Alexander Talarides, a senior associate in the San Francisco office, is a member of the Securities Litigation, Investigations and Enforcement Group.

Alex's practice focuses on disputes involving mergers and acquisitions, proxy contests, directors and officers liability, indemnification and advancement, and stockholder access to books and records; counseling directors, officers, special committees and stockholders on issues of corporation and alternative entity law; and disputes involving complex agreements such as merger agreements, asset purchase agreements, limited liability company and partnership agreements.

Alex has handled a broad array of securities, financial, accounting and other business disputes in federal and state courts throughout the country. He has also assisted boards of directors in connection with stockholder derivative actions and has assisted boards, officers and others in SEC investigations.

Alex has represented Chesapeake Energy, Nordstrom, PayPal, 23andMe, Deckers Outdoor, Oracle, Microsoft, LinkedIn, ASUS, NVIDIA, SemiLEDs, Electronic Arts, Emerson Electric, Barclays, Charles Schwab, UBS, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Viasystems Group, ZipRealty, Synopsys, SureWest Communications, Recurrent Energy, Pre-Paid Legal Services, Merix, Par Pharmaceutical Companies, among others.

Alex's experience includes the following.

  • In re Rocket Fuel, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2015 WL 9311921 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Obtained dismissal on behalf of underwriters of class action claims asserted against them under the Securities Act based on Rocket Fuel's IPO and secondary offering.
  • Burbrink v. Campbell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128699 (W.D. Wash. 2015).  Obtained dismissal of stockholder derivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Nordstrom's board of directors.
  • In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 11263-VCG (Del. Ch. 2015).  Defeated stockholders' attempt to enjoin PayPal's acquisition of Xoom. 
  • Kelly v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 2015 WL 1967233 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against the company and its top officers.
  • Jones v. Martinez, 230 Cal. App. 4th 1248 (2014). Obtained dismissal of stockholder derivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Deckers Outdoors' top officers and board of directors. The dismissal was affirmed in a precedent-setting opinion by the California Court of Appeal.   
  • In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation, 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against the company and its top officers. The dismissal was affirmed in a precedent-setting opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
  • United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 774 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2014). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Act against the company, its top officers, and board of directors. The dismissal was affirmed in a precedent-setting opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
  • Weinstein v. McClendon, 757 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2014). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against Chesapeake Energy and its top officers. The dismissal was affirmed in a precedent-setting opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
  • The Raymond L Permenter Revocable Trust v. Dunham, No. CJ-2014-2064 (Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2014). Obtained dismissal of stockholder dervivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Chesapeake Energy's board of directors.
  • In re 23andMe, Inc., Consumer Products Litigation, 2014 WL 2903752 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Successfully compelled class action claims alleging violations of various consumer protection statutes into arbitration, which led to dismissal of the claims.
  • In re SemiLEDs Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 13-4776 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against the company and its top officers.
  • Egleston v. McClendon, 318 P.3d 210 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013). Obtained dismissal of stockholder derivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Chesapeake Energy's board of directors. The dismissal was affirmed in a precedent-setting opinion by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
  • Norris v. McClendon, No. 111,137 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014). Obtained dismissal of stockholder derivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Chesapeake Energy's board of directors. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal.  
  • In re Chesapeake Energy Corp. 2012 ERISA Class Litigation, 2013 WL 5596908 (W.D. Okla. 2013). Obtained dismissal of class action asserting claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against the company, its top officers and board of directors.
  • Percoco v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 2013 WL 3584370 (D. Del. 2013). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against the company and its top officers.
  • Cheseldine v. McClendon, No. 111,890 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013). Obtained dismissal of stockholder derivative action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Chesapeake Energy's board of directors. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
  • Bracht v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., No. 12-4768 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Obtained dismissal of securities class action asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act against the company and its top officers.
  • Town of Davie Police Officers Retirement System v. RightNow Technologies, Inc., No. 11-1032 (Gallatin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). Obtained dismissal of stockholder class action challenging Oracle's acquisition of RightNow Technologies.
  • Deborah G. Mallow IRA SEP Investment Plan v. McClendon, 2012 WL 2036748 (W.D. Okla. 2012). Defeated stockholders' attempt to enjoin Chesapeake Energy's annual stockholder meeting.
  • Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., 2012 WL 2847575 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Obtained dismissal of class action asserting claims against the company for breach of implied warranties and violations of California's consumer protection laws.
  • Asbestos Workers Philadelphia Pension Fund v. McCormick, No. 0910-14399 (Multnomah Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2010). Defeated stockholders' attempt to enjoin Viasystem Group's acquisition of Merix.

Posts by: Alex Talarides

Too Good to Be True: Fraudulent Self-Promotion Lands “Prodigy” in Hot Water with SEC

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In June 2014, the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy at the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an alert cautioning that investment newsletters are often “used to carry out schemes designed to deceive investors.” In particular, the SEC advised investors to be “highly suspicious” of newsletter “promises” of “high investment returns” and to contact the SEC to report potential securities fraud in newsletters and other promotional materials.

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The SEC Audit Trail – Several Industry Groups See Problems as Currently Proposed

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Last week, several securities industry groups filed critical responses to the SEC’s plan for an audit trail.  While most groups that commented on the SEC’s proposed regulation supported implementing the proposal, several had concerns regarding the cost for investors and firms, and the protection of private data.

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In a Case of First Impression, Delaware Chancery Court Holds It’s “Out with the Old (Board) and In With the New” When Considering Demand Futility

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On May 31, 2016, the Delaware Chancery Court rejected shareholders’ allegations of corporate wrongdoing in a derivative suit against a national healthcare company, Bioscrip, holding that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege demand futility with respect to Bioscrip’s board of directors. For the first time, the Delaware Court found that Plaintiff was required to demonstrate demand futility with respect to the board of directors that was in place after shareholders filed their derivative complaint. Park Emps.’ & Ret. Bd. Emps.’ Annuity & Ben. Fund v. Smith, No. 11000-VCG (Ch. May 31, 2016).

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The Ripple Effects of U.S. v. Newman Continue: SEC Lifts Administrative Bar on Downstream Insider Trading Tippee and Tipper Requests that Third Circuit Vacate SEC Settlement

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The ripple effects of the Second Circuit’s landmark insider trading decision, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), were felt again last week.  On Tuesday, February 23, 2016, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) ruled that Former Neuberger Berman Analyst Sandeep “Sandy” Goyal, whom the SEC previously barred from the securities industry after he pled guilty to insider trading, could participate in the industry again. The SEC’s rare decision to lift an administrative bar order resulted from Newman, (previously discussed at length here), which led to Goyal’s criminal conviction being vacated and the civil claims against him being dropped by the SEC.  Newman raised the bar for what prosecutors in tipper/tippee insider trading cases have to show by holding that tipper/tippee liability requires the tipper to receive a “personal benefit” amounting to a quid pro quo or pecuniary benefit in exchange for the tip and the tippee to know of that benefit.  Despite the SEC’s decision to drop the administrative bar against Goyal in light of Newman, as recently as SEC Speaks on February 19-20, 2016, SEC Deputy of Enforcement Stephanie Avakian affirmed that insider trading cases “continue[] to be a priority” for the Commission.   Nonetheless, the ripple effects of Newman continue to call the government’s ability to successfully bring both criminal and civil cases into question.

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But Everybody’s Doing It: Delaware Chancery Court Invalidates VAALCO’s “Wacky” Charter and Bylaws Provisions Despite Use by Other Companies

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Ruling from the bench on dueling motions for summary judgment just days before a special meeting of shareholders was to be held, on December 21, 2015, Delaware Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster invalidated certain provisions in VAALCO Energy, Inc.’s (“VAALCO”) certificate of incorporation and bylaws (the “Charter and Bylaws Provisions”).  The litigation and ruling stem from investor attempts to remove a majority of VAALCO’s Board.  VAALCO argued that the Charter and Bylaws Provisions prevented investors from removing board members without cause.  Vice Chancellor Laster disagreed, holding that these provisions, in purporting to restrict stockholders’ ability to remove directors without cause in the absence of a classified board or cumulative voting provision, violated Delaware corporate law.  The ruling is a cautionary note for a small percentage of Delaware corporations that apparently still have similar provisions on their books.

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The Boss Makes HOW much more than me? SEC Issues Final Pay Ratio Rule

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On August 5, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved its final rule subjecting most public companies to the so-called “Pay Ratio Disclosure” mandated by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  The SEC voted 3-2 to approve the measure, with the panel’s two Republican members opposing it.  In the split vote, the SEC finally put into place one of the most controversial rules mandated by Dodd-Frank.  In the years since the SEC began working on the rule, it has attracted an intense measure of both public scrutiny and advocacy, drawing more than 286,000 public comments.

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Wannabe Derivative Plaintiffs of Delaware Corporations Cannot Skirt Delaware Law By Filing Suit in California

Decorative Scales of Justice in the Courtroom

It is well-established that a shareholder-plaintiff may not assert derivative claims against a corporation’s officers or directors unless he or she makes a pre-suit demand on the corporation’s board of directors and alleges particularized facts showing that the demand was wrongfully refused, or alleges particularized facts showing that a demand on the board would have been futile.  One question that frequently arises is whether the shareholder-plaintiff may obtain discovery from the corporation and its officers and directors in order to assist his or her compliance with this threshold pleading obligation.

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Oklahoma Takes a Stand a Stand in the Battle Over Derivative Fee-Shifting

Back in May we discussed ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund a seminal Delaware Supreme Court case that upheld a non-stock corporation’s “loser pays” fee-shifting bylaw.  ATP Tour held that where a Delaware corporation adopts a fee-shifting bylaw, it can recover its fees and costs from any shareholder that brings a derivative lawsuit and loses.  Many commentators have suggested the case would effectively kill derivative actions in Delaware and indeed, since the time of that decision, the Delaware Corporation Law Council has proposed amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that would limit its applicability to only non-stock corporations.

Last week the Oklahoma State Legislature went a step further than ATP Tour and amended the Oklahoma General Corporation Act to specifically require fee-shifting for all derivative lawsuits brought in the state, whether against an Oklahoma corporation or not.  Unlike the fee provision in ATP Tour, however, the law also affords derivative plaintiffs the right to recover their fees and costs should they win final judgment.

The difference is likely substantial.  For while the law will potentially chill unmeritorious derivative actions, also known as “strike suits,” it could also provide an incentive for derivative plaintiffs with strong claims.  Where shareholders use the “tools at hand”—including books and records inspection requests—to carefully vet their claims before filing, the promise of a fee recovery could encourage shareholder plaintiffs to bring claims they otherwise might not.

Consider:  in the typical derivative lawsuit, the shareholder plaintiff stands to gain nothing tangible if he or she wins.  Because he or she is suing on behalf of the corporation, any recovery will inure to the corporation itself.   Thus, under the old regime, even if a derivative lawsuit was successful, the plaintiff would receive, at most, any resulting increase in the value of his or her company stock.  Under the new statute, that same plaintiff could stand to receive the not-insubstantial costs of his or her efforts.

Does Being an ‘Expert’ Make You an Expert?

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Earlier this month, Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York issued his opinion certifying a class of buyers of the common stock of a company created by a Chinese reverse merger.  McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113446 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014).  In doing so, he rejected defendants’ Daubert motion challenging the qualifications and methodology of plaintiffs’ expert witness on market efficiency, Cynthia Jones, and concluded that the market was efficient enough to support the Basic presumption of reliance and to permit class certification.  READ MORE

Delaware Supreme Court Tells Controlling Shareholders “If You Look Out For Your Minority, We’ll Look Out For You”

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On March 14, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously affirmed an important Delaware Court of Chancery decision issued in 2013 that offered a roadmap to companies and their directors on how to obtain the protections of the deferential business judgment rule when entering into a change-in-control transaction with a controlling stockholder.  As we discussed previously, in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, then-Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine held as a matter of first impression that the deferential business judgment rule – as opposed to the more onerous “entire fairness” – standard of review should apply to a merger with a controlling stockholder where (i) the controller conditions the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee acts with care; (v) the minority vote is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
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