Newton’s Third Law of Physics states that “for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.” A recent Complaint filed in the Southern District of New York suggests that this principle may also hold true for the recent “Me Too” movement. READ MORE
Joy is a member of the Employment Law Group at Orrick's Global Operations Center in Wheeling, West Virginia.
Prior to joining Orrick, Joy worked for several years as an employment lawyer. She represented employers in federal and state courts and before administrative agencies defending claims of employment discrimination and harassment, wrongful discharge, violation of non-competition agreements, and other related allegations. She also regularly counseled employers with regard to various aspects of employment law, including hiring and firing, payment of wages, employee policies and handbooks, performance management, separation and severance agreements, and leave issues.Array
Posts by: Joy Taylor
In July, we reported that the Supreme Court scheduled oral arguments to settle the circuit split of whether mandatory class action waivers violate section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).
Last month, both sides argued before the Court: the pro-employer representatives argued that arbitration agreements containing class waivers must be enforced under the FAA (representing the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits) while the pro-employee representatives argued that class waiver provisions contained in arbitration agreements are illegal under the NLRA and thus, not subject to the FAA (representing the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits). READ MORE
Employers faced with discrimination claims must determine if summary judgment is a viable means to dispose of those claims. A recent Ninth Circuit decision provides some additional ammunition for employers moving for summary judgment going forward.
In affirming summary judgment on August 16, 2017, the Court in Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, Case No. 14-56853, 2017 WL 3496030, held that “context is key when a plaintiff alleges age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence” and, on the facts before it, affirmed summary judgment for the employer. Id. at *8. Plaintiffs fond of quoting the standard for summary judgment articulated in Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) – which held that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case needs to produce “very little evidence” to defeat summary judgment – will need to contend with the more nuanced picture of summary judgment requirements that Merrick paints. READ MORE