On April 9, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Hewlett-Packard had agreed to pay more than $108 million to settle Foreign Corrupt Practices Act actions brought by the SEC and the Department of Justice. These actions were based on HP’s subsidiaries’ alleged payments of more than $3.6 million to Russian, Polish, and Mexican government officials to obtain or maintain lucrative public contracts. The settlement is important because it highlights the SEC’s and DOJ’s continued focus on companies’ internal controls, particularly in the FCPA arena. It also shows that the SEC may be able to use lesser, non-fraud offenses in which the underlying conduct involves a fairly de minimis amount of money to police behavior and subject companies to significant financial consequences. Read More
In a story right out of the movies, complete with “poison pills” and “white squires,” the SEC announced on March 13, 2014 that motion picture company Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation settled charges that it failed to disclose to investors a set of “extraordinary” corporate transactions designed to thwart takeover efforts by investor Carl Icahn.
The tale of intrigue and midnight board meetings can be traced to Icahn’s efforts, beginning in 2008, to acquire control of Lions Gate. Despite his eventually gaining beneficial ownership of nearly 40 percent of Lions Gate’s outstanding shares, the company rejected various demands from Icahn over the years, including a demand to appoint five of the twelve seats on the Board of Directors. In March, 2010, Icahn made a tender offer with a premium over the market price to entice shareholders to sell. To thwart Icahn’s tender offer, Lions Gate adopted a poison pill and began to look for ways to keep the company out of Icahn’s hands. Read More
Though investors might have assumed that the entire Securities and Exchange Commission was their advocate to begin with, on February 12th the agency announced that it had hired Rick Fleming to be its very first Investor Advocate in the recently created Office of the Investor Advocate (“OIA”).
In hiring Fleming, the SEC is implementing Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by creating, among other things, an Investor Advisory Committee, the OIA, and an ombudsman to be appointed by the Investor Advocate. Fleming comes to the SEC from his most recent job as Deputy General Counsel at the North American Securities Administrators Association where he advocated for state securities regulators in matters before Congress and the SEC. Fleming previously spent several years in Kansas state government, including some fifteen years in the state’s Office of the Securities Commissioner. Read More
Ever had one of those days where you think you’re acting with good faith, diligence, and care, and yet you still get sued by the FDIC? The directors and officers of the now defunct Buckhead Community Bank in Georgia find themselves in the government’s crosshairs and, unlike their D-and-O counterparts at public companies, a federal court in Georgia thinks it’s not so clear that they’ll be able to claim the protections of the business judgment rule to avoid the FDIC’s claim that they caused the bank to lose millions of dollars.
The background in this case reads like so many others in similar suits around the country. According to the FDIC, the bank implemented an “aggressive growth strategy” beginning in 2005 that resulted in a 240 percent increase in the bank’s loan portfolio through 2007, primarily from gains in the bank’s “high-risk real estate and construction loans.” The bank’s adversely classified assets grew from twelve percent to more than 200 percent of its tier-1 capital, and by December 2009 the bank had landed in FDIC receivership. The FDIC later sued the bank’s directors and officers in federal court alleging that they were negligent for repeated violations of the bank’s loan policy, underwriting requirements, banking regulations, and “prudent and sound banking practices.” Read More
A pair of investment firms recently filed suit against Twitter in the Southern District of New York, alleging that Twitter had fraudulently refused to allow them to sell its private stock in advance of its much-anticipated IPO. If that sentence looks somewhat bizarre, it is because the allegations themselves are bizarre, at best.
In short, the plaintiff investment firms allege that a managing partner of GSV Asset Management, who was a Twitter shareholder, engaged them to market a fund that would purchase and hold nearly $300 million in private Twitter shares from the Company’s early-stage shareholders. Plaintiffs then embarked on an “international roadshow” to line up investors in the fund. Plaintiffs allege that, on the roadshow, “there was substantial interest in purchasing [the private] Twitter shares at $19 per share.” Read More
Recently we discussed whether directors of public companies face potential liability for not preventing cyber attacks. As we discussed, the answer is generally no, because absent allegations to show a director had a “conscious disregard” for her responsibilities, directors do not breach their fiduciary duties by failing to properly manage and oversee the company.
That well-established rule was again affirmed last week by the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re China Automotive Systems Inc. Derivative Litigation, a case that concerned an accounting restatement by a Chinese automotive parts company. Plaintiffs there alleged that the company’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to manage and oversee the company’s accounting practices and the company’s auditors, who improperly accounted for certain convertible notes from 2009 to 2012. When the error was uncovered, the company restated its financials for two years and its stock price dropped by 15%. Read More
In a decision rendered from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Judge Ronald Guzmán granted summary judgment on the SEC’s insider trading claims as to three defendants but allowed claims as to one defendant to proceed to trial. The SEC’s claims against all of the defendants focused on suspiciously-timed sales and other circumstantial evidence, but failed to identify specific tippers who provided defendants with inside information. The case highlights the SEC’s aggressive strategy in pursuing insider trading claims without direct evidence of tipping. The court’s decision also underscores the importance of pursuing motions during discovery in order to preserve arguments, or obtain sanctions establishing evidentiary points, in order to later use discovery misconduct to bolster otherwise thin bases for liability.
Defendant Yonghui Zhang worked full time for a company called Global Education & Technology Group, Ltd. (“GEDU”). GEDU was founded by Zhang’s younger brother and sister-in-law, and provides educational programs and services in China including consultation concerning higher education opportunities in the United States. Zhang purchased 7,900 GEDU American Depository Shares on the NASDAQ for almost $40,000 on the last trading day before GEDU announced its acquisition by Pearson plc. Zhang had never purchased GEDU stock for himself, spent more than three times his annual salary to purchase the securities, and made a profit of close to $50,000. Zhang moved for summary judgment, relying on his testimony that he had no knowledge of the Pearson acquisition and pointing to the SEC’s failure to identify a specific “tipper” who told him about the acquisition.
The Court denied his motion. Zhang’s office was on the same floor as his brother and sister-in-law’s offices, and Zhang had numerous communications with them and with GEDU senior management aware of the Pearson acquisition. Zhang argued that the SEC did not point to any particular records of communications or opportunities to communicate, but the SEC had sought those types of details and Zhang failed to provide them in discovery. Read More
Rule 10b5-1, enacted in August 2000, codified the SEC’s position that trading while in possession of material non-public information is sufficient to establish liability for insider trading. The rule also provided an affirmative defense for individuals who could prove that the purchase or sale of stock was made pursuant to a pre-existing written plan executed before the individual became aware of the material non-public information. These so-called 10b5-1 plans have long been considered to be an efficient way to trade company stock without raising suspicion of insider trading or another improper motive.
However, recent news stories have reignited concerns that corporate insiders may be abusing 10b5-1 trading plans to trade on material non-public information. An April Wall Street Journal article reported that not only has the use of 10b5-1 plans by non-executive directors nearly doubled between 2006 and 2011, but a significant percentage of the plans were being used to unload all or a large percentage of the directors’ holdings in a short period of time. An earlier November 2012 Wall Street Journal article analyzing thousands of trades made by corporate executives found evidence that company insiders did statistically much better than expected in realizing trading profits. Together, these articles suggest that the lack of transparency and regulation of 10b5-1 trading plans has allowed them to be misused as vehicles to effectuate opportunistic trades.
Hackers aren’t the only ones after company information. Earlier this week, Wills Fortune 500, a unit of Wills Group Holdings, a global insurance broker providing insurance and risk management services, made available its own report tracking the response by Fortune 500 companies to the SEC’s October 2011 guidelines for cybersecurity disclosures. The report’s key findings include that, as of April 2013, 85% of Fortune 500 companies were following the SEC guidelines and providing some level of disclosure of cyber exposures. However, close to 40% of the companies failed to provide details on the size of their exposure, stating only that the risk would have an impact on the company without further discussing the extent of the impact. As such, the report concluded that the question whether company disclosures rise to the level mandated by the SEC is debatable, given the paucity of information regarding the probability of incidents and their quantitative and qualitative magnitude.
In light of the findings of the Willis Fortune 500 report, it’s not surprising that SEC Chairman Mary Jo White had previously asked the Commission to evaluate compliance with current guidelines for cybersecurity disclosures, assemble a report on the general practice and compliance with the existing guidelines, and make recommendations for further guidance.
Plaintiffs’ counsel beware: to avoid Rule 11 sanctions you might actually have to talk to “confidential witnesses” yourself and corroborate their statements before citing them in a securities fraud complaint.
That is one major takeaway from the Seventh Circuit’s March 26, 2013 opinion in City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System v. The Boeing Company, et al. In that case, Judge Posner singled out plaintiffs’ counsel for making “confident assurances in their complaints about a confidential source . . . even though none of the lawyers had spoken to the source and their investigator had acknowledged that she couldn’t verify what (according to her) he had told her.” Slip op. at 16. Citing multiple cases in which the same firm, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, had “engaged in similar misconduct” and noting that “recidivism is relevant in assessing sanctions,” Judge Posner remanded to the district court for further proceedings on Rule 11 sanctions.
The appeal came from the district court’s grant of a renewed motion to dismiss in Boeing’s favor after discovery into the CW’s statement revealed significant inconsistencies with the complaint’s allegations. The allegations, briefly, were that Boeing made false statements about the progress of Boeing’s flagship aircraft, the Dreamliner. In April and May 2009, with the Dreamliner’s maiden test flight (or “First Flight”) scheduled for June 30, 2009, the Dreamliner failed several “stress tests” that raised doubts about the First Flight’s timing. Boeing remained optimistic about the scheduled First Flight, though, and made disclosures to that effect in May and June. But one week before the anticipated First Flight, the Company disclosed that it had failed the tests and that the First Flight had been canceled, delaying final delivery of the plane to customers. Following the disclosure, Boeing’s stock price fell 10% over two days of trading.