Europe

More Affordable and Innovative Medicines and Treatments in Europe – Has the Competition Enforcement Met the 2009 Objective?

A decade ago, the European Commission conducted a thorough sectoral inquiry into the European pharmaceutical sector that identified antitrust shortcomings impeding access to more affordable and innovative medicines and treatments. Concluding this inquiry by setting priority actions for the years to come, former Competition Commissioner Kroes called for “… more competition and less red tape …” (sic).

Since this statement, there has been intense enforcement activity in the sector not only by the European Commission itself, but also by the European Union Member States’ antitrust authorities.

In its report on “Competition enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector” issued on January 28, 2019, the European Commission takes stock of their actions in this space.

The past enforcement record (2009-2017): intense activity, hard stance towards pharmaceutical companies with the use of novel or less known theories of harm

Between 2009 and 2017, no less than 29 infringement decisions were issued by European antitrust authorities, leading to fines totaling over €1 billion, while the European Commission asked for structural remedies for 25% of the reportable mergers in the sector.

Antitrust enforcement

In total, European antitrust authorities investigated over a hundred cases during the 2009-2017 period. Their investigations related to a wide range of medicines and many of the actors involved in the pharmaceutical sector: manufacturers, wholesalers and retail distributors.

Applying Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (or its national equivalent), which prohibits anticompetitive agreements and cartels, European antitrust authorities condemned, for the first time, certain pay-for-delay agreements, whereby a generic company agrees to restrict or delay its independent entry onto the market in exchange for benefits transferred from the originator. They also condemned practices of collusion in tenders, price fixing, conduct aimed at excluding competitors or limiting their ability to compete, and other types of coordination between competitors.

Besides, European antitrust authorities found that the misuse of the regulatory framework, whereby a dominant company misleads public authorities and misuses the regulatory procedures, can infringe Article 102 TFEU (or its national equivalent). Similarly, disparagement and other practices curbing demand for generics were found to infringe Article 102 TFEU. Reviving the neglected notion of exploitative abuse, European antitrust authorities found that under certain circumstances, a dominant pharmaceutical firm may infringe Article 102 TFEU if it imposes unfair terms and conditions or excessive pricing. In these cases, the reward for innovation seemed to have weighed little in the balance against the alleged harm caused to patients.

Merger control

19 of the 80 mergers reviewed by the Commission over the 2009-2017 period were subject to structural remedies, namely divestitures, offered by the merging firms. Antitrust concerns in those cases related to the risks of (i) price increases for some medicines in one or several Member States, (ii) depriving patients and national healthcare systems of some medicinal products, and (iii) diminishing innovation in relation to certain treatments developed at the EU or even global level.

All in all, the Commission takes a positive view: it considers that active competition enforcement throughout the European Union has fostered innovation, choice and affordability by intervening where companies, unilaterally or jointly, relax competitive pressures that force them to innovate further or prevent others from innovating or illegitimately exploiting their market power.

What’s next?

After this positive assessment, the question that finally arises is whether pharmaceutical companies remain in the spotlight in Europe and should expect the same level of attention from the European antitrust authorities.

The response is, fortunately or unfortunately (depending on the standpoint), yes, definitely.

The now numerous precedents and case law have undoubtedly helped the sector to put some order into the practices implemented in the past. However, the critical challenges facing pharmaceutical companies for years (succession of blockbusters, very high cost and remuneration of innovation, very lengthy development process, etc.) weaken them and may still lead them to adopt either defensive or aggressive strategies at risk from an antitrust perspective. The European Commission remains fully aware of such risk and ultimately recommends that: “Authorities … remain vigilant and pro-active in investigating potentially anti-competitive situations, including where new practices used by companies or new trends in the industry are concerned, such as the growing relevance of biosimilars.”

So, it is most likely not the end of the story …

EU: Parent Companies Are Liable for Cartel Damages Caused By Their Liquidated Subsidiaries

In a landmark judgment (Case C‑724/17, Vantaa vs. Skanska Industrial Solutions and others), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided on March 14, 2019 that companies cannot use corporate restructuring to escape their liability for cartel damages.

Background

The Skanska case concerned a cartel in the asphalt market in Finland. Seven companies were ultimately fined for their participation in the cartel. After the cartel became public, the municipality of Vantaa, which had bought asphalt during the cartel period, requested compensation from the cartelists. However, several companies had already been dissolved in “voluntary liquidation procedures.” Their sole shareholders (among them Skanska) had then acquired the dissolved companies’ assets and continued their economic activity.

The liquidation of the companies involved in the cartel did not prevent the Finnish authorities from imposing fines on their parent companies. They applied the “principle of economic continuity,” which is well established in the law on fines for EU competition law infringements. However, Skanska disputed that this principle should also apply in civil damages matters. It argued that it could not be held liable because it was not personally involved in the cartel.

The Decision of the European Court of Justice

The ECJ did not follow the arguments of Skanska and the other defendants and found that the defendants could be held liable for the harm caused by their former subsidiaries.

According to the ECJ, the EU prohibition of cartels will be effective, punitive and deterrent only if the associated right to seek private damages is also effective. The identification of the liable entity for a damage claim is governed by EU law and must be based on the same interpretation of the “concept of undertaking” as for the imposition of fines. This means, in particular, that companies cannot circumvent the right of victims to claim damages by dissolving the legal entity which participated in the cartel.

Practical Implications

The Skanska judgment is the latest of a series of judgments in the EU that have strengthened the rights of claimants in antitrust damages actions. It has closed the door for defendants to use corporate restructurings to escape their responsibilities. While Skanska concerns a very specific situation of legal succession, the ECJ’s reasoning implies that the entire case law on the “concept of undertaking” may be applied in private damages cases. As a consequence, corporate parents may be held liable for infringements of group companies to a far greater extent than previously thought.

The Skanska judgment will also have implications for M&A transactions. Since the “concept of undertaking” attaches liability to assets rather than to a particular legal entity, the buyer of a business in an asset deal needs to consider the possibility of being held financially accountable for antitrust infringements of the seller. This aspect should be part of any due diligence.

CMA Orders Parties to Unwind Integration During Ongoing Investigation

For  the first time, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has flexed its regulatory muscles by ordering the unwinding – during the course of its ongoing investigation – of a completed acquisition. In a demonstration of its willingness to use all of the tools at its disposal – regardless of deal size or complexity – the CMA ordered Tobii AB (Tobii) to reverse any integration that had taken place as a result of its completed acquisition of Smartbox Assistive Technology Limited and Sensory International Ltd (Smartbox).

 

Background

Tobii announced its acquisition of Smartbox for £11 million in cash through a debt-financed deal in August 2018. Both are relatively small tech companies that provide specialist “augmentative and assistive communication” (AAC) for those with speech disabilities through hardware and software solutions, including eye-gaze cameras.

Following completion of the transaction, Tobii took various steps to integrate the Smartbox business, including entering into an agreement (Reseller Agreement) whereby Smartbox would act as reseller of Tobii products in the UK and Ireland, the discontinuation of certain Smartbox R&D projects, and the withdrawal of certain Smartbox products from the market.

CMA Investigation

In September 2018, the CMA opened an investigation into the completed transaction and subsequently found that it would lead to less choice, higher prices and reduced innovation for customers. The CMA gave the parties one week to submit undertakings to address these concerns, or the CMA would proceed to an in-depth, Phase 2 investigation.

Despite the parties offering various undertakings designed to alleviate the CMA’s concerns, these were not deemed sufficient and, on February 8, 2019, the CMA referred the transaction for Phase 2 investigation, simultaneously imposing an interim order preventing preemptive action.

Unwinding Order

Following further investigation during the Phase 2 process, the CMA issued – for the first time – an unwinding order. The order requires the parties to reverse integration and restore the parties to the positions in which they would have been had the integration not taken place. The parties are required to fulfil any open orders pursuant to the Reseller Agreement, but terminate it once these are fulfilled. Moreover, the unwinding order requires Smartbox to supply certain products which had been discontinued. Smartbox is also required to reinstate all R&D projects, including investment and staff allocations, which were discontinued due to the acquisition.

In imposing the unwinding order, the CMA concluded that the integration actions taken by the parties might prejudice the Phase 2 reference or impede the taking of any action by the CMA to rectify competitive harm caused by the transaction.

The CMA is scheduled to make its final decision on the transaction by July 25, 2019.

Practical Implications

The imposition of an order to unwind integration in a small tech deal could be seen as the CMA wielding a sledgehammer to crack a nut, but the Tobii/Smartbox case reflects several of the CMA’s priorities for 2019, including an increased focus on tech deals and the protection of vulnerable consumers.

The willingness of the CMA to use the full range of merger control tools at its disposal impacts not only tech deals, but deals in all industry sectors, regardless of size and complexity. Parties in completed transactions, which might affect competition in the UK, but which are not notified to the CMA, should consider carefully what steps to take in terms of integration, and whether and how those steps could be reversed if required to do so by a CMA unwinding order.

The CMA’s approach in this case also highlights the perils of not notifying transactions prior to completion. While the UK merger control regime is voluntary in theory, the consequences of not notifying are such that, in practice, the regime requires parties to carry out a careful pre-transaction assessment of the impact on competition in the UK and the risk of the CMA’s launching an investigation, instead of simply concluding that filing is not required because the UK regime is voluntary.

For more information, contact Douglas Lahnborg ([email protected]) or Matthew Rose ([email protected]).

 

New EU Rules on Foreign Investments: All You Need to Know About the New Screening Mechanism

The Council of the European Union (EU) has adopted a new regulation “establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union” (the Regulation). This is the first time the EU is equipping itself with a comprehensive framework to monitor investments into EU businesses by investors from outside the EU.

The new rules create a cooperation mechanism where EU member states and the European Commission are able to exchange information and raise concerns. The Commission will have the possibility to issue opinions in cases concerning several member states, or where an investment could affect a project or program of interest to the whole EU. However, EU member states remain in charge of reviewing, and potentially blocking, foreign investments on grounds of security or public order. The decision to set up and maintain national screening mechanisms also continues to be in the hands of individual member states.

In the following, we give an overview of the main features of the Regulation.

The New Regulation

Until recently, there were no measures at the level of the EU on the review and control of foreign direct investments. At the national level, such measures have existed in several member states – and amid growing concerns about the impact that certain foreign investments may have on national interests, some member states have made their review procedures significantly more stringent in recent years. However, the decentralized and fragmented nature of the national review procedures raised questions about their effectiveness in addressing adequately the potential (cross-border) impact of foreign investments in sensitive sectors.

To respond to such concerns, the European Commission proposed the Regulation in 2017.

The objective of the Regulation is not to harmonize the formal foreign investment mechanisms used in EU member states, or to replace them with a single EU mechanism. Rather, it provides a mechanism for EU-wide cooperation and information sharing to allow member states to make informed decisions taking into account all relevant risks and protect pan-European interests. The decision on whether to set up a review mechanism or to review a particular foreign investment remains the sole responsibility of the member states.

The EU Council adopted the Commission’s proposal on March 5, 2019. The Regulation will enter into effect after a transitional period of 18 months following its publication in the Official Journal, expected to take place on March 21, 2019.

Under the Regulation, the competent authorities of the EU member states remain in charge of screening foreign direct investments under the applicable national laws. The role of the European Commission is to facilitate coordination and to advise member states where it considers that an investment would likely affect security or public order in one or more member states.

Transactions Subject to Review

The Regulation does not put in place a review requirement for foreign investments; rather, it sets up a procedural framework for screening mechanisms created by the EU member states. The rules of the Regulation apply to any national “procedure allowing to assess, investigate, authorize, condition, prohibit or unwind foreign direct investments.”

The definition of “foreign direct investments” is broad and does not require an investment above a defined threshold of shareholder rights or the acquisition of control in the target company. Any investment “aiming to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links” with a business in “in order to carry on an economic activity” in an EU member state is sufficient. The investment must be made by a “foreign investor,” defined as “a natural person of a third country or an undertaking of a third country.” Third countries are countries outside the EU. Therefore, the Regulation does not apply to the screening of cross-border investments inside the EU.

 

Procedure

The aim of the Regulation is to enhance cooperation and increase transparency between EU member states and the European Commission. To this end, it creates a “cooperation mechanism” that requires member states to inform each other and the Commission of incoming foreign direct investments affecting security and public order (→ EU Cooperation Mechanism for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments):

  • Where a member state screens a foreign direct investment, it is obliged to notify the other member states and the Commission by providing, “as soon as possible,” certain information on the investment (→ Information Requirements). The other member states can then comment and the Commission can issue a (nonbinding) opinion within certain time limits, normally within 35 calendar days following the notification (this period is extended if other member states or the Commission request additional information).
  • Where a foreign direct investment in a member state is not undergoing screening and other member states or the Commission considers that the investment is likely to affect security or public order, the latter may request from the former certain information on the investment (→ Information Requirements). The other member states and the Commission may then provide comments or a (nonbinding) opinion, respectively, to the member state receiving the foreign direct investment. The time limit for comments and opinions is 35 calendar days following the receipt of information on the investment, although extensions are possible.

Although the final screening decision is the sole responsibility of the member state receiving the foreign investment, it is required to give “due consideration” to the comments of the other member states and the opinion of the Commission. Moreover, in cases where the Commission believes that the foreign direct investment may affect projects or programs of “Union interest,” the member state receiving the investment is required to take “utmost account” of the Commission’s opinion and provide an explanation if the opinion is not followed. Project and programs of “Union interest” are defined in the Annex of the Regulation. They currently include:

  • European GNSS programs (Galileo & EGNOS);
  • Copernicus;
  • Horizon 2020;
  • Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T);
  • Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);
  • Trans-European Networks for Telecommunications;
  • European Defence Industrial Development Programme; and
  • Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO).

In addition to creating the cooperation mechanism, the Regulation also imposes certain minimum standards for the national screening mechanisms of EU member states. These include:

  • National rules and procedures must be transparent and not discriminate between third countries.
  • Member states must set out the circumstances triggering a screening, the grounds for screening and the applicable detailed procedural rules.
  • Member States must apply timeframes that allow them to take into account the comments of other member states and the opinions of the Commission under the coordination mechanism.
  • Confidential information must be protected.
  • Foreign investors and the undertakings concerned must have the possibility to seek recourse against screening decisions of the national authorities.
  • National screening mechanism must include measures necessary to identify and prevent circumvention.

Substantive Assessment

The Regulation does not attempt to harmonize national rules on foreign investments in the EU member states. However, it does provide a list of factors that the member states and the European Commission may take into consideration when conducting their assessment. This includes potential effects on the following:

  • critical infrastructure (incl. energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing, finance);
  • critical technologies and dual use items (incl. artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum, nuclear, nano- or biotechnologies);
  • supply of critical inputs (incl. energy, raw materials, food);
  • access to sensitive information (incl. personal data); or
  • freedom and pluralism of the media.

 

Agree to Disagree: Competition Authorities Differ on Approach to Digital Platforms

Tech giants have captured the attention of competition agencies around the world. As we have previously shared, the FTC is in the midst of a series of hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, including sessions on Big Data, Privacy, and Competition and the Antitrust Framework for Evaluating Acquisitions of Potential or Nascent Competitors in Digital Marketplaces. Multiple European regulators (the EU, Germany and now Austria) recently launched investigations into Amazon. Technology platforms are a priority for many other enforcers as well, from China to Australia to the UK.

With different competition authorities weighing in on how to assess tech competition, there is the potential for divergence in intensity of enforcement as well as whether existing competition doctrine suffices. Disparities are borne out by recent statements emanating from U.S., Australian, and UK competition agencies and officials.

Fresh remarks from the U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division indicate the agency does not support a regulatory approach to platforms and the digital economy. In a speech last week, agency head Makan Delrahim addressed Antitrust Enforcement in the Zero-Price Economy, noting that while zero-price strategies have “exploded” with the rise of digital platforms, “the strategy of selling a product or service at zero price is not new, nor is it unique to the digital economy.” Mr. Delrahim acknowledged the divergent views of how antitrust enforcement should treat such products and services, which range from exemption from antitrust scrutiny entirely to the creation of new, specially crafted rules and standards. Rejecting both of these “extreme views” as “misplaced,” he emphasized the ability of current antitrust doctrine – including the consumer welfare standard – to tackle the issue, stating: “[W]e do not need a wholesale revision of the antitrust laws to address competitive concerns in these contexts. . . . [O]ur antitrust laws and principles are flexible enough to adapt to the challenges of the digital economy.” Mr. Delrahim called for “careful case-by-case analysis” in enforcement. He touted the innovation and benefits that zero-price strategies have brought to consumers, crediting the country’s “pro-market economic and legal structures” and cautioning against “distortions of our antitrust standards” to address issues like privacy and data protection if they do not impede the functioning of the free market.

His speech echoes a view Mr. Delrahim and others at the Antitrust Division have expressed previously regarding the need (or lack thereof) for new rules to address the antitrust implications of “big data.” In an October 2018 speech regarding startups, innovation, and antitrust policy, Mr. Delrahim remarked that “accumulation of data drives innovation and benefits consumers” in many ways (including by enabling zero-price offerings), and that forced sharing risks undermining innovation by reducing incentives for both incumbents and new entrants. Invoking Trinko,[1] he stated that “free and competitive markets” – not antitrust agencies or courts – are best equipped to determine “how much data should be shared, with whom, and at what price.” Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bernard Nigro, Jr. has taken a similar position, stating that “forced sharing of critical assets reduces the incentive to invest in innovation” and that “where benefits to sharing exist, they can be best captured by the parties negotiating in a free and competitive market, not by government regulation.”

By contrast, other jurisdictions and industry observers considering the competitive implications of digital platforms have questioned the status quo. In their view, control of valuable data provides a competitive advantage and raises entry barriers that may entrench a platform’s dominant position and lead to competitive or consumer harm. At a higher level, France and Germany just announced an effort to overhaul competition rules to enable European companies to better develop technologies that compete on the global stage.

For example, last week the Australian Productivity Commission and the New Zealand Productivity Commission released a joint report that reviews how most effectively to address the challenges and harness the opportunities the digital economy creates (particularly for small- to medium-sized enterprises). In a section titled “Existing competition regulation may not be adequate for digital markets,” the report addressed the challenges of applying existing laws to the digital economy, including (among others) that zero-price goods and services complicate the analysis of market definition and market power, and that data “is an increasingly important business input and may be a source of market power” but is not adequately captured in traditional competition policy. Although the report acknowledged that in some cases technological developments might obviate the need for regulation (and in others the mere threat of regulation may be enough), it posited that new regulation might be necessary to maintain competitive markets: “[I]f ‘winner-take-most’ markets do end up prevailing, competition regulators may need to consider extending tools such as essential service access regimes to digital services.” An essential service (or “essential facilities”) regime would treat a digital platform’s data as an input essential to competition and require the platform to provide its competitors with reasonable access to it. In contrast to the Productivity Commissions’ suggestion, U.S. competition enforcers to date have been loath to treat digital platforms as essential facilities.

The Productivity Commissions’ report comes on the heels of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) Digital Platforms Inquiry preliminary findings released in December. The ACCC expressed similar concerns about the rise of digital platforms and the threat they pose to consumers and the competitive process. Addressing what it found to be Google’s and Facebook’s market power in a number of markets,[2] the report encouraged governments to be “responsive, and indeed proactive, in reacting to and anticipating challenges and problems” posed by digital platforms. It offered eleven preliminary recommendations to address these concerns, including: amending merger law to expressly consider potential competition and the data at issue in the transaction, requiring advance notice of any acquisition by a large digital platform of a business with activities in Australia, and tasking a regulatory authority with monitoring the conduct of vertically integrated digital platforms. The report also proposed areas for further analysis, such as: a digital platforms ombudsman, the monitoring of intermediary pricing and opt-in targeted advertising. As such, indications from Australia suggest calls for more competition intervention have some teeth.

The UK may have a similar appetite, as indicated by a new Parliament publication addressing “Disinformation and ‘fake news.’” The statement calls for increased oversight and greater transparency into “how the big tech companies work and what happens to our data,” highlighting Facebook’s treatment and monetization of user data as an example of why intervention is needed. In addition to recommending a compulsory Code of Ethics overseen by an independent regulator with “statutory powers to monitor relevant tech companies,” the publication advocated for greater competition law scrutiny of and enforcement against digital platforms, including an investigation of Facebook and a “comprehensive audit” of the social media advertising market. Invoking existing “legislative tools” such as privacy laws, data protection legislation, and antitrust and competition law, the report cautioned: “The big tech companies must not be allowed to expand exponentially, without constraint or proper regulatory oversight.”

Operating under an international patchwork of competition approaches can present a challenge to global enterprises. Technology-focused, data-intensive businesses should consider seeking antitrust counsel to monitor developing competition trends and implications across jurisdictions.

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[1] Verizon Communic’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004).

[2] The preliminary report finds that Google has market power in online search, online search advertising and news media referral services, and that Facebook has market power in social media services, display advertising and news media referral services.

German Competition Authority Investigates Amazon

The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has opened abuse proceedings against Amazon for practices related to the German marketplace amazon.de. This move comes not long after the European Commission initiated a preliminary investigation into Amazon’s use of transaction data.

In both the German and the EU case, the competition concerns appear to be linked to Amazon being not only the largest online retailer but also the largest online marketplace for competing retailers. There are, however, important differences between the two investigations: While the Commission is looking at “exclusionary abuse,” i.e. conduct hindering the competitive opportunities of its rivals, the FCO investigates potential “exploitative abuse,” i.e. imposing conditions that are significantly more onerous for retailers using the marketplace than they would be in a competitive environment (see the FCO’s press release).

The approach of the FCO is based on special features of German competition law, which facilitate proceedings against abuses of market power:

First, regarding the issue of market power, the German prohibition on abusive market conduct applies not only to companies with a dominant market position (as under EU law) but also to companies with “relative market power,” which is a less demanding standard. A company has relative market power if small or medium-sized customers or suppliers are dependent on it and cannot reasonably switch to other companies for the supply or the sale of a particular type of goods or services. The FCO believes that Amazon may be dominant or may have relative market power because it functions as a “gatekeeper.” In fact, Amazon has become so powerful in Germany that many retailers and manufacturers depend on the reach of its marketplace for their online sales.

Second, regarding the existence of abuse, the FCO suspects that Amazon is abusing its market position to the detriment of sellers active on its marketplace by imposing unfair terms and conditions. Here, the FCO relies on the case law of the German Supreme Court, which has decided that the use of unfair terms and conditions by a dominant firm can constitute an abuse – provided it is because of its dominance or relative market power that the firm is able to impose such terms and conditions. In other words: there must be a causal link between the firm’s market power or dominance and the unfair terms and conditions. It is not yet clear how the FCO will establish such a link.

Regarding the terms and practices that will be scrutinized, the FCO has listed the following provisions as being potentially illegal:

  • liability provisions
  • choice of law and jurisdiction clauses
  • rules on product reviews
  • the non-transparent termination and blocking of sellers’ accounts
  • withholding or delaying payment
  • clauses assigning rights to use the information material that a seller has to provide with regard to the products offered
  • terms of business on pan-European dispatch

The FCO’s Amazon investigation shows some similarities to its ongoing proceedings against Facebook (see our previous Blog post). Both cases are focused on the use of unfair terms and conditions. The FCO has said that it will issue its Facebook decision in early 2019. We expect that decision to set the direction for the Amazon investigation.

 

Platform Bans: German Competition Authority Critical Despite Coty Judgment

Since last year’s “Coty” judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), it may have seemed settled that authorized dealers in a selective distribution network can be prohibited from selling products via third-party marketplaces, i.e. online platforms operated by third parties such as Amazon.[1] However, in a recent position paper, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has expressed a much more nuanced view.[2]

According to the Coty judgment, EU competition law generally allows the banning of online third-party platforms in selective distribution systems, especially for luxury goods. First, where such a ban is applied without discrimination and in a proportionate manner to the distribution of luxury goods and with the objective of preserving the luxury image of such goods, the ban is not considered a restriction of competition. Second, in all other cases – for example where the goods in question are not “luxury goods” – the ban may be justified by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER), provided the market shares of the parties are below 30 percent.[3]

The FCO, however, makes it clear that there are several issues that remain unsolved, even after the Coty ruling.

First, the FCO points out that the Coty judgment deals with “luxury goods” and that it cannot simply be applied one-to-one to other types of products, including high-quality products. Thus platform bans for non-luxury goods may, in fact, infringe competition law, even within selective distribution systems. In the absence of a clear definition separating “luxury goods” from other (high-quality) branded products, accepting outright bans of online platforms will, therefore, be anything but automatic.

Second, the FCO explains the policy that it proposes to apply outside the (limited) scope of the Coty ruling, i.e. to non-luxury goods, including high-quality branded products: it considers that a general prohibition on using third-party online platforms is likely excessive and that less restrictive measures, such as specific quality requirements, will normally suffice to protect a brand image. For example, the FCO explains that dealers could be required to have their own online shop on the marketplace rather than share a product page with other dealers.

Third, the FCO also puts a question mark over the application of the VBER to third-party platform bans. The ECJ decided in its “Pierre Fabre” judgment that manufacturers generally cannot prevent their distributors from using the internet as a sales channel.[4] An outright ban on internet sales is normally an infringement of EU competition law. However, in “Coty,” the ECJ added that a mere ban of third-party platforms does not amount to a prohibition on using the internet – provided distributors are able to run their own online shops and are unrestricted in using the internet for advertising and marketing purposes so that customers can find their online offers via online search engines. The FCO now points out that consumer preferences and the relative importance of different sales channels may vary between EU member states. According to the FCO, marketplaces and price comparison sites are much more significant in Germany than in other EU member states. In Germany, banning the use of marketplaces could reduce a distributor’s visibility to such an extent that the ban becomes equivalent to a complete ban of online sales and, thus, unlawful.

In a nutshell, the FCO is not prepared to generally accept the legality of third-party platform bans and it can be expected that it will continue to challenge such prohibitions if they have restrictive effects on competition.

However, the FCO also recognizes that Amazon Marketplace has become increasingly important for manufacturers and that many manufacturers can no longer afford to exclude this particular sales channel from their distribution system. The rising market power of Amazon Marketplace is of particular concern for the authority because of Amazon’s dual business model. Amazon is a “hybrid platform” that acts both as an intermediary for online dealers and as an authorized dealer for the same products. The FCO highlights the risks that follow from this setup: in particular, independent dealers could be disadvantaged or squeezed out of the market. The FCO is very clear about its intention to keep online markets open and that it will closely monitor Amazon’s growing market power with this in mind.

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[1] EU Court of Justice judgment of December 6, 2017, Coty Germany GmbH vs. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, C-230/16, EU:C:2017:941.

[2] “Competition and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy: Competition restraints in online sales after Coty and Asics – what’s next?” published on the FCO website (link).

[3] Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of April 20, 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices.

[4] EU Court of Justice judgment of October 13, 2011, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS vs. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence a.o., C-439/09, [2011] ECR I-9447.

UK’s Proposed Investment Scrutiny Powers Are Far-Reaching

Douglas Lahnborg and Matthew Rose present a comparative discussion on the recently issued National Security and Investment White Paper, which proposes a significant expansion of the UK government’s powers to scrutinize foreign investment beyond those available in other leading economies. The white paper introduces powers to intervene in a broad range of transactions in any sector, regardless of deal value, the transaction parties’ market shares, or their revenues. If the proposals are brought into force in their current form, the UK regime would be one of the most stringent in the world, with wide-ranging implications for foreign and domestic companies and projects in sensitive sectors, including technology, energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, real estate and financial services. Read more here.

European Crackdown on Violations of Merger Control Procedural Rules Continues

Last year on this Blog we wrote about the uptick in enforcement action by European competition authorities against violations of merger control procedure (see here).

Yesterday, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) indicated that this trend is set to continue, issuing a fine of £100,000 for a breach of an Interim Order imposed on Electro Rent in its acquisition of Microlease. This is the first time the CMA has fined a company for such a procedural breach.

On the face of it, the fine seems harsh given that the relevant action – serving notice of termination of a lease without the CMA’s prior consent – was discussed with the appointed Monitoring Trustee prior to coming into effect.[1] Indeed, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) recently confirmed that parties may take certain actions without violating the standstill obligation imposed under the EU Merger Regulation – including terminating agreements – where such actions do not contribute to the implementation of a transaction.[2] In doing so, the ECJ’s ruling confirmed the commonly held view that merging parties are permitted to take certain steps allowing them to prepare for implementation of a transaction without violating merger control procedural rules.

Given the developing case law on standstill obligations, companies involved in M&A will need to revisit pre-completion protocols, noting that the EU approach seems to be diverging from the CMA’s somewhat more rigid approach to merger control. READ MORE

CMA Launches Consultation Concerning Changes to its Jurisdiction over M&A in the Tech Sector

The UK government considers that transactions in the following sectors can raise national security concerns:

1. quantum technology;
2. computing hardware; and
3. the development or production of items for military or military and civilian use.

In order to allow the UK’s Secretary of State to intervene in transactions in these sectors, the UK government has proposed amendments to the Enterprise Act 2002 that would expand the Competition & Markets Authority’s (“CMA”) jurisdiction to review transactions in these sectors from a competition perspective. READ MORE

Enhancing Fairness in Platform-to-Business Relations in the EU Through a Change of Legal Landscape

Online platforms have become a crucial infrastructure for businesses. They enable small businesses to have easy access to millions of potential customers and create an unprecedented choice of products and services for them. According to a recent Eurobarometer survey on the use of online marketplaces and search engines by small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”),[1] 42% of the respondents declared that they use online platforms and marketplaces to sell their products or services.[2] This survey also indicates that 82% of the respondents rely on search engines to promote and sell their products or services. In short, online platforms play a key role in the growth of the economy and help the digital transformation of small businesses. READ MORE

First Person Extradited From Europe to the United States for Criminal Antitrust Charges—Continued

Can Germany extradite an EU national to the United States for criminal prosecution when Germany’s own nationals are protected from extradition? This question has been put to the European Court of Justice, and the court’s advisor, Advocate General Yves Bot, has said “yes”. READ MORE

Gun-Jumping Continues To Be Serious Infringement in EU

Like many other merger control regimes, the EU merger control regulation (Regulation No. 139/2004, hereinafter “EUMR”) imposes certain obligations on parties to mergers and acquisitions that come under the jurisdiction of the European Commission. In particular, a transaction must be notified to the Commission prior to its implementation, and the parties must not implement the transaction until it has been cleared by the Commission. Failure to comply with the notification or the “standstill” obligations may result in a fine of up to 10% of the worldwide group turnover for each party. READ MORE

Big Data: German Antitrust Decision Regarding Facebook Expected in 2017

As more internet users entrust their personal data to operators of websites, operators’ use of this “Big Data” has become a growing concern. As a result, government agencies around the world are grappling with whether and how to regulate “Big Data” in the context of social networking websites.  This includes some competition authorities that are trying to expand their purview by using competition laws to regulate “Big Data” in the context of social media.  The possibility that competition authorities around the world may try to become super regulators of “Big Data” should be of concern to all operators of social networking websites.

A case in point is the German competition authority (FCO), which in March 2016 initiated proceedings against one of the most popular social networking sites – Facebook – purportedly based on a concern that it may have infringed data protection rules. Since the case is the first of its kind in Europe, the outcome – which is expected before the end of the year – is awaited with great interest.

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UK High Court of Justice Issues an Injunction Prohibiting Huawei from Selling Wireless Telecommunications Products in Britain Due to its Failure to Enter Into a Worldwide Patent License

Orrick antitrust practice team attorneys Matthew G. Rose, Jay Jurata and Emily Luken recently published an article in the e-Competitions Bulletin August 2017 discussing the implications of the UK High Court of Justice ruling that enjoins Huawei from selling wireless telecommunications products in Britain due to Huawei’s failure to enter into a patent license for Unwired Planet’s worldwide portfolio of standard-essential patents (SEPs), even though Huawei was willing to enter into a license for Unwired Planet’s United Kingdom (UK) SEPs.

The article examines the potential competitive harms that would result from a regime in which licensees are required to take worldwide SEP licenses.

The Chips Are Down: Intel’s Victory in the European Court of Justice Has Implications on How Anticompetitive Conduct Is Analysed in EU Antitrust Cases

 

On 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) handed down its long-awaited ruling in Intel v Commission (the “Ruling”).[1] The Ruling, which sets aside the appealed judgment of the EU General Court and orders the case to be re-examined for failing to consider the effects of anticompetitive conduct on competition, has potentially broad implications for how the European Commission (“Commission”) conducts its analysis and reasons its decisions in ongoing and future EU antitrust investigations.

Key Takeaways

  • The Ruling signals a return of “effects-based” analysis in EU antitrust cases and a move away from a “form-based” approach where certain conduct is deemed per se illegal.
  • The Ruling not only clarifies how the General Court should assess appeals of Commission decisions, but is likely to have implications for how the Commission approaches its analysis and reasons its decisions in EU antitrust cases going forward. In particular, the burden of proving that specific conduct or practices have anticompetitive effects is placed firmly with the Commission.
  • Intel’s victory may embolden other entities facing similar allegations to defend their corners more aggressively.
  • This is not the end of the road. It cannot be ruled out that the General Court, when it re-examines the case and applies the appropriate analysis, comes to the same ultimate conclusions and upholds the Commission’s original fine.

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European Competition Authorities Crack Down on Violations of Merger Control Procedural Rules

Is a wind of change blowing through the European merger control enforcement landscape?

The response is yes, certainly.

Very recent cases or investigations launched by the European Commission alleging potential violations of merger control procedural rules by notifying parties have sent a clear signal to companies: you’d now better think twice before breaking the merger control procedural rules.

It is even truer when one considers that this may well be a trend throughout Europe. These cases have echoed back to recent similar cases, pending or closed, at the member state level (the Altice case in France, the CEE Holding Group limited/ Olympic International Holdings Limited case in Hungary, the AB Kauno Grudai / AB Vievio Paukstynas case in Lithuania, and a very recent bakery case in Slovakia). READ MORE

Janssen Cilag S.A.S v. France: Approval of Broad and Indiscriminate Seizures by the European Court of Human Rights

European Court of Human Rights Logo Janssen Cilag S.A.S v. France: Approval of Broad and Indiscriminate Seizures by the European Court of Human Rights

On April 13, 2017 in Janssen Cilag S.A.S v. France,[1] the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) confirmed the validity of search and seizure operations carried out by the French Competition Authority at Janssen Cilag’s company premises. In keeping with its findings in Vinci Construction and GTM Génie Civile et Services v. France, [2] the Court considered that the broad and indiscriminate seizure by the FCA amounted to interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (the “Convention”), but that the interference was while pursuing a legitimate aim and therefore “in accordance with the law.”

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New Merger Filing Thresholds In Germany and Austria

Merger Acquisition Antitrust

Merger notification obligations are changing in Germany and Austria, as new alternative jurisdictional thresholds based on the “transaction value” are being introduced into the respective national regimes, previously solely based on turnover thresholds.

Germany

In Germany, the introduction of a new set of alternative thresholds was approved by both chambers of Parliament and will enter into force upon the (imminent) signature by the Federal President.

Even though the new thresholds are being introduced with a view to better control acquisitions of Internet startups, they apply regardless of the economic sector to any high-valued acquisition of undertakings that have a “significant” presence in Germany. READ MORE

New Anonymous Whistle-Blower Tool Launched By The European Commission

Businessman in black suit hiding face behind sign whistle blower New Anonymous Whistle-Blower Tool Launched By The European Commission

On March 16, 2017, the European Commission (“EC”) introduced a new tool to make it easier for individuals to alert the EC about competition law violations, mainly secret cartels, while maintaining the anonymity of the whistle-blowers.

The EC presented the objectives of the new tool (I) and how it works (II); this tool, which is not new in Europe, leaves several questions unanswered (III).

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