The Department’s revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy—which will be incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual—builds on and makes permanent the Department’s 2016 FCPA Pilot Program. While much of the commentary on the revised policy has focused on the potential benefits of voluntary self-disclosure and cooperation after an issue arises, the policy also provides updated guidance to all companies on the hallmarks of an effective compliance and ethics program – an important and practical takeaway for compliance officers, in-house counsel, boards and executives.
DOJ’s Revised FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Formalizes the 2016 FCPA Pilot Program
The Pilot Program set out to evaluate if the Department could motivate companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct, fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, remediate flaws in controls and compliance programs. One of the key components of the Pilot Program was the potential for substantial mitigation—including declination of prosecution in certain cases and, where warranted, a credit of up to a 50 percent reduction below the low end of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ fine range for companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct and cooperate and remediate to the Department’s satisfaction. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein expressed his satisfaction with the program’s results, which he heralded as a step forward in fighting corporate crime. He also noted that during the pilot period, the DOJ saw 30 voluntary disclosures to the FCPA Unit—compared to 18 during the previous 18‑month period.
In announcing the new formalized Policy, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein emphasized that the Department will continue to strongly encourage voluntary disclosures and set forth what he considers to be the revised Policy’s three key features: READ MORE
Almost a year into the new administration, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement released its annual report last week, providing a recap of the SEC’s enforcement results over the past 12 months, as well as some insight into its direction for the coming year. Overall, the report suggests that the SEC will increase its focus on addressing harm to “Main Street” investors and that pursuing individuals will continue to be the rule, not the exception.
During fiscal year 2017, the SEC pursued 754 enforcement actions, 446 of which were “stand-alone” actions (as opposed to “follow-on” actions which seek to bar executives from practicing before the Commission or to deregister public companies). This represents a drop from the prior year in which the SEC pursued 784 enforcement actions, 464 of which were stand-alone actions. The bulk of the Division’s 446 stand-alone actions in FY 2017 focused on issuer advisory issues, issuer reporting, auditing and accounting, securities offerings, and insider trading—all areas that saw a relatively similar number of cases in FY 2016. Actions involving public finance abuse represented the only significant decrease in the number of cases versus the prior year. In FY 2016, the SEC brought nearly 100 public finance abuse actions compared to fewer than 20 in FY 2017. READ MORE
The recent settlement by Telia Company AB (“Telia”), one of the first of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the Trump administration and one of the largest FCPA enforcement actions to date, has been touted by some as a sign that enforcement will remain tough. In this area of the law with scant case law or other guidance for companies looking to evaluate their own conduct and compliance programs, do these charting and resolution documents offer anything new? Telia obtained the maximum downward departure from the US Sentencing Guidelines and avoided the imposition of an independent monitor – what can be gleaned from the facts of the resolution as to how?
On September 21, 2017, Telia, a Swedish telecommunications company, entered into a $965 million joint settlement with U.S., Dutch, and Swedish authorities. The settlement revolved around allegations that Telia bribed a foreign official (widely reported to be Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbekistan’s former president Islam Karimov), to assist Telia and its Uzbeki subsidiary, Coscom LLC (“Coscom”) in expanding the company’s share of the Uzbeki telecommunications market. According to the settlement documents (Links to the settlements: DOJ and SEC), from 2006 to 2007, Telia made approximately $331 million in corrupt payments to secure approvals from the Uzbek Agency for Communications and Information and business in the Uzbek telecommunications sector, generating more than $2.5 billion in revenues and approximately $457 million in profit. READ MORE
In recent years, the DOJ and SEC have significantly increased their Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement efforts, and in the process, have successfully advocated the theory that state-owned or state-controlled entities should qualify as instrumentalities of a foreign government under the FCPA. The FCPA defines a foreign official as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof.” In August 2014, the government’s broad definition of who constitutes a “foreign official” came into question for the first time when two individuals (Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court to challenge their convictions under the FCPA and argued for the high court to limit the FCPA’s definition of the term. However, on October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court declined to consider the potential landmark case effectively upholding the government’s broad view of the term “foreign official.” READ MORE
On April 9, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Hewlett-Packard had agreed to pay more than $108 million to settle Foreign Corrupt Practices Act actions brought by the SEC and the Department of Justice. These actions were based on HP’s subsidiaries’ alleged payments of more than $3.6 million to Russian, Polish, and Mexican government officials to obtain or maintain lucrative public contracts. The settlement is important because it highlights the SEC’s and DOJ’s continued focus on companies’ internal controls, particularly in the FCPA arena. It also shows that the SEC may be able to use lesser, non-fraud offenses in which the underlying conduct involves a fairly de minimis amount of money to police behavior and subject companies to significant financial consequences. READ MORE
Comments made by Kara N. Brockmeyer, the Securities Exchange Commission’s chief of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) unit, and Charles E. Duross, deputy chief of the Department of Justice’s FCPA unit, at the recent International Conference on the FCPA suggest that both agencies are increasing their scrutiny of possible FCPA violations for the next year. Both units have increased their resources for tackling investigations of possible FCPA violations. Additionally, both agencies have increased awareness among other U.S. and international government agencies so that those agencies could also be on the lookout for possible FCPA violations. Having strengthened their relationships with overseas regulators, both agencies are optimistic that they are in the position to bring significant FCPA cases in the following year.
According to Andrew Ceresney, co-director of the SEC’s enforcement division, the SEC also expects that FCPA violations will be “increasingly fertile ground” for the Dodd-Frank whistle-blower program. The SEC received 149 FCPA violation tips from whistle-blowers in just the last year and the SEC expects more enforcement cases to arise from whistle-blowers. READ MORE
In its seminal decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), regarding antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws, the Supreme Court held that “Section 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.” Id. at 2888. Although Morrison—which involved a private action by foreign plaintiffs—appeared to set down a bright-line rule, it spurred a number of questions, including whether its holding would apply beyond the private civil context, to SEC civil enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions as well. A large number of courts have already applied Morrison to SEC actions. In a recent significant development, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that Morrison also applies to criminal cases brought pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. United States v. Vilar, Case No. 10-521, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013). But the Dodd-Frank Act’s “extraterritorial jurisdiction” amendment to the Exchange Act for actions brought by the SEC and the DOJ—the immediate congressional response to Morrison—will presumably be invoked by the government for actions based on post-amendment conduct. READ MORE
In 2008, Rajat Gupta made a handful of short phone calls to his friend Raj Rajaratnam. The information that Gupta conveyed to Rajaratnam in those phone calls is now likely to cost Gupta millions of dollars, two years in prison, and the loss of his livelihood. These are the fateful consequences of the government’s use of wiretapping to uncover evidence of insider trading on Wall Street.
In June 2012, after a weeks-long trial and relying heavily on recorded conversations between Gupta and Rajaratnam, a jury convicted Gupta of three counts of federal securities fraud and one count of criminal conspiracy. The jury found that Gupta, a former director of Goldman Sachs, had provided Rajaratnam with material non-public information regarding Goldman’s then-unreported financial results and an imminent investment by Berkshire Hathaway at the height of the financial crisis. Though the court found that Gupta did not receive “one penny” in return for providing the information, he was convicted and ultimately sentenced by Judge Jed Rakoff to two years in prison and assessed a $5 million fine, a heavy penalty for his gratuitous generosity to his friend, Rajaratnam. To prove insider trading, the government is not required to prove that the “tippee” receive any direct financial benefit in recompense for transmitting material nonpublic information in violation of a duty of nondisclosure.
It is important to note that Gupta’s brief phone calls, which later became the key evidence used against Gupta in the criminal trial, were recorded by federal criminal prosecutors without Gupta’s knowledge or consent. (The SEC can seek to obtain wiretap evidence from criminal proceedings through civil discovery.) While the nation debates NSA snooping, this is a reminder that the Department of Justice could be listening to and recording your most sensitive domestic telephone conversations with court authorization. Gupta’s criminal prosecution was only possible because federal law enforcement officials had obtained warrants to record telephone communications of Gupta’s friend, Rajaratnam – telephone conversations that happened to include Gupta – based on evidence of possible insider trading. Gupta’s criminal conviction was then used to underpin his civil liability. The use of federal wire taps, previously the weapon of choice in organized crime prosecution, to generate the evidence needed to pursue both criminal and civil insider trading cases is a watershed moment in securities enforcement. READ MORE
Judge Carter issued his final order on July 16, 2013, following our blog post. The final order is substantively the same as the tentative order, and denies S&P’s motion to dismiss the case for the same reasons previously set forth. Judge Carter added a note rejecting Defendants’ argument at the hearing on July 8, 2013 that no reasonable investor or issuer bank could have relied on S&P’s claims of independence and objectivity, because this would beg the question of whether S&P truly believed that S&P’s rating service added zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness. Judge Carter’s finding that an issuer bank could be a victim that was misled by S&P’s fraudulent ratings of its own mortgage-backed security products is an interesting development, and one that may open new doors to mortgage-backed securities litigation under FIRREA.
We first blogged about the obscure Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) on May 14. As we explained, this statute provides a generous ten-year statute of limitations and a low burden of proof. Just as we predicted, the FIRREA story is beginning to heat up.
The most recent FIRREA litigation involves claims brought under this statute against ratings agency giant Standard & Poor’s. The DOJ sued S&P for $5 billion, accusing it of knowingly issuing ratings that didn’t accurately reflect mortgage-backed securities’ credit risk. S&P’s practices of issuing credit ratings to banks that paid for those services led to an inherent conflict of interest. To reassure banks and investors that its ratings were accurate, S&P issued a “Code of Conduct,” containing promises that it had established policies and procedures to address these conflicts of interest. The DOJ alleged that the “Code of Conduct” statements were false and material to investors.
On July 8, Judge David O. Carter of the Central District of California tentatively denied S&P’s motion to dismiss the case. In his tentative order, Judge Carter explained why S&P’s three arguments for dismissal were unpersuasive. First, he found that the allegedly fraudulent statements regarding the credibility of S&P’s ratings were not “mere puffery” because they were filled with “shalls” and “must nots” that went beyond mere aspirational language. READ MORE