Latest news and industry trends in the distressed debt and restructuring markets
The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year. READ MORE
On 12 February 2016 Snowden J handed down his judgment in Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V. [2016] EWHC 246 (Ch). Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V. (“Indah Kiat”), part of the global Asia Pulp & Paper Group (one of the world’s largest pulp and paper manufacturers), applied for an order convening a meeting of scheme creditors to consider and, if thought fit, approve a proposed scheme of arrangement (the “Scheme”) under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006. One creditor, APPIO, opposed the Scheme on various grounds and in this hearing sought an adjournment on the basis that insufficient notice was given to the creditors of the convening hearing.
The Indah Kiat judgment neatly follows a similar judgment of Snowden J in Van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWCG 2151 (Ch) only a few months earlier. In this case Snowden J took the opportunity to review the current law on jurisdiction relating to schemes of arrangement, and, arguably, to raise the jurisdictional hurdle. He noted that in recent years, schemes of arrangement have been increasingly used to restructure the financial obligations of overseas companies that do not have their centre of main interest or an establishment or any significant assets in England, and stated that companies seeking approval of a scheme would be well advised “to ensure that greater detail is provided, both in the explanatory statement and in the evidence before the court”. Additionally, and more importantly for Indah Kiat, he commented on the judgment in re Telewest Communications plc (No 2) [2005] 1 BCLC 772 that the court will not generally sanction a scheme if it finds a “blot” in the scheme such that the scheme will not have the effect that the company and creditors intend. This is key in the underlying message of Snowden J’s Indah Kiat judgment.
Whilst schemes of arrangement have become increasingly popular to compromise creditors’ claims in a pragmatic manner which may not be available in the jurisdiction of incorporation of the relevant debtor, the judgments in Van Gansewinkel and, more specifically, in Indah Kiat, make it clear that the English courts will not compromise the integrity of this highly effective restructuring tool where the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction act other than with the “utmost candour”.
One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. The discharge of prepetition debts at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case is one of the most important ways to attain this fresh start. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court made it harder for debtors to obtain a fresh start by broadening an exception to discharge.
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an individual debtor is not discharged from any debt “for money, property [or] services … to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud[.]” Circuits split as to whether actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires an affirmative misrepresentation; the Fifth Circuit had held that this was a necessary element to prevent discharge, but the Seventh Circuit had held that “actual fraud” encompassed a broader range of behaviors.
The Supreme Court resolved this split, rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpretation and finding that the term “actual fraud” does not need to include an affirmative misrepresentation by the debtor. With this broader reading, debtors will be unable to discharge prepetition debts where there is evidence that they inappropriately siphoned of their assets prior to filing for bankruptcy. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, 2016 WL 2842452 (U.S. May 16, 2016). READ MORE
The Deal has once again recognized Orrick as a Top Ten Bankruptcy Law Firm in its Q1 2016 Bankruptcy League Tables. After being named to the top ten in each quarter last year, Orrick extended the streak by gaining one spot in the rankings (now #7).
During a busy Q1 period, we advised several clients on a diverse blend of bankruptcy matters, with a particular emphasis in the areas of distressed energy, municipal debt and cross-border restructurings.
The Deal’s Bankruptcy League Tables are the industry’s only league tables focused solely on active bankruptcy cases. These rankings are compiled on a quarterly basis through comprehensive deal intelligence to identify the top law, crisis management, investment, and non-investment firms and professionals involved in bankruptcy transactions throughout the United States.
Earlier this year, we covered Judge Shelley Chapman’s ruling in the Sabine bankruptcy, permitting the Debtors to reject a handful of gathering and other midstream agreements. Previously, Judge Chapman permitted rejection on the grounds that the Debtors exercised their reasonable business judgement in doing so. At that time, the Court issued a “non-binding” ruling on whether the agreements were (or contained) “covenants running with the land” that would have rendered rejection impossible or useless.
On May 3, 2016, approximately six weeks later, Judge Chapman reached a final “binding” ruling on this open issue – holding that the contracts do not constitute (or include) covenants running with the land, and can be rejected in full. The Court largely reiterated its prior analysis – and even attached the prior opinion to the new opinion. The Court also noted for the first time that, if the contracts had contained covenants affecting the value and use of the real property, they likely would have defaulted the Debtors’ credit facility. Mem. Decision on Motions of Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC et al. at 11, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., No. 15-11835 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., May 3, 2016).
Litigation costs money.
Litigation finance can provide the cash a plaintiff needs to prevail in court. Plaintiffs holding valid—and potentially quite valuable—claims sometimes do not have the resources to initiate a lawsuit or to see one through to a favorable resolution. Rules of professional ethics generally prohibit lawyers from providing clients with financial assistance. A contingency fee arrangement with a lawyer can help reduce a plaintiff’s out-of-pocket legal costs, but such arrangements are not always feasible. Even when they are, the lawyer may not have enough cash available to fully fund the costs of litigation.
Litigation financing (also known as professional funding, settlement funding, third-party funding, or legal funding) is the process by which plaintiffs can finance their litigation or other legal costs through a third party. This third party provides a nonrecourse cash advance to the plaintiff in exchange for a percentage share of the judgment or settlement. Litigation finance is used to fund all types of cases, including commercial litigation, intellectual property disputes, personal injury cases, class actions, whistleblower suits, and even high-profile divorce cases. And funders invest in early stage cases, cases pending appeal, and even finished cases.
Many investors, including big banks, participate in this sector. There are also firms dedicated solely to investment in litigations. These firms now invest about $1 billion a year, and the industry seems to be growing. Topping $1 Billion Mark, Big Litigation Funder Gets Bigger, Julie Triedman, The Am Law Daily, January 6, 2016. The industry’s largest investor, Chicago-based Gerchen Keller, was formed in 2013 with $100 million in capital and now has more than $1.4 billion in assets under management. In many ways, the firm operates like a typical hedge fund. It maintains several separate funds that invest private capital in portfolios of assets selected by the firms’ managers. The major difference between it and more traditional hedge funds is that Gerchen Keller invests only in this new asset class—namely, interests in lawsuits. In addition to investments by big banks and funds, accredited investors with as little as $2,500 to invest can get a piece of the action. Specifically, LexShares, a crowdsourcing website, matches third-party funders meeting certain qualifications with litigants in need of funding.
The foregoing demonstrates that lawsuit investment is a new and burgeoning asset class. In spite of this, there is no uniform regulation. Congress and state legislatures are looking to change this situation.
Bankruptcy Judge Shelley Chapman held that Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. has satisfied the standards for rejection of several gathering and handling agreements between Sabine and its midstream counter-parties, Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC. The ruling has limits. The matter ultimately turns on whether certain covenants “run with the land” under Texas law. While the Court held that Sabine exercised reasonable business judgment in rejecting the agreements, the Court declined to decide “in a binding way the underlying legal dispute with respect to whether the covenants at issue run with the land,” and instead offered a “non-binding” analysis to determine the reasonableness of Sabine’s rejection. Thus, if the counter-parties can demonstrate that the covenants do run with the land in an adversary proceeding, Sabine may not be able to terminate those covenants. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., No. 15011835 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016).
How did Judge Chapman come to this ruling and how will it affect agreements between upstream and midstream providers? See below for background on this case, the two main arguments and an analysis of potential implications this case may have, particularly on midstream counter-parties who may have thought they were protected from upstream credit risk.
Once again, Orrick has been ranked a Top Ten Bankruptcy Law Firm by The Deal Pipeline. These rankings are released on a quarterly basis, compiling comprehensive deal intelligence to identify the leading law, crisis management, investment, and non-investment firms and professionals involved in bankruptcy transactions throughout the United States. After cracking the top ten in Q1, Orrick remained among the top ten bankruptcy law firms in every quarter in 2015.
Orrick’s restructuring team enjoyed a busy year, including such recent highlights as representing the City of Stockton in its exit from bankruptcy and dismissal of an appeal filed by holdout creditor Franklin Templeton in the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit; Tirreno Power on a complex corporate reorganization including the negotiation and drafting of a €1 billion debt restructuring agreement, which was awarded Restructuring Deal of the Year at the 2016 Legalcommunity Energy Awards; and IFM Investors Pty Ltd, on behalf of IFM Global Infrastructure Fund, in its $5.72 billion acquisition of 100% of the membership interests of ITR Concession Company, which operates and maintains the Indiana Toll Road – named M&A Deal of the Year by M&A Advisor.
To see the complete list of rankings, please click here.
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). In the Caesars bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit explored the breadth of a court’s rights to take action under this section. The Seventh Circuit held that section 105(a) permits the Bankruptcy Court to issue an injunction with respect to litigation pending against the debtors’ non-debtor parent. The Court of Appeals did not ultimately determine whether the stay should in fact be granted because “that’s an issue for the bankruptcy judge to resolve in the first instance;” rather, it held that the Bankruptcy Court and District Court had erred in interpreting section 105(a) too narrowly in denying the stay sought by the debtors. In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., No. 15-3259, 2015 WL 9311432 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015).
Since May, we’ve followed Solus v. Perry, a New York County Supreme Court case originally filed in July of 2012. The case centered around whether Perry entered into a binding oral agreement to sell Solus a participation interest in a $1.6 billion claim against Bernie Madoff’s bankruptcy estate. The parties agreed on a price and some other material terms during a phone call in April of 2012 but never signed a written agreement. In its pleadings, Perry claimed that because its trader noted that the trade was “subject to documentation,” no agreement was ever formed.
Last Monday, the parties filed a stipulation discontinuing the case with prejudice.
During oral arguments on the parties’ summary judgment motions last year, Judge Saliann Scarpulla noted that several issues with meaningful implications for the distressed trading market would need to be resolved before summary judgment could be entered, including: (1) whether there is an industry custom regarding the binding nature of oral contracts for unsecured claim trades; (2) whether an agreement that a trade is subject to documentation means there is no binding contract; and (3) whether the need for consent of a third party means there is no binding contract if such consent is not obtained.
The Solus v. Perry case will not produce an opinion resolving these issues. However, market participants should take note that even in New York, these issues are still considered open questions. Therefore, we reiterate the conclusions from our May article: