” and “use of data” could trigger antitrust issues. READ MORE