When is a foreign entity eligible to file a chapter 15 petition? This question has been the subject of debate over the last few years, and Judge Martin Glenn’s recent opinion in In re Berau Capital Resources Pte Ltd. will add to this debate. Although the debtor in the case was foreign and did not have a place of business in the United States, Judge Glenn concluded that the debtor had satisfied the eligibility provisions under section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because the New York choice of law and forum selection clause in the underlying bond indenture rendered the bonds “property in the United States.” No. 15-11804 (MG), 2015 WL 6507871 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015).
Bankruptcy Code
Privacy Policies and the Sale of Corporate Assets: It pays to plan ahead to preserve the value of your data assets
Personal data is a valuable corporate asset. At times, the personal information collected from customers (such as email address, mailing address, phone number, etc.) can be a company’s most valuable asset. Unfortunately, when a company attempts to sell this asset, it can find the value of the data significantly diminished due to promises made in a privacy policy the company implemented years before it ever contemplated such a sale.
A company’s privacy policy sets forth the company’s promises to its consumers as to how it will collect, store, maintain, and share the consumers’ personal data. In an attempt to appeal to customer privacy concerns, it is common for a company to proclaim in such policies:
“We share your personal data only in the ways described in this policy,”
or
“We care about our customers and we will never sell or share your personal data.”
Most companies include these statements to highlight their promise not to capitalize on a consumer’s data by selling to third party marketers. However, many companies do not realize that statements such as these could also severely restrict the company’s ability to sell data as a corporate asset in a company sale, merger, bankruptcy, or similar corporate transaction, unless there is also a clear statement within the policy which permits data to be transferred during the course of such events.
There are steps a company can take leading up to the corporate transaction to smooth the transfer of customer data, such as updating its privacy policy, providing additional notice to consumers, requesting opt-out or opt-in consent to the revised policy and/or the data sale. Companies that fail to take these steps and attempt to transfer data in a manner that conflicts with promises made in its privacy policy may face regulatory scrutiny or litigation, both of which would ultimately diminish the value of their data assets in any eventual sale.
Decoding the Code: Bankruptcy Code Section 510(a) – Subordination Agreements in Bankruptcy
Once upon a time, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, subordination agreements entered into outside bankruptcy were generally enforced by bankruptcy courts, but the issue was left to the discretion of the courts to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Since 1979, when the current Bankruptcy Code came into effect, however, the treatment of subordination agreements in bankruptcy has been governed by statute: “A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).
Since a bankruptcy court is supposed to enforce a subordination agreement that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, section 510(a) closes the door on the exercise of case-by-case discretion by bankruptcy courts, but the statute nevertheless opens up a series of other issues that the courts have been grappling with for over 35 years now. What constitutes a “subordination agreement”? Must a bankruptcy court enforce all the provisions of a “subordination agreement”? What about rights of the parties that are not spelled out in the agreement (including rights that are derived from equitable principles) or that are dealt with in the agreement in ambiguous terms? How are the answers to such questions affected by section 510(a)’s mandate that “subordination agreements” should be enforced in bankruptcy cases?
Decoding the Code: Reclamation Under Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
This is the second post in our “Decoding the Code” Series. The Series intends to discuss various sections of the Bankruptcy Code in a clear and easy to understand manner. Today’s post addresses enforcement of reclamation rights in a bankruptcy case.
Let’s decode the basics:
First Circuit Rules Bankruptcy Code Preempts Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act
On Monday, July 6, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the February 6, 2015 order and injunction of the Puerto Rico District Court and held that section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts the Puerto Rico Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”). Franklin Cal. Tax Free Trust, et al. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., (1st Cir. July 6, 2015) (Case No. 15-1218): On February 10, 2015, we reported on the district court’s decision holding that the Recovery Act was unconstitutional.
As a result of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, Puerto Rico, unlike states, may not authorize its municipalities, including its public utilities like PREPA or PRASA, to seek federal bankruptcy relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. In considering the appeal of the district court’s order, the Court first confirmed that it had jurisdiction to consider the bondholders’ claims of preemption, that those claims were ripe and that they had become ripe immediately upon adoption of the Recovery Act. The Court then ruled that the Commonwealth’s effort to allow its public corporations to restructure their debt by enacting the Recovery Act is expressly preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code. Rejecting the Commonwealth’s arguments that the 1984 amendments made the preemption provisions of section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code inapplicable, the Court stated that “§ 903(1) has applied to Puerto Rico since the predecessor of that section’s enactment in 1946. The statute does not currently read, nor does anything about the 1984 amendment suggest, that Puerto Rico is outside the reach of § 903(1)’s prohibition. Op. at 4. Because the Court affirmed the district court’s order and injunction, the Court declined to consider the Commonwealth’s appeal of the district court’s order denying motions to dismiss the bondholders’ Contracts Clause and Takings Claims. Op. at 21.
Supreme Court Rules Against Fees For Fee Application Defense
Issuing its third bankruptcy ruling in a month, the Supreme Court held, by a 6-3 margin, that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit awarding fees to debtor’s counsel, when counsel incurred those fees defending its own fee application. The Court held that services defending fee applications were not rendered to the debtor’s estate, and therefore the fees did not constitute “actual, necessary services” payable under section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code as reasonable compensation. This decision could increase leverage on parties seeking to rein in bankruptcy litigation by threatening to challenge attorney’s fees. Baker Botts L.L.P. et al. v. ASARCO LLC, No. 14-103, 2015 WL 2473336 (S. Ct. June 15, 2015) (hereinafter, the “Opinion”).
Momentive: Where does it stand?
On September 9, 2014, following a hotly contested four-day confirmation hearing, Robert Drain, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York, issued a bench ruling approving Momentive’s chapter 11 plan. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014). Momentive’s plan provided for the company’s first and 1.5 lien noteholders to receive new notes with extended maturities at a reduced interest rate, while fully equitizing the second lien noteholders. Holders of senior subordinated notes did not receive any recovery. At the heart of the plan was a $600 million rights offering backstopped by the second lien noteholders.
In approving the plan, Judge Drain overruled objections filed by trustees for the first and 1.5 lien noteholders who argued that the plan was not “fair and equitable” because the proposed cramdown interest rate for each of the new notes was below the applicable market rate. The first and 1.5 lien noteholders also asserted that a make-whole premium would have been due upon a repayment of the debt pursuant to language in the first and 1.5 lien note indentures. The trustee representing holders of senior subordinated notes also objected to the plan on the grounds that it impermissibly subordinated the claims of senior subordinated noteholders to the deficiency claims of second lien noteholders, which resulted in the senior subordinated noteholders not receiving any recovery. The trustee for the senior subordinated notes also argued that the plan violated the absolute priority rule because Momentive and its debtor-subsidiaries retained intercompany interests even though the senior subordinated notes were not paid in full.
Although Judge Drain’s bench decision touched on several important confirmation topics, the ruling was controversial because it explicitly rejected a market-based approach to calculating the cramdown interest rate and endorsed the “formula approach” espoused in the chapter 13 cases Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) and In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997). Under the formula approach, the debtor must, in a cram-down scenario, provide a secured creditor with new notes bearing interest equal to a “risk free” base rate (such as the prime rate) plus a risk adjustment of 1-3%. Importantly, he found while market pricing includes an element of profit, the Bankruptcy Code has no such requirement and thus the risk adjustment should be just that – an adjustment that reflects the ultimate risk of nonpayment, and not a mechanism to recover opportunity costs. Judge Drain’s decision conflicts with decisions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as well as some lower court opinions. In economic terms, Momentive’s oversecured first and 1.5 lien noteholders lost nearly $100 million in trading value for their existing notes because the cramdown interest rate was calculated using the formula approach versus a market rate.
Following his confirmation decision, Judge Drain denied the creditors’ immediate request for a stay of consummation of the plan pending appeal. Whether a stay pending appeal is granted is committed to the discretion of the judge after considering the following factors: (i) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (ii) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, (iii) whether the movant has demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on appeal, and (iv) the public interest that may be affected. On September 11, 2014, Judge Drain formally entered an order confirming Momentive’s plan, prompting the trustees for the first and 1.5 lien noteholders as well as the trustee for the senior subordinated noteholders to file an appeal with the district court and once again seek a stay pending appeal.
Rep. Pierluisi Introduces Bankruptcy Code Amendment to Permit P.R. Municipalities to File Under Chapter 9
Just days after the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico struck down the Commonwealth’s efforts to pass its own insolvency regime, Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi introduced the “Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015” into the U.S. House of Representatives last week. The bill, which is substantively similar to one introduced in 2014, would allow the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to authorize its insolvent public corporations to file a chapter 9 petition; they currently are not able to do so. The bill, H.R. 870, has been assigned to the House Judiciary Committee and is scheduled for a hearing before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law on February 26th. H.R. 870, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015)
Puerto Rico Debt Recovery Act Ruled Unconstitutional
On Friday February 6, the Puerto Rico Federal District Court ruled the Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) unconstitutional. Franklin Calif. Tax-Free Trust, et al. v. Comm. Of Puerto Rico et al., (D.P.R., Feb. 6, 20150)(Case No. 3:14-cv-01518-FAB).
The opinion is extensive and addresses each of the constitutional challenges raised by both Blue Mountain and the Franklin/Oppenheimer plaintiffs, and the Commonwealth’s request that the bondholder complaints be dismissed as being “unripe”, among other defenses. The Court confirmed federal jurisdiction and ripeness of the bondholders’ claims of preemption, impairment of contracts and certain of the taking clause claims. The Court said that those claims became ripe immediately upon adoption of the Recovery Act. Most importantly, the Court has ruled that the entire act is preempted expressly by the federal Bankruptcy Code and is therefore void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court further ruled that the Commonwealth is permanently enjoined from enforcing the Recovery Act.
A summary of the key findings by the Court is provided below. The Court also dismissed the claims against PREPA. The Court held that the mere fact that PREPA may commence an action under the Recovery Act at some future time is not sufficient to assert claims against PREPA. The Court noted that “if PREPA’s filing for debt relief pursuant to the Recovery Act were imminent, this could be a sufficient injury traceable to PREPA.” (Decision at 26-27).
Overview and Analysis of Select Provisions of the ABI Chapter 11 Reform Commission Final Report and Recommendations
In December 2014, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) issued its Final Report and Recommendations of the Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11. The Report is almost 400 pages long and contains more than 200 recommendations. Twenty-two Commissioners, including attorneys, academics, financial advisors and a former bankruptcy judge spent more than two years taking testimony from over 90 additional restructuring experts and considering the reports provided by 13 advisory committees, each comprised of 10-12 members from the bankruptcy bench, the bankruptcy bar, the financial community and academia. The Commission developed the report with goals including: reducing barriers to entry for debtors, facilitating more efficient resolution of disputed matters, enhancing debtors’ restructuring options and creating an alternative restructuring scheme for smaller businesses.
The recommendations do not constitute proposed legislation. Rather, the Report represents the opinion of the Commissioners and will spur debate. It ultimately could help lead to comprehensive overhaul of the almost 40-year old Bankruptcy Code. Recognizing that major bankruptcy reform generally takes years to wind its way through Congress, the Report implicitly acknowledges that 2018 is an appropriate target date for reform.
That does not mean the Report should be taken lightly, as it represents the consensus view of many well-regarded bankruptcy practitioners, academics and judges. At minimum, the Report will mark the commencement of a conversation about what the Commissioners view as much-needed reforms to the Bankruptcy Code. We also expect the report to receive the attention of judges and litigants in upcoming matters. Parties may look to the Commission’s interpretations of open legal questions as support for their assertions that certain interpretations represent the “better” argument or the “intended” result.
The Report covers nearly every aspect of the chapter 11 process with a multitude of suggested modifications to the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy jurisprudence. Below is our analysis of a number of the Commission’s most critical recommendations and of the potential impact of the proposed recommendations on the bankruptcy process.
To view the full article, please click here.