Securities Class Action

Second Circuit Ruling Creates Challenge for Securities Class Action Plaintiffs

The Second Circuit recently considered the extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws in the private securities class action context, bringing some clarity to an area of the law that is increasingly important given the globalization of financial markets.

In re Petrobras Securities, 862 F.3d 250 (2nd Cir. 2017), was an appeal of a class certification order in a securities class action related to an alleged multi-year money-laundering and kickback scheme involving Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (“Petrobras”), the Brazilian state-owned oil and gas company. The district court had certified two classes of investors who purchased Petrobras American Depository Shares (ADS) and debt securities, and who brought misrepresentation claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Petrobras, its subsidiaries, and its underwriters. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), held that the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws have no extraterritorial effect, and as a consequence apply only to transactions in securities that occur on a U.S.-based exchange or that are otherwise “domestic.” Petrobras ADS shares satisfied the first requirement, but the company’s debt securities are traded over-the-counter, not on a U.S. exchange. Prior decisions had limited “domestic” transactions to ones where (1) the purchaser “incurred irrevocable liability within the United States to take and pay for a security . . . or to deliver a security” or (2) “legal title to the security . . . transferred in the United States” (see, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012)), but how this test implicated the standards for class certification was not clear. READ MORE

Keep Looking Forward: Federal Court Holds Company’s Bad Legal Predictions Protected by PSLRA’s Safe Harbor

Gavel and Hundred-Dollar Bill

In a comprehensive tour of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) safe-harbor provisions, on November 22, 2016, a federal court in Massachusetts dismissed a shareholder class-action lawsuit against Neovasc, Inc.  In holding that Neovasc’s ultimately faulty predictions concerning the outcome of a trade secrets lawsuit fell within the PSLRA’s safe harbor, the court rejected the plaintiff’s attempts to import a scienter requirement into the safe-harbor inquiry, among other things, and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.

This putative class-action came on the heels of a $70 million jury verdict against Neovasc in May 2016. In that case, a jury found that Neovasc misappropriated certain trade secrets from CardiAQ Valve Technologies after CardiAQ had severed its manufacturing relationship with Neovasc, and Neovasc had patented a competing product.  Neovasc’s stock price fell approximately 75 percent when the jury verdict was announced.  Shortly after the verdict and stock decline, shareholders filed the class action, alleging securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.  The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that prior to the verdict, Neovasc CEO Alexei Marko mischaracterized the lawsuit as “baseless,” and that Neovasc had misstated that the suit was “without merit” in the company’s SEC filings.


It’s Not Easy Being Green: LeapFrog Execs Dodge Class-Action Over Sales Projections

On August 2, 2016, U.S. District Judge Edward Chen dismissed a shareholder lawsuit brought against children’s educational toymaker LeapFrog Enterprises, Inc. (“LeapFrog”) for failure to adequately plead statements were false or misleading, or made with requisite intent.  Plaintiffs’ suit, which was consolidated in 2015, alleged that LeapFrog and its executives hid demand and inventory problems from investors.  The judge disagreed, finding that the investors had been sufficiently warned of problems with LeapFrog’s product lines and that the allegedly misleading statements were forward-looking and cautionary, and therefore fell within the PSLRA’s safe harbor.  Defendants’ public statements about many of the allegedly misleading topics helped drive home that Plaintiffs’ theory amounted to classic “fraud by hindsight.”