Trump Administration

The Best Defense Is a Good Offense: FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Cements Importance of Compliance Programs

The Department’s revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy—which will be incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual—builds on and makes permanent the Department’s 2016 FCPA Pilot Program. While much of the commentary on the revised policy has focused on the potential benefits of voluntary self-disclosure and cooperation after an issue arises, the policy also provides updated guidance to all companies on the hallmarks of an effective compliance and ethics program – an important and practical takeaway for compliance officers, in-house counsel, boards and executives.

DOJ’s Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Formalizes the 2016 FCPA Pilot Program

The Pilot Program set out to evaluate if the Department could motivate companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct, fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, remediate flaws in controls and compliance programs. One of the key components of the Pilot Program was the potential for substantial mitigation—including declination of prosecution in certain cases and, where warranted, a credit of up to a 50 percent reduction below the low end of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ fine range for companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct and cooperate and remediate to the Department’s satisfaction. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein expressed his satisfaction with the program’s results, which he heralded as a step forward in fighting corporate crime. He also noted that during the pilot period, the DOJ saw 30 voluntary disclosures to the FCPA Unit—compared to 18 during the previous 18‑month period.

In announcing the new formalized Policy, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein emphasized that the Department will continue to strongly encourage voluntary disclosures and set forth what he considers to be the revised Policy’s three key features: READ MORE

The SEC Enforcement Division 2017 Annual Report: Continued Focus on Individual Wrongdoers and Enhanced Protections for the “Main Street” Investor

Almost a year into the new administration, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement released its annual report last week, providing a recap of the SEC’s enforcement results over the past 12 months, as well as some insight into its direction for the coming year. Overall, the report suggests that the SEC will increase its focus on addressing harm to “Main Street” investors and that pursuing individuals will continue to be the rule, not the exception.

During fiscal year 2017, the SEC pursued 754 enforcement actions, 446 of which were “stand-alone” actions (as opposed to “follow-on” actions which seek to bar executives from practicing before the Commission or to deregister public companies). This represents a drop from the prior year in which the SEC pursued 784 enforcement actions, 464 of which were stand-alone actions. The bulk of the Division’s 446 stand-alone actions in FY 2017 focused on issuer advisory issues, issuer reporting, auditing and accounting, securities offerings, and insider trading—all areas that saw a relatively similar number of cases in FY 2016. Actions involving public finance abuse represented the only significant decrease in the number of cases versus the prior year. In FY 2016, the SEC brought nearly 100 public finance abuse actions compared to fewer than 20 in FY 2017. READ MORE

Sudan Now Open for Business, but Risks Remain

On October 12, 2017, the United States made permanent its lifting of a longtime general embargo on trade and investment with Sudan. As a result, U.S. individuals and companies are now generally free to engage in transactions involving Sudan, the Government of Sudan or many formerly sanctioned Sudanese persons without a license from the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). While this presents opportunities for new business in Sudan, any U.S. person considering business relating to Sudan should be aware of the legal restrictions that remain in place and the risks associated with such an undertaking.

Background

For almost two decades, Executive Orders (EOs) by Presidents Bill Clinton (EO 13067) and George W. Bush (EO 13412), along with the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR), have generally prevented U.S. persons from conducting transactions involving the Government of Sudan or certain sanctioned Sudanese persons, importing goods or services of Sudanese origin, exporting any goods or services to Sudan, or performing any contract “in support of an industrial, commercial, public utility, or governmental project in Sudan,” among other things. This trade and investment embargo was prompted by findings that the Government of Sudan was engaged in support for international terrorism, efforts to destabilize its neighboring countries, and myriad human rights violations.

On January 13, 2017, President Obama issued EO 13761, which observed that the dangerous and unstable situation in Sudan that had prompted sanctions by his predecessors “has been altered by Sudan’s positive actions over the past 6 months.” In particular, the order praised Sudan for “a marked reduction in offensive military activity, culminating in a pledge to maintain a cessation of hostilities in conflict areas in Sudan, and steps toward the improvement of humanitarian access throughout Sudan, as well as cooperation with the United States on addressing regional conflicts and the threat of terrorism.” The order, which was one of President Obama’s final acts in office, called for a conditional return of U.S. trade and investment transactions with Sudan with permanent revocation of sanctions after a six-month monitoring period and approval by certain U.S. agencies. Consistent with this order, OFAC issued a temporary general license on January 17, 2017, authorizing transactions that were previously prohibited by the aforementioned sanctions. As it turns out, the January 17 general license marked the end of the main set of sanctions against Sudan. READ MORE

Breaking Down Telia: One of the Largest FCPA Settlements and One of the First of the Trump Administration

The recent settlement by Telia Company AB (“Telia”), one of the first of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the Trump administration and one of the largest FCPA enforcement actions to date, has been touted by some as a sign that enforcement will remain tough. In this area of the law with scant case law or other guidance for companies looking to evaluate their own conduct and compliance programs, do these charting and resolution documents offer anything new? Telia obtained the maximum downward departure from the US Sentencing Guidelines and avoided the imposition of an independent monitor – what can be gleaned from the facts of the resolution as to how?

THE ALLEGATIONS

On September 21, 2017, Telia, a Swedish telecommunications company, entered into a $965 million joint settlement with U.S., Dutch, and Swedish authorities. The settlement revolved around allegations that Telia bribed a foreign official (widely reported to be Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbekistan’s former president Islam Karimov), to assist Telia and its Uzbeki subsidiary, Coscom LLC (“Coscom”) in expanding the company’s share of the Uzbeki telecommunications market. According to the settlement documents (Links to the settlements: DOJ and SEC), from 2006 to 2007, Telia made approximately $331 million in corrupt payments to secure approvals from the Uzbek Agency for Communications and Information and business in the Uzbek telecommunications sector, generating more than $2.5 billion in revenues and approximately $457 million in profit. READ MORE