Posts by: Andrew Wallach

6 Questions Blockchain Founders Should Ask When Launching a Product or Token

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As any founder knows, operating in the blockchain space requires navigating a myriad of regulatory regimes. While every product and token are different, below are 6 key questions that any founder should ask themselves as they launch their product or token:

  1. Are you advertising to the public? If a company advertises to the public, anti-fraud and consumer protection laws are relevant. Regulators in the U.S. from the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, along with state attorneys-general, enforce rules to ensure advertisements and public statements do not contain (among other things) statements or promises that are false, misleading, or deceptive. Companies should screen public messages with their counsel before publishing them.
  2. Where do you plan to launch your product or token? Companies should be aware of sanctions programs in jurisdictions in which they plan to operate. In the U.S., the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) enforces compliance with U.S. sanctions programs. Conducting transactions with sanctioned persons or in a sanctioned jurisdiction is an offense and OFAC may impose penalties on a “strict liability standard.”  This means that OFAC can hold violators civilly liable regardless of whether they knew they participated in a transaction with a sanctioned person or entity. Many companies have policies and internal controls (e.g., customer screening and IP address blocking) meant to prevent prohibited transactions.
  3. Would a person reasonably rely on the Company’s efforts to profit from their purchase? If a blockchain company issues or plans to issue tokens or other digital assets, it is imperative that the company complies with securities laws. The lodestar for determining whether a token is an “investment contract” (one type of security) is the Howey Test. In short, pursuant to the Howey Test, a token is a security if a purchaser could reasonably depend on the efforts of a third party (i.e., the company) to generate a profit. While the interpretation of the Howey Test is more nuanced than that, understanding how consumers are going to think about your token is important in assessing the level of risk that launching the token might impose. The actual application of the Howey Test is fact intensive, and therefore requires comprehensive review and application of the token and the Company’s distribution plans.
  4. Will employees have access to sensitive information that could impact prices? If a company’s employees will have access to material, non-public information regarding prices of the company’s publicly traded digital asset or any other asset trading on a platform controlled by the company, the company should implement policies to prevent employees or other insiders from profiting off of that information (by implementing, for example, insider trading policies). These policies should dictate how and when an employee, consultant, or director is allowed to buy and sell the company’s digital assets or any other asset trading on the company’s platform.
  5. Will the Company transmit someone’s money? Blockchain companies acting as an “administrator” or “exchanger” of “convertible virtual currency” (“CVC”) may be deemed a money transmitter under federal law. In short, if a company has the authority or power to issue, remove, or exchange a cryptocurrency or virtual currency, the company may be required to register as a “money services business” under the federal Bank Secrecy Act, which requires companies to assist the U.S. government in detecting and preventing money laundering. In addition, 49 states also have “money transmission laws.” Each state has different laws with respect to CVC, so a state-by-state analysis will be required to determine where the company should file for money transmission licenses.
  6. Will the Company collect customer information? Consumer data protection has received a sizable amount of attention from both legislatures and regulators over the past several years, including the implementation of GDPR in the EU and the CCPA in California (just to name a couple prominent laws).  Any company that is collecting, storing, or transmitting consumer information should review its online privacy policy and terms of use, as well as its internal policies around how that information is stored and where that information is transmitted.  Even if still under the control of the company, data transferred from one jurisdiction to another may violate applicable data privacy laws.

The 6 questions above will help frame some of the more common regulatory issues that companies in the blockchain space need to pay attention to, but that list is certainly not exhaustive.  With an increased focus on blockchain companies by regulatory agencies, it’s important that founders operate within and understand existing regulations, and also make a plan for how they will adapt as those regulations change.

5 Ways Venture Investment in Blockchain Differs from Investment in Traditional High-Growth Startups

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Venture investments in blockchain companies are often similar to investments in traditional, high-growth technology startups. However, there are a few differences any company or investor should know about:

  • Board Seats: Lead investors in venture backed companies often require a right to designate a member of the company’s board of directors. Having a seat on the board lets investors exercise corporate governance oversight and influence the overall company’s strategic direction. However, given the complex and evolving regulatory and enforcement environment in blockchain, as well as difficulties of blockchain companies in obtaining cost-effective directors and officers liability insurance, investors often decline to obtain or fill a seat on the board. Investors may prefer board observer rights or stockholder-level approval rights.
  • Token Rights: Blockchain-based companies can provide returns to investors via capital appreciation of the preferred stock investors purchase and/or via tokens or other digital assets tied to the target company’s products. As a result, investors often require secure rights to tokens in the future via token warrants, token side letters, or simple contractual covenants. The features of token rights investors negotiate for is often specific to a company’s business and stage of growth.
  • Blockchain-Specific Diligence: Investors often conduct more thorough legal due diligence in blockchain companies than they would for traditional high-growth technology startups. For example, investors in blockchain companies usually ask detailed questions about the company’s efforts and plans for regulatory compliance – including in areas of securities regulation, anti-money laundering and money transmitter regulation, and tax. In addition, because many blockchain companies use open-source code, investors typically want comprehensive representations and diligence regarding the company’s compliance with the open-source licenses that underlie the company’s products.
  • Negative Covenants: It is not uncommon in traditional venture capital financings to have negative covenants governing matters on which the investors’ consents are required.  Blockchain-based companies, however, bring increased focus on these covenants given the typical trajectory of many companies in the space.  For example, there may be additional covenants around how the company’s subsidiaries and affiliate entities are governed and what they are permitted to do.  Additionally, licensing intellectual property outside the ordinary course of business will likely get additional attention.  Lastly, notwithstanding the existence of fiduciary duties typically imposed by state law, it is not uncommon to see negative covenants relating to transactions between the company and its executive officers.  While none of these provisions are used solely in blockchain companies, due to the nature of these kinds of companies, investors will have an increased focus on these kinds of provisions.
  • Transaction Timing and Costs:  In part because of the increased diligence and custom negotiation with respect to governance rights, token rights, and negative covenants, investments in blockchain companies often take longer and cost more than investments in traditional startups. Companies should be prepared for the increase in time and cost as they venture into their fundraising cycles.

5 Things to Know About Token Warrants

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Venture capital investors in blockchain companies often require formal rights to receive tokens or other digital assets created by those companies. Typically, these rights are provided through an instrument called a “token warrant.” While token warrants are most frequently issued in priced rounds, they have become increasingly prevalent in connection with SAFE or other convertible rounds. Here are five things that any blockchain company or investor should know when evaluating token warrants:

  1. Token Warrants Can Confer Broad or Narrow Rights. Companies and investors should pay close attention to the types of tokens that warrants entitle their holders to acquire. Token warrants may provide holders with rights to receive one specific type of token only, such as the first governance token issued by a company. However, token warrants typically provide holders with rights to receive any future tokens created or issued by a company or its affiliates – as well as any future tokens issued by an acquiror of the company’s intellectual property or any entity established by or on behalf of the company to issue tokens or operate a blockchain-based protocol or other technology associated with the tokens. Token warrants may also provide holders with rights to receive tokens created or issued by the company’s founders.
  2. Exclusions May Apply. Token warrants often outline specific types of tokens that are not acquirable under the terms of the warrant. Often known as Excluded Tokens, they generally include tokens that are generated pursuant to mining, staking, or reward systems. Depending on the applicable company’s business, Excluded Tokens may also include non-fungible tokens, stablecoins, or certain tokens issued in the ordinary course of business. Typically, the company and its investors will negotiate what is considered an Excluded Token based on the company’s business model.
  3. The Number of Tokens Issuable to Holders Can Be Calculated Several Ways. Token warrants specify the share of tokens holders can acquire under the warrant. This typically depends on three key variables:
    • The set of tokens from which the holder’s share is calculated: The holder’s share may be calculated from the number of tokens minted, from the number of tokens minted and issued to the company’s “insiders,” which includes the company’s stockholders and holders of its convertible or exercisable securities, or otherwise. In the “insider” structure, the holder would not be entitled to any share of tokens that are reserved for community members or other non-“insiders.” In addition, token warrants may provide holders with rights to tokens issued in inflationary events or in connection with other increases in the token supply.
    • How to calculate the holder’s share: The holder’s share may be a hard-coded percentage, but it is more typically based on the holder’s fully diluted ownership of the company. In the latter structure, the holder’s share will typically equal its fully diluted ownership as a percentage of the total cap table. But investors may negotiate a “super” pro rata share, which is a multiple (e.g. 1.25x, 1.5x) of the investor’s fully diluted ownership.
    • When to calculate it: The time at which a holder’s share is calculated can make a difference in how many tokens the holder has a right to acquire. For example, the holder’s share may be calculated as of the date of warrant issuance, the date of the applicable token launch, or the date the warrant is exercised.
  4. “Lockup” Provisions Govern the Transferability of Tokens. Token warrants typically specify the “lockup” restrictions that will prevent holders from transferring tokens acquired under the warrant for certain periods. Lockup schedules in token warrants may include provisions that prohibit any transfers of tokens for one year after the tokens are acquired, release some tokens from lockup at the one-year mark, and then release the balance over successive monthly increments. For example, a lockup schedule may prohibit 100% of the tokens from being transferred until the one-year anniversary of the exercise date, and then permit the transfer of 50% of the tokens on the one-year anniversary and 1/24th, 1/36th or 1/48th of remaining tokens over the next two to four years. A common provision requires an early release of the lockup provision if certain “insiders” (particularly founders or board members) have a less stringent lockup period. Token warrants may also provide the token issuer with rights to impose additional transfer restrictions on tokens in light of regulatory requirements or in connection with centralized exchange listing requirements.
  5. Beware of Token Warrants that Compensate Service Providers. Token warrants are not ideal instruments for compensating a company’s service providers (e.g. employees, contractors, advisors). The Internal Revenue Code subjects deferred compensation – including token warrants – to a variety of complex and generally unfavorable tax, vesting and exercise rules. Therefore, companies should generally limit issuing token warrants to investors.

Wyoming, the “Equality State,” Seeks to Level the Playing Field for Digital Assets Businesses

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In its continued effort to establish itself as the go-to jurisdiction for digital asset businesses, Wyoming, through its Department of Audit, Division of Banking, recently published a digital asset custody regime for its newly created, special purpose depository institutions (SPDIs). SPDIs are banking institutions authorized to take custody of digital assets. If they function as intended, SPDIs may prove to be a solution to, among other things, digital asset companies’ money transmitter licensing woes.

One major impediment to entering the U.S. market for digital asset companies is the requirement to obtain money transmitter licenses from individual states. Applying for these licenses state by state can be expensive and burdensome, and some states have created additional hurdles for digital asset companies. New York, for example, requires digital asset companies to obtain a “BitLicense,” which is notoriously difficult to obtain, to operate in the state. California may soon follow suit, imposing substantial licensing requirements under Assembly Bill 1489, which has been introduced in the legislature.

Wyoming is trying a different approach. In establishing SPDIs, Wyoming is helping blockchain companies avoid the costs of these burdensome licensing regimes while still protecting customers by taking advantage of a regulatory benefit enjoyed by banking institutions like SPDIs. Per the Bank Secrecy Act, banks are exempt, as a general matter, from needing money transmitter licenses.

Further, advocates argue that the SPDIs will provide a solution for startups seeking to operate in New York without a BitLicense. Federal law, through the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act, protects the parity of national banks and the state-chartered banks of other states. Accordingly, if a state exempts a national bank from a regulation, then other state-chartered banks must be exempt from that regulation as well. Because New York exempts national banks from the requirement to obtain a BitLicense to operate, so the argument goes, Wyoming’s SPDIs – which are state-chartered banks – should be exempted from that requirement as well. This theory remains untested, and New York has not taken a position on whether it will exempt SPDIs from needing a BitLicense to operate there. Perhaps Wyoming’s status as “The Equality State” will prompt New York to provide its state-chartered banks with “equal” treatment.

While the first new SPDIs could become operational by early 2020, which might provide a work-around for the current money transmitter licensing barriers facing digital asset companies, there remain a few obstacles for a company desiring to take advantage of the law, albeit surmountable ones.

First, SPDIs are required to maintain a minimum capital requirement of $5 million – making it prohibitive for most startups to charter their own SPDI. However, multiple companies may partner with one unaffiliated SPDI to pool assets. Assuming cooperation among market players, startups should be able to find enough capital among other SPDIs to satisfy the capital requirement. Second, SPDIs are required to maintain the principal operating headquarters and the primary office of its CEO in Wyoming, but – as we know – the excellent skiing, beautiful vistas and abundant wildlife in Wyoming provide ample justification for setting up shop there.

Wyoming’s creation of SPDIs comes on the heels of other pro-blockchain moves by the state, including authorizing corporations to issue securities via “certificate tokens in lieu of stock certificates,” creating a FinTech sandbox that enables startups to receive waivers from laws or regulations that may unnecessarily burden their ability to test new products and services, and classifying digital assets as property.

Wyoming’s small population and limited infrastructure may make it difficult to attract personnel and capital to create a competitive SPDI market. But with sufficient incentives, and the opportunity to engage in a potentially lucrative and groundbreaking industry, Wyoming is making a bid to become the crypto capital of the U.S.

Reading the Blockchain Tea Leaves: Reconciling Telegram and Block.one

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The juxtaposition of two recent SEC enforcement actions against token issuers may shed some light on the regulator’s evolving regulatory framework.

On October 11, 2019, the SEC won a motion for a temporary restraining order from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Telegram Group Inc., the creator of Messenger, an encrypted messaging application, to halt its planned $1.7 billion “Gram” token distribution and follow-on sale. The SEC’s action, which alleged that the planned offering of Grams would violate the registration requirements of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, put a halt to a long-running development project and more than 18 months of continued interaction with the SEC.

The SEC’s stance against Telegram stands in stark contrast to its settlement on September 30, 2019, with Block.one, the creator of the EOSIO blockchain protocol. Block.one conducted a year-long initial coin offering that raised a record $4 billion in 2017 and 2018. Block.one’s ICO utilized a dual-token structure: over the course of the ICO, Block.one sold 900 million digital assets (“ERC 20 tokens”) to purchasers. These tokens were freely transferable while the ICO was ongoing. At the end of the ICO, the ERC-20 tokens became nontransferable and, upon the subsequent launch of the EOSIO blockchain, holders of the ERC-20 tokens were entitled to receive the native EOS token. Block.one settled the SEC’s claims against it by agreeing to pay a monetary penalty of $24 million. Unlike what we have seen in similar settlements, the SEC did not require rescission of the sale of the ERC-20 tokens, which were designated securities, or the EOS tokens, which received no mention in the cease-and-desist order. The EOSIO blockchain protocol remains live, and EOS tokens remain in circulation. The SEC also explicitly granted a “bad actor” waiver under Regulation D permitting the Company to continue fundraising and capital formation in the United States.

The SEC’s seemingly distinct approaches to Block.one’s and Telegram’s offerings have left the industry scratching its collective head. What is most odd is the SEC’s decision in the case of Telegram to seek emergency relief, a remedy typically reserved for ongoing frauds, which is not alleged here. In lieu of a public explanation from the SEC, reviewing the differences between the two offerings may be the only way to extract guidance from these actions. There is, however, no way of knowing which differences actually had an impact on the results. Nevertheless, below we discuss some of the differences.

Token Use Case

The SEC’s disparate treatment of Telegram and Block.one may come down to the differences in the nature, purpose and design of their technologies. The SEC has given indications (although not official guidance) that a critical part of the Howey analysis as to whether a token is a security is if purchasers are dependent on a centralized group of people to drive its value; if the developer community of a blockchain technology is decentralized enough, the token may fall outside of Howey.

The Gram may have always been doomed to fail this test because of the planned integration with Messenger, which is a proprietary product. The integration with Messenger was supposed to be a significant driver of the Gram’s value, and the development of Messenger is entirely dependent on Telegram.

In contrast, the EOS tokens and the EOSIO blockchain protocol are designed and meant to power a smart contract platform on top of which other developers may build. Perhaps Block.one’s intention to build a decentralized platform resembling Ether helped it find favor with the SEC.

Manner of Token Sale

Telegram sold “Gram Purchase Agreements” to sophisticated purchasers that promised Grams upon the launch of Telegram’s TON blockchain. No Grams were to be distributed until the launch of the blockchain, presumably because Telegram held the view that if Grams were not distributed until the blockchain was live it might escape the “efforts of others” Howey prong. Clearly, this wasn’t enough to satisfy the SEC.

Block.one’s dual-token structure – issuing ERC-20 tokens first, which entitled holders to EOS tokens once the native EOSIO platform launched – gave the SEC the opportunity to take action against the ERC-20 tokens and remain silent on EOS. It is questionable whether this move is justified by strict legal analysis: the ERC-20 tokens were sold in conjunction with “Token Purchase Agreements” that made it clear to purchasers they were being sold the right to receive EOS tokens. Furthermore, until EOSIO launched, the future value of those EOS tokens was dependent on Block.one. Given the manner of sale, it is unclear why EOS received the apparent favorable treatment over Grams.

Participants in Sale and Availability of Tokens on Secondary Markets

In their official documents, the SEC presented two distinctly different attitudes towards the availability of a token on secondary markets accessible to U.S. persons. For Telegram, such availability justified the SEC in shutting down its entire operation, while for Block.one the availability only provoked a slight admonition, without enjoining the offering.

Block.one made some efforts to prevent U.S. customers from participating in the ICO: it blocked U.S.-based IP addresses and required purchasers to sign a contract that included a provision stating that any purchase by a U.S. person rendered the contract null and void. However, despite those measures, U.S. persons still succeeded in participating in the ICO; moreover, Block.one made efforts that could be viewed as conditioning the U.S. market, including participating in blockchain conferences and advertising EOSIO on a billboard in Times Square. Notably, too, the ERC-20 tokens were widely traded and available for purchase by U.S. persons on secondary markets. Block.one took no steps to prevent this.

In contrast, the fact that Telegram’s tokens would be available to U.S. purchasers on secondary markets drove the SEC’s argument that a TRO and preliminary injunction were necessary, regardless of the fact that Telegram limited the sale of Gram purchase agreements to sophisticated investors and that upon the distribution of Grams and the sale to the public the Telegram network would be fully functional.

Takeaways

The SEC’s distinctly different treatment of Telegram and Block.one provides insight into the SEC’s perspective on what sorts of tokens are securities, and which are not. It appears that the Gram’s integration into Telegram’s proprietary product – and therefore its dependence on Telegram – was critical to the SEC’s analysis. The analogous nature of EOS to Ether probably led to it not being designated a security. However, both ICOs were deemed in violation of securities laws, so neither should serve as a safe harbor for others. Furthermore, there is still no clear legal path to launching a token like EOS.

The 2019 Token Taxonomy Act: A Path to Consumer Protection and Innovation Takes Shape

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We’ve previously written that the Token Taxonomy Act first introduced to Congress by Representatives Warren Davidson (R-OH) and Darren Soto (D-FL) on December 20, 2018, was a welcome legislative initiative designed to provide a regulatory “light touch” to the burgeoning digital asset industry. The bill expired, however, with the termination of the 115th Congress, leaving open the question of what any future blockchain regulatory proposals, would look like. The industry’s questions were answered on April 9, 2019 when Representatives Davidson and Soto introduced the Digital Taxonomy Act of 2019 (DTA) and the Token Taxonomy Act of 2019 (TTA) to the 116th Congress. The DTA and TTA represent expanded efforts to clarify regulation and spur blockchain innovation in the United States.

According to Representatives Davidson and Soto, the DTA is meant to add jurisdictional certainty to efforts to combat fraudulent behavior in the digital asset industry. As such, the DTA grants the FTC $25,000,000 and orders it to prepare reports on its efforts to combat fraud and deceptive behavior. The DTA also specifically carves out from its purview the authority of the CFTC to regulate digital assets as commodities subject to the Commodities Exchange Act.

The 2019 TTA, with the backing of four bipartisan representatives in addition to Davidson and Soto, is similar to last year’s model. Besides defining digital assets and exempting them from certain securities law requirements, the 2019 TTA maintains proposals to amend the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 so that certain regulated entities can hold digital assets. Like the 2018 version of the TTA, the 2019 TTA would also allow the sale of digital assets to qualify for the benefits of Internal Revenue Code Section 1031 like-kind exchange provisions and for the first $600 dollars of profit from digital asset sales to be tax-free.

The TTA also has important updates. The most prominent change is the definition of a “digital asset.” As we’ve previously discussed, the 2018 version of the TTA required that a digital asset’s transaction history could not be “materially altered by a single person or group of persons under common control” to qualify for exemption from securities laws. Because of the unavoidable possibility of a 51% attack, which would alter a token’s transaction history, the language created the possibility that proof of work- and proof of stake-based tokens would not be eligible for regulatory relief, thus limiting the bill’s benefits.

In the re-proposed TTA, however, the newly proposed language of Section 2(a)(20)(B)(ii) requires that the transaction history, still recorded in a mathematically verifiable process, “resist modification or tampering by any single person or group of persons under common control.” Thus, any digital asset, even those subject to 51% attacks, may be exempt from certain securities law requirements, although the language appears to require that a governance or security system underline the token’s consensus system.

Another important update is the TTA’s proposed preemption of state regulation of the digital asset industry by federal authorities. While the TTA would still permit states to retain antifraud regulatory authority, it largely strips states’ rights to regulate digital assets as securities. Representative Davidson’s press release on the bill specifically cites the “onerous” requirements of the New York BitLicense regulatory regime as a reason for the inclusion of this provision.

Critics have been quick to point out that the bills, while well intentioned, leave many unanswered questions and therefore may not provide the regulatory certainty the bills’ authors hope to effect. And even a perfect bill would face an uphill battle in getting enacted these days. But the digital asset industry should nonetheless take comfort in the growing contingent of legislators who take seriously the imperative to balance consumer protection and blockchain innovation.

SEC’s Light Touch: An ICO Settlement Without a Penalty

In another first for the digital token industry, on February 20 the SEC announced a settlement involving a self-reported unregistered initial coin offering (ICO) without imposing a penalty. Like its earlier settlements with AirFox and Paragon, the SEC required Gladius Network LLC to repay investors and register its GLA tokens as securities. This time, however, in a sign that the SEC is willing to work with companies trying to come into compliance, the SEC did not impose a monetary penalty due to the company’s “decision to self-report and its extensive cooperation with the staff’s subsequent investigation.”

Having just completed their freshman year at the University of Maryland College Park in 2017, Max Niebylski, Alex Godwin, and Marcelo McAndrew during their summer break founded Gladius as a cyber security company dedicated to ending Distributed Denial of Service attacks. On September 27, 2017 Gladius released a White Paper, and between October 13, 2017 and December 13, 2017 it raised a total of $12.7 million dollars through the sale of GLA tokens.

In an apparent attempt to maneuver around the securities laws and avail itself of the as-yet-untested utility token defense – which attempts to show that the tokens did not represent an investment contract but rather, like it sounds, something with utility for the purchaser – Gladius required participants in the ICO to warrant that they were purchasing GLA tokens “solely for the purpose of accessing Services . . . [and not for] any investment, speculative or other financial purposes.” Nevertheless, in the summer of 2018 Gladius self-reported the unregistered sale of GLA tokens to the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

The SEC, in the settlement order, included a one-sentence Howey analysis, finding that the sale of GLA tokens met the factors of Howey because “[a] purchaser in the offering of GLA Tokens would have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a future profit based upon Gladius’s efforts to create a ‘marketplace’ using the proceeds from the sale of GLA Tokens and to provide investors with liquidity by making GLA Tokens tradeable on secondary markets.”

Although the Company will have to comply with notice and reporting requirements under the federal securities laws, the only ordered monetary relief is the requirement that the Company refund GLA token purchases made between September 2017 and December 2017 pursuant to a claims process similar to what the SEC devised for the AirFox and Paragon settlements. Given the infrequency with which investors actually file claims, it is unlikely that the Company will end up refunding the full $12.7 million-dollar obligation it faces.

In another notable deviation from the AirFox and Paragon settlements, the SEC directed Gladius to provide the Commission advance notice if it planned to file a Form 15 to terminate its registration pursuant to Rule 12g-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the grounds that the GLA Tokens no longer constitute a “class of securities.” This seemingly superfluous requirement could be the SEC’s way of signaling to the industry that token issuances that remain below the monetary and holder threshold requirements of Rule 12g-4 will not run afoul of securities laws.

All told, the Gladius settlement is proof that the SEC continues to show leniency to token issuers who violated the securities laws if they act in good faith and come into compliance.

Blockvest II: Court Reverses Itself and Grants the SEC a Preliminary Injunction in the Face of Manifest Fraud

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As we previously discussed, the SEC suffered a rare defeat in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Blockvest, LLC et al. on November 27, when Judge Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued a denial (the “November Order”) of its motion for a preliminary injunction against Defendants’ future violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Section 17(a)”), despite manifest evidence of fraudulent representations in the Defendants’ website postings. The November Order attracted intense scrutiny and on December 17, the SEC moved for partial reconsideration of the November Order. Last week, on February 14, the court granted, in part, the SEC’s motion for reconsideration (the “February Order” and, together with the November Order, the “Orders”), relying on purported new evidence and an argument that the court apparently had overlooked. It is fair to ask whether the new evidence motivated the reversal.

As Judge Curiel recited, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate, among other reasons, if the district court is “presented with newly discovered evidence.” Judge Curiel stated that the standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the SEC to show: “(1) a prima facie case of previous violations of federal securities laws, and (2) a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated.” Based upon these standards, the court concluded that reconsideration in this case was warranted “based upon a prima facie showing of Defendants’ past securities violation and newly developed evidence which support the conclusion that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations.” However, it is not clear what “newly developed evidence” formed the basis for this conclusion.

In applying the Howey test to the tokens offered by Blockvest, the court agreed with the SEC that “the Howey test is unquestionably an objective one.” The court disputed the SEC’s assertion that in the November Order the court had applied a “subjective test” by relying solely on the beliefs of some individual investors. Rather, the court stated that it had “objectively inquire[d] into the ‘terms of promotional materials, information, economic inducements or oral representations at the seminars, or in other words, an inquiry into the ‘character of the instrument or transaction offered’ to the ‘purchasers.’”

The court emphasized that in the November Order it had denied the motion for a preliminary injunction “because there were disputed factual issues as to the nature of the investment offered to alleged investors.” Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that in denying the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction, it did not “directly address” an alternate theory originally presented by the SEC that the promotional materials presented on Defendants’ website, in the whitepaper posted online, and on social media accounts concerning the ICO of the token constituted an offer of unregistered securities that contained materially false statements and therefore violated Section 17(a). The court again applied the Howey test to find that the tokens being offered were securities. The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that applied state law to interpret “offer” narrowly to require a manifestation of an intent to be bound, finding that “offer” is broadly defined under the securities laws.

The court also found that the SEC had satisfied the required showing that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations, one of the elements of injunctive relief. In support of its ruling, the court cited the misrepresentations in Defendants’ website postings that had been detailed in the November Order and which were manifestly fraudulent. Based upon this information, addressed by the SEC in supplemental briefing, the court granted partial reconsideration of the November Order.

Also factored into the February Order were the findings that defense counsel had moved to withdraw as counsel because “the firm found it necessary to terminate representation due to, inter alia, Defendants instructing counsel to file certain documents that counsel could not certify under Rules of Civil Procedures 11… and Defendants have yet to find substitute counsel.” The court stated its concerns that Defendants would resume their prior alleged fraudulent conduct, in light of its order allowing defense counsel to withdraw.

Given the severity of the fraudulent representations as alleged in the SEC’s action, which included false claims of approval by federal regulators and a wholly fabricated federal agency, it was surprising that the court had originally denied the SEC’s request for a preliminary injunction; the need to shut down ongoing fraud and protect investors often drives a court’s rulings on requests for interim relief in these cases. It appears that in reversing itself, the court rethought its reasoning based on the information and arguments that the SEC had originally presented. In one telling ruling in the new decision, the court declined to accept new arguments raised by defendants in opposition to the motion for reconsideration because they had not previously raised them. It appears that the SEC can shrug off its original loss and continue to seek to shut down this alleged fraud with all the power of the federal securities laws.

The Token Taxonomy Act: A Fatal Drafting Ambiguity

As we’ve previously written, the Token Taxonomy Act (TTA) is an ambitious and potentially impactful piece of legislation that, by exempting digital tokens from the securities laws, might remove regulatory inhibitions from the maturing digital token industry. The bill is not without fault, however. As it stands, the language of the bill requiring that a digital token’s consensus be inalterable is ambiguously written and the SEC could use a strict interpretation to preclude many digital assets from qualifying as digital tokens.

The proposed additional language of Section 2(a)(20)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933 reads that to qualify for the exemption, a digital token:

(i) must be recorded in a distributed, digital ledger or digital data structure in which consensus is achieved through a mathematically verifiable process; and

(ii) after consensus is reached, cannot be materially altered by a single person or group of persons under common control.

In other words, a digital token must use an inalterable and objectively verifiable process. This language is designed to include in the definition only those digital tokens that are or will be in widespread enough use so that no one single party can influence the nature of the outstanding tokens in a way that adversely affects digital token holders.

The proposed language creates the possibility that the SEC could strictly apply the requirement that a token “cannot” be materially altered. As it stands, proof-of-work and even proof-of-stake digital assets are susceptible to a 51% attack, which could alter the digital token’s consensus. “Proof-of-work” and “proof-of-stake” refer to different systems used to verify and process transactions on a blockchain.

A “51% attack” is an event in which a party takes control of the requisite computer power underlying a token’s blockchain such that the party can control the token platform’s operation. Typically, a party seeking such control needs to possess 51% of the outstanding tokens, but the threshold amount can be lower for individual digital assets. A party that has successfully executed a 51% attack can change the ledger history so that it can, for example, double-spend tokens.

The SEC could negate the potential application of the TTA because the recent 51% attack against Ethereum Classic shows that the risk of attack against proof-of-work digital assets, especially those with a low market capitalization, is real. And although the proof-of-stake system makes a 51% attack prohibitively expensive, the SEC could justifiably claim that it is theoretically possible. An irrational, non-economic actor could still stage a 51% attack against a proof-of-stake digital asset with an intent to destroy it rather than to make profit.

In the end, the ambiguity in the bill’s language might not have a deleterious effect. It is hoped that a regulator would not strictly interpret the bill’s language to exclude the intended beneficiaries because of a hypothetical possibility of a 51% attack. So, too, the digital asset industry will likely continue to innovate new and more secure protocols that could potentially eliminate the threat of 51% attacks, making potential exclusion from the bill’s benefits a moot point. Nonetheless, as the TTA undergoes revision, the potential ambiguity in the proposed language should be remedied.

Transactors in Digital Tokens – New Bill Offers Hope

On December 20, 2018, Representatives Warren Davidson (R-Ohio) and Darren Soto (D-Fla) offered some early holiday hope to digital token issuers by introducing the “Token Taxonomy Act” (the TTA). If passed, the TTA would exclude “digital tokens” from the federal securities laws and would undoubtedly have profound effects for the U.S. digital token economy. The TTA is an ambitious piece of legislation that faces an uncertain future. Nevertheless, Representatives Davidson and Soto should be commended for attempting to provide some regulatory relief and certainty to an industry that has been yearning for it.

In addition to exempting digital tokens from the securities laws, the TTA would amend the Internal Revenue Code and classify the exchange of digital tokens as like-kind exchanges under Section 1031, and allow digital tokens to be held by retirement accounts.

The TTA would also amend language in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 so that state-regulated trust companies, which include broker dealers, investment advisors and investment companies, would be able to hold digital assets for customers.

According to the TTA’s authors, the intention behind the bill is to provide much-needed regulatory certainty to digital token issuers and to ensure the U.S. remains competitive against other countries like Switzerland, where blockchain startups are thriving.

However, the TTA’s benefits are hypothetical at this point, since it is likely to be opposed by the SEC. On November 30, 2018, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton opined at a New York Times-hosted event that SEC rules were made by “geniuses” and “have stood the test of time.” He stated that he did not foresee changing rules “just to fit a technology.” While he was not referring specifically to the TTA, these comments indicate an unwillingness by the SEC to change its longstanding rules to accommodate a nascent technology.

Even if the bill is passed, it would permit the SEC to determine whether a particular digital unit qualifies as a security and therefore is subject to the SEC’s regulation. The SEC thus would have the power to halt an offering and force compliance with the applicable securities laws. The TTA would spare issuers from any penalties if they have acted in good faith and take reasonable steps to cease sales. But with an unclear, and a potentially costly or lengthy, appeals process, the SEC could discourage issuers from taking the risk of attempting to qualify and sell digital tokens from the start. This provision would blunt the intended deregulatory impact of the TTA.

Although its future is uncertain, the TTA shows that there are government leaders that are listening to the concerns of the digital token issuers. If the TTA is introduced in the 116th Congress, it will be a piece of legislation worth tracking. Even if this particular bill is not enacted, it might point the way to other legislation whose passage might provide some regulatory relief to those who transact in digital tokens.