After four failed attempts at persuading federal appellate courts to hear constitutional challenges to SEC administrative courts, it is increasingly clear that defendants in SEC in-house proceedings will not be able to pursue an early out because of the manner in which SEC administrative judges are appointed. The latest loss came on June 17, when the Eleventh Circuit in consolidated cases Gray Financial Group Inc. et al. v. SEC, No. 15-13738 (11th Cir. Jun. 17, 2016), and Charles L. Hill v. SEC, No. 15-12831 (11th Cir. Jun. 17, 2016), agreed with the Second Circuit’s decision of three weeks ago in Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-2103 (2d. Cir. Jun. 1, 2016) (which we covered here) in ruling that respondents in an SEC administrative enforcement cannot bypass the Exchange Act’s review scheme by filing a collateral lawsuit in federal district court challenging the administrative proceeding on constitutional grounds. A different decision from the Eleventh Circuit would have created a circuit split and a heightened possibility of Supreme Court review, but instead it joined the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits in an approach that is unanimous among the circuit courts to have considered the question. The constitutional legitimacy of SEC administrative law judges is thus likely to continue unchallenged, at least for now.
Posts by: Katherine Maco
On June 1, the Second Circuit in Tilton et al. v. SEC, No. 15-2103 (2d. Cir. Jun. 1, 2016), echoed recent Seventh and D.C. Circuit decisions (respectively, Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-1511 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (Mar. 28, 2016), and Jarkesy v. SEC, No. 14-5196 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2015)) in finding that constitutional or other challenges to SEC proceedings cannot go forward in court until the administrative proceeding ends; review can only be sought as an appeal from a final decision by the Commission. The Second Circuit’s decision in Tilton creates unanimity among the circuit courts that have addressed the issue to date, although, as we previously reported, the Eleventh Circuit is likely to rule on the issue sometime this year in Hill v. SEC, No. 15-12831. Unless the Eleventh Circuit bucks this trend and creates a circuit split, it now looks unlikely that the Supreme Court will weigh in on this issue (particularly because the Supreme Court previously denied a petition to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bebo).
Shortly into his tenure as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara announced a crackdown on insider trading, indicating that it would be his office’s “top criminal priority” and that investigations would utilize novel and “covert methods” to achieve convictions, including using wiretaps and informants. According to Bharara, “every legitimate tool should be at our disposal.” Over the next several years, federal prosecutors in Manhattan initiated nearly 100 insider trading cases against some of Wall Street’s leading names, and secured more than 80 convictions, many through guilty pleas. For his work, Time magazine featured Bharara on its February 13, 2012 cover under the headline: “This Man is Busting Wall Street.”
Last Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied cert in the highly publicized insider trading case of United States. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). Without providing further commentary, the justices said they would not consider the Government’s challenge to the Second Circuit’s decision overturning the insider trading convictions of two hedge fund portfolio managers. The Supreme Court’s denial means that the Second Circuit’s decision limiting the scope of insider trading liability remains good law. It also signals the end of the Justice Department’s efforts to overturn a decision that the Government called a “roadmap for unscrupulous traders.”
On July 16, 2014, a three-judge Second Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of a securities class action against Deutsche Bank AG and several underwriters. The case was brought on behalf of investors who purchased approximately $5.5 billion in preferred Deutsche Bank shares in 2007, and who alleged that defendants misled them about the bank’s exposure to mortgage-backed securities and other risks in a registration statement filed in October of 2006. Plaintiffs alleged that the registration statement omitted details about Deutsche Bank’s business, including that the company failed to properly record provisions for RMBS, commercial real estate loans and exposure to monoline insurers.
Judge Carter issued his final order on July 16, 2013, following our blog post. The final order is substantively the same as the tentative order, and denies S&P’s motion to dismiss the case for the same reasons previously set forth. Judge Carter added a note rejecting Defendants’ argument at the hearing on July 8, 2013 that no reasonable investor or issuer bank could have relied on S&P’s claims of independence and objectivity, because this would beg the question of whether S&P truly believed that S&P’s rating service added zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness. Judge Carter’s finding that an issuer bank could be a victim that was misled by S&P’s fraudulent ratings of its own mortgage-backed security products is an interesting development, and one that may open new doors to mortgage-backed securities litigation under FIRREA.
We first blogged about the obscure Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) on May 14. As we explained, this statute provides a generous ten-year statute of limitations and a low burden of proof. Just as we predicted, the FIRREA story is beginning to heat up.
The most recent FIRREA litigation involves claims brought under this statute against ratings agency giant Standard & Poor’s. The DOJ sued S&P for $5 billion, accusing it of knowingly issuing ratings that didn’t accurately reflect mortgage-backed securities’ credit risk. S&P’s practices of issuing credit ratings to banks that paid for those services led to an inherent conflict of interest. To reassure banks and investors that its ratings were accurate, S&P issued a “Code of Conduct,” containing promises that it had established policies and procedures to address these conflicts of interest. The DOJ alleged that the “Code of Conduct” statements were false and material to investors.
On July 8, Judge David O. Carter of the Central District of California tentatively denied S&P’s motion to dismiss the case. In his tentative order, Judge Carter explained why S&P’s three arguments for dismissal were unpersuasive. First, he found that the allegedly fraudulent statements regarding the credibility of S&P’s ratings were not “mere puffery” because they were filled with “shalls” and “must nots” that went beyond mere aspirational language. READ MORE
In what Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York called an “extraordinary case,” French multimedia company Vivendi, S.A. has scored an unusual victory based on a successful rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which the Supreme Court established 15 years ago in the seminal decisions of Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1998). Though the stakes were relatively small—the Vivendi investor alleged only $3.5 million in damages—the decision is significant. It is one of the few in which a defendant successfully rebutted the almost impenetrable fraud-on-the-market presumption.
The court’s opinion in Gamco Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A. came after a two day bench trial on the limited issue of whether Vivendi could rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Vivendi was collaterally estopped from challenging any elements of the plaintiff’s 10b-5 claims, other than reliance, following an earlier class action jury verdict concerning similar claims regarding Vivendi’s liquidity status. READ MORE